Daoist Encounters with Phenomenology
Thinking Interculturally about Human Existence

Edited by David Chai
Zhuangzi and Nietzsche on Transperspectival Experience

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The world is overfull of beautiful things, but nevertheless poor, very poor, in beautiful moments and unveilings of these things.

NIETZSCHE

Zhuangzi and Nietzsche. The names have similar cadences and rhyme on the last syllable. But what is the point of the and? In a context like this, it sounds like a compare-and-contrast exercise. But again—so what? Well, with Nietzsche and Zhuangzi the consonances are remarkable, between what they say and how they say it. These have been remarked on before, in the first comparison (as far as I know) of these two thinkers’ ideas: an article called “The Wandering Dance: Zhuangzi and Zarathustra,” published in Philosophy East & West in 1983. But before considering this essay, whose point is “to enhance our understanding of both philosophies,” let’s first ask the question, which the essay fails to ask, whether Nietzsche was familiar with Zhuangzi’s ideas. Then, after comparing Zhuangzi’s and Nietzsche’s views on what’s going on at the deepest philosophical level, we’ll inquire into how a comparison might highlight aspects of their thought that have generally gone unnoticed—especially on the question of whether and how perspectives beyond the human might be attainable. Finally, I’ll point to a correspondence between the physical practices underlying their philosophical ideas.
The occasional comments Nietzsche makes about China suggest that he didn’t know much more about Chinese culture than one would expect from a well-educated German of his time. He mentions Chinese philosophers only twice, both times at the end of his career. In a letter to a good friend he wonders whether The Laws of Manu, an ancient Hindu text that he has just read with enthusiasm, might have influenced “Confucius und Laotse [Laozi]”—unlikely, since scholars now date the text to not much earlier than the second century BCE, a few centuries after the golden age of classical Chinese philosophy. And in a discussion of Christ the Redeemer in The Antichristian, he claims that the allusive language of the Holy Bible corresponds to the language of the Sankhya School of philosophy in India and Laozi in China.³

This claim suggests that the basis for the mentions of Laozi may have been the German translation of the text by Victor von Strauss, published in 1870. Strauss compares the “saying” connotation of the Chinese term dao 道 with the Biblical “In the beginning was the Word”; and although he leaves the term untranslated, he writes in his Preface that the only being to whom you could ascribe everything that Laozi ascribes to dao is: “God, and only God!” According to Strauss, Laozi was possessed of “a surprisingly grand and profound awareness of God, a sublime and very definite concept of God that is consistently congruent with the revealed concept of God.” This wholesale projection of Christian ideas onto the ancient Chinese text results in misleading mistranslations that give the text a religious and moralistic flavor that’s quite foreign to the original. This would surely have discouraged Nietzsche from taking the book, if he read it, as serious philosophy.⁴

1. The Wandering Dance

“The Wandering Dance” begins by acknowledging “the disparate historical circumstances” of the Zhuangzi 莊子 and Zarathustra, and then draws numerous parallels—between the literary styles, dramatic episodes, conversations and dialogues, irony, humor, parody, and above all their imagery. The significance of these parallels (which the essay doesn’t mention) is that Zhuangzi and Nietzsche are thinkers who highlight the limitations of language with respect to a world of radical becoming, and employ language in new and poetic ways to help transform our experience.

In both cases it’s images rather than concepts that articulate the thought, with images of natural phenomena predominating—sky, earth, fire, water, plants, animals, moon, sun, and stars. The imagery reflects a common antipathy to anthropocentrism: both authors believe that we become fully human (or “Overhuman” in Nietzsche’s case) by getting over the ludicrous prejudice that we are the center of the universe.

On an abstract plane, the anti-anthropocentrism is connected with their perspectivisms, which are remarkably similar and raise the question of how
to go beyond human perspectives—or whether that’s even possible. They are both thinkers of flux and transformation, philosophers of becoming rather than Being. And on the question of what, ultimately, is going on, they offer comparable suggestions. “The Wandering Dance” deals with this question, claiming early on that “Nietzsche’s later understanding of will to power as an interpretive energy inherent in all things comes close to the panpsychism that informs the Zhuangzi.”

This is the basic philosophical question: when the Zhuangzi says “Just open yourself to the one energy that is the world,” and Nietzsche says “This world is the will to power—and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power—and nothing besides!” are they saying more or less the same thing?

“The Wandering Dance” is surely heading in the right direction, but the formulations are sometimes imprecise. Rather than “an interpretive energy inherent in all things” the energy is all things: that’s what they are. And “panpsychism” isn’t quite the right term for Zhuangzi’s view that everything is qi energy. The Daoists’ “one energy that is the world” isn’t just a matter of “life energy,” since qi exceeds the animate and animal realms to become rivers and rocks—what we regard as “inanimate” matter—as well. The closest equivalent to qi in Western philosophy before Nietzsche is probably the notion of aer proposed by Anaximines, but “panaerism” doesn’t sound quite right for the idea of the world as a field of energies. “Panenergism” perhaps?

The wandering dancer develops the idea further: “Just as for Nietzsche every being manifests will to power—primarily through interpreting and construing the world in terms of values—so, too, for Zhuangzi every being has its own perspective, determined by the conditions particular to it.”

Better to say that every being is will to power, because “manifests” suggests that they could be separate from it. Otherwise this is fine, though the author doesn’t provide much textual justification for the claim that Nietzsche understands will to power as “interpreting” and “interpretive energy.” There is only—but significantly—a citation of the first mention of will to power in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in “On the Thousand Goals and One.” Zarathustra speaks thus:

A tablet of things held to be good hangs over every people. Behold, it is the tablet of its overcomings; behold, it is the voice of its will to power.

The values that inform our world, the points on which a people overcomes itself, are collective interpretations, different in different cultures, of what is good, or praiseworthy, holy, or evil.

But this only gives us “will to power as interpretation” in the human realm, which needs to be extended to the non-human as well—and that’s where “The Wandering Dance” takes us.
Just as for Nietzsche everything in existence is a manifestation of the will to power, so in the Zhuangzi there is a correspondence between the universal dao and the idea of de 德, or power, which is the manifestation of the dao in particular existents.\(^\text{10}\)

If we drop the “manifestations” again, and “the universal” before dao, we’ll be on track: dao refers to the whole process, together with the way, or patterning, of its unfolding—and so not to something that could exist independently of its manifestations. We could say, then, that corresponding to dao as total patterning of particular des would be the world as will to power as a field for particular things as configurations of will to power.

2. The Field of Dao-De

A colleague of the wandering dancer at the University of Hawaii, Roger Ames, developed this theme in an essay from 1991 with the title “Nietzsche’s ‘Will to Power’ and Chinese ‘Virtuality’ (De): A Comparative Study.” For the thinkers behind the classical Daoist texts, according to Ames, “Existence is a ceaseless and continuous process or field of change (dao) made determinate in the interdependent particulars (de) that constitute it.” And for each of these particulars, “the range of its particularity is variable, contingent upon the way in which it is interpreted both by itself and by other environing particulars.” This means that de is continuous with dao: “a variable field or focus of potency in the process of existence. As viewed from the perspective of any particular, this dynamic process in toto is called dao, but when discussed as individuated existents, these particulars are de.”\(^\text{11}\) These fine formulations, which remain central to Ames’s reading of Daoism, open up a helpful way of understanding the philosophy of qi as the field of dao and de.

Turning to Nietzsche, Ames suggests that “perhaps the most felicitous way of describing the ‘part–whole’ relationship in will to power is to invoke the language of ‘field and focus’ we used for describing dao-de.” Most felicitous indeed. Insofar as Nietzsche understood existence “as a force-field: dynamic quanta of interconnected relationships” (Ames again), the particulars as de would be configurations of will to power such as rocks, trees, animals, human beings and so forth. Whereas the essay focuses on these particulars as de, it’s just as significant that the whole field of dao would be equivalent to “the world as will to power” for Nietzsche.\(^\text{12}\) For example, one of our wisest Nietzsche scholars, in discussing Nietzsche’s rejection of materialistic atomism in favor of a view of “the world as will to power,” supposes that “it can be shown with some probability that to be is to be energy in an always shifting energy field.”\(^\text{13}\)

What is more, in a passage that Ames doesn’t cite, Nietzsche entertains a view of existence as “interpretation” similar to what Ames ascribes to the Daoists (any particular is “interpreted both by itself and by other environing
particulars”). In an aphorism in *The Joyous Science* titled “Our New ‘Infinite,’” Nietzsche asks “whether all existence isn’t essentially interpreting existence.” If we open ourselves up to perspectives beyond the human, he writes, we find that “the world has become ‘infinite’ for us again, insofar as we cannot reject the possibility that it contains infinite interpretations.” Since this means not only multiple interpretations from each human being, but also from all other beings, we’re in a world that’s a lot more like Zhuangzi’s than Ames appears to acknowledge.

Ames goes on to invoke the stark contrast in tone and language between the Daoists and Nietzsche: with the former we have a sense of mutuality, coherence, coordination, harmony, integration; and from Nietzsche’s side we get overcoming, mastery, contest, conquest, domination. Yes, this contrast is valid to some extent—and derives from the differing contexts. The Daoists (Laozi especially) advocate, in view of the horrors of the Warring States period (475–221 BCE), maintaining a low profile and withdrawing rather than confronting or contending; while Nietzsche, faced with two millennia of Platonism and Christianity, engages the war of ideas in a more aggressive mode.

Ames cites the infamous characterization of “life as will to power” from *Beyond Good and Evil*: “Life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering what is alien and weaker, suppression, hardness, imposition of one’s own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation.” Critics of Nietzsche who cite this statement as evidence of the man’s moral turpitude miss the point by taking it as prescriptive rather than descriptive. And on this point, I have to part company with my friend Roger Ames. Yes, Nietzsche characterizes life as appropriation, injury, and so forth, but this doesn’t mean that he’s advocating a human life—especially a philosophical one—dedicated to murdering, raping, and pillaging. The question is this: given that life is essentially appropriation—how, as human beings, do we deal with that? How are we to live *our* lives?

Ames concludes his essay with what he sees as the main contrast between the Nietzschean and Daoist ideals:

The attitude of the Nietzschean Übermensch who engages his world by asserting his will to power against both his environments and himself might be regarded by the person of virtuality as one who squanders his considerable energies by failing to respect the complementarity and synchronicity of things.

In the philosophical “compare-and-contrast” exercise, the more interesting is often the “contrast” phase—but in this case it’s coming too soon: the parallels extend further. The comparative approach prompts us to look for correspondences that may not immediately be apparent: domination in Daoism, for example, and harmonious integration in Nietzsche. Leaving the former topic aside for now, let’s see whether we might find in Nietzsche a Daoist sense for “the complementarity and synchronicity of things”—not
only in his texts but also in (what we know of) his experience as a plausible basis for the ideas found in his works.

A reason to suppose that there is such a sense there comes from a well-known note from 1885 that prefigures Nietzsche’s paramount presentation of the teaching of will to power in Beyond Good and Evil 36. “This world,” he writes, is

an ocean of energies . . . flowing out from the simplest forms into the most manifold, from the stillest, most rigid, and coldest into the most incandescent, wildest, and most self-contradictory, and then again returning home from abundance to the simple, from the play of contradictions to the pleasure of harmony.17

3. A Net of Light

When Nietzsche discovered the Upper Engadine (in the south east of Switzerland) in 1879, “at the end of [his] thirty-fifth year,” he felt himself “surrounded by death”—his father had died at 35 of a brain tumor, and Nietzsche's susceptibility to migraines made him think that he might suffer a similar fate. But at the same time, he felt himself profoundly related to the landscape: “The nature here,” he wrote, “is related to my own.” This resonates not only with the Daoists’ ideal of a natural spontaneity in the human being which is attuned to the powers of Heaven and Earth, but also with the Stoics’ project of living “according to our human nature as well as the nature of the universe.” Marcus Aurelius liked to remind himself that “our own natures are parts of the nature of the whole,” and so the task is to integrate them harmoniously.18

Nietzsche likes to remind those who are proud of the human spirit that their pride rests on the mere prejudice of human superiority to all other beings. For most of human history, he remarks, spirit (Geist) pervaded the human and natural realms equally. “There was thus no shame attached to being descended from animals or trees . . . and one saw spirit as that which connected us to the natural world rather than what separated us from it.” Such a view is still possible in the modern age, as long as we’re open to the idea, and experience, of what Nietzsche calls “Nature as Doppelgänger”: the idea that “in many a part of nature we discover ourselves again, with enjoyable horror.” And in the part called the Engadine, he is fortunate to be able to say: “This part of nature is intimate and familiar to me, related by blood, and even more.”19

We’re not going to get that sense of intimacy and quality of experience as long as we remain in what Nietzsche regards as the natural attitude—in which we simplify and thereby falsify our experience in order to get by, getting from the natural world what we need, and taking care of human business. We need to shift out of our “life” perspective to a “death” view of the world: uncouple for a while the drive for self-preservation so that we can
just look, or contemplate, without wanting or aiming at anything. In an aphorism of *The Wanderer and His Shadow* that was composed amidst the magnificent landscape of the Engadine, Nietzsche writes of himself in the third person, graced by a vision of the great god Pan asleep “At Midday”:

> Upon a meadow hidden among the woods he sees the great God Pan asleep; all the things of nature have fallen asleep with him, an expression of eternity on their faces—so it seems to him. He wants nothing, he frets about nothing, his heart stands still, only his eyes are alive—it is a death with open eyes. Now the man sees much that he has never seen before, and for as far as he can see everything is spun into a net of light, and as it were buried in it.20

The world as a net of light, *ein Lichtnetz*: things of nature buried in the light, the Earth illumined, everything dissolved into a network of interactions—a field of *dao* and *de*.

Letting the heart stand still and not wanting anything is a way of getting beyond the all-too-human perspective: “To think oneself away out of humanity, to unlearn desires of all kinds: and to employ the entire abundance of one’s powers in looking.”21 The Daoists engage in a corresponding practice, which Zhuangzi calls “fasting the heart”—a matter of emptying the mind of what we humans bring to our engagement with the world in the way of prejudices and preconceptions, inclinations and aversions, all of which get in the way of our experiencing what is actually going on. Talking of hearing rather than seeing (which Nietzsche as an “ear” rather than an “eye” person would appreciate), Zhuangzi recommends (through the person of “Confucius”) “coming to hear with the vital energy [*qi*] rather than the heart” because “the heart is halted at whatever verifies its preconceptions.” This fasting of the heart bypasses human prejudices and lets one experience through the openness of *qi* “the presence of beings.”22

Returning to Nietzsche, another world of light, “pure and crisp,” shines forth in another passage that evokes the mountain landscapes of the Engadine, *Et in Arcadia ego*: “Even here, I [death] am.” The ground is “bright with flowers and grasses” yet also shadowed by death, as in the painting by Poussin that Nietzsche alludes to. He describes a scene of beauty that “made one shudder and mutely worship the moment of its revelation,” a “pure, crisp world of light, in which there was no longing, expecting, or looking forward and back.”23 Another “enjoyable horror,” a shudder in the face of light—reminiscent of the shuddering and divine delight that Lucretius experienced on understanding Epicurus’ vision of natural activity going on throughout the void.24

But how is it that the everyday world seems so much more substantial than light most of the time, so full of things, some of which can get in the way? It’s a matter of where our attention is: on figures (things we have to cope with to survive) or ground (the background contexts). The *Zhuangzi*’s
take on this is succinctly summed up by Brook Ziporyn in the Introduction to his translation, and in distinctly phenomenological terms:

Our attention is directed away from the foreground purposes of human activity and toward the background, that is, what normally escapes our purpose-driven awareness. This move reorients our focus toward the spontaneous and purposeless processes in nature and man that undergird and produce things, begin things, end things, compose the stuff of things, and guide things along their courses by not deliberately guiding them at all.25

It’s a matter of broadening our perspectives, expanding the “natural light” (lumen naturale) of human understanding to become co-extensive with what Zhuangzi calls the “broad light of Heaven.”26 Viewing things in this light lets us see them impartially, since the light of Heaven is above all indifferent to what it illuminates. But how would such a broadening of perspective work in Nietzsche’s case?

4. Driving Reality

A year after writing of his experience of the “net of light” Nietzsche remarks that we tend to get caught in a very different net, imprisoned by the restricted range of our sense-apparatus, its location in a particular place, and the projections of our minds.

The habits of our senses have woven us into the lies and deceptions of sense-perception . . . from which there is no escaping, no hidden bypaths into the actual world! We are in our own nets, we spiders, and whatever we may catch in it, we cannot catch anything that does not allow itself to be caught in our own net.27

As spiders we spin webs of concepts from our own mental substance and project them into the world—also images, schemata, narratives, categories, persons—where they support the fleeting stuff of our lives and lend it some kind of structure, providing some measure of regularity on which we can depend.

In a context where preconceptions prevent us from being flexible in the perspectives we entertain, and in the uses for things that we envision, Zhuangzi describes this situation as “a lot of tangled weeds clogging up the mind.” He uses similar terms to characterize the obscuring effects of notions of right and wrong, and ingrained Confucian virtues such as humaneness and responsibility—effects that Nietzsche would also regard as restrictive. In one of the Zhuangzi’s Outer chapters there’s the question: “What is the use of throwing humaneness and responsibility into the midst of the Course
[dao] and its virtuosity [de], trying to fasten everything together as if with glue and knotted cords? All it does is cast the world into confusion.”

Projections of moral values and attempts to fix things into some kind of conceptual framework are fruitless exercises—because as Nietzsche as well as Zhuangzi will say: they are already fastened together. We would see this if we opened up and paid closer attention.

On another level of description Nietzsche highlights the crucial role of the drives (Triebe) in constituting our experience—for example, the drives for distinction, understanding, predominance, security, play, peace and quiet, justice, truth, and so forth. On the basis of the play of nervous stimulation on the system, the drives interpret nerve-impulses by imagining their causes—and they do this as much, and more freely, when we are asleep and dreaming as when we’re awake. In contrast to the spider’s web of dry concepts, the play of drives produces images, and is described in terms of images—especially of vegetation. The activity of the drives introduces a strong dose of poetic or imaginative invention into our experience.

In one of his more incisive provocations, Nietzsche invokes the power of past experience as he ridicules the realists’ naïve belief in their ability to be totally objective:

That mountain there! That cloud there! What is “real” about those? Try taking away the phantasm and the entire human contribution, you sober ones! Yes, if only you could do that! If you could forget your heritage, your past, your training—your entire humanity and animality! For us there is no “reality”—nor for you either, you sober ones.

In other words, it is impossible to extract from our current awareness the sedimentations, accumulated over millennia, of previous animal as well as cultural experience, impossible to escape the ways in which “some phantasy, some prejudice, some unreason, some ignorance, some fear and who knows what else” have woven their way into our “every feeling and sense-impression.”

Zhuangzi would agree, but he doesn’t emphasize the archaic or historic dimension to this contribution, in part because the weight of tradition appears to lie less heavily on his shoulders. Yes, he was aware of the power of tradition invoked by the Confucian thinkers who came before him, but Nietzsche is confronted by over two millennia more of cultural development.

On the one hand Nietzsche appears to have lost touch with the net of light and resigned himself to being caught, if not in a spider’s web of concepts, then at least in the inventive play of interpreting drives. But on the other, while he was composing this passage about the inevitable contribution from our archaic heritage, he was also thinking of ways to subvert it. We find a number of passages in his writings suggesting that it may be possible after all to check that ancient positing, perhaps through some kind of phenomenological epoché, and let natural phenomena like mountains and
clouds simply show themselves, from themselves—and perhaps even as they are in themselves?

5. Opening up the Angle

Nietzsche elaborates the idea of knowing things as they are in themselves, rather than as human awareness construes them, in a remarkable series of notebook entries from 1881. “The task: to see things as they are! The means: to be able to see with a hundred eyes, from many persons!” We can adopt a multiplicity of perspectives because we consist in a multiplicity of drives, which often manifest themselves as inner persons. But in order to “think oneself away out of humanity” it’s necessary to acknowledge as well the vast inscape of the human soul, which consists in land and sea, rocks and waves, wind and stars.32

After praising “wanting to know things as they are [as] the only good inclination,” Nietzsche writes: “What is needed is practice in seeing with other eyes: practice in seeing apart from human relations, and thus seeing factually [sachlich]! To cure human beings of their delusions of grandeur!”33 If we are to “know things as they are” we have to get out of the anthropocentric mode of approach and regard things from the perspective of the thing itself—die Sache selbst. To see sachlich is to see from the viewpoint of the thing in the sense of “the matter,” the affair, the concern, the whole situation.

Zhuangzi appreciates not only the benefits of seeing with other eyes but also of fluttering with other wings, swimming with other fins, and waving one’s boughs in the winds. Stories of talking animals, insects, and even trees abound in the Zhuangzi, and invite us to entertain the perspectives of other inhabitants of the world. The “free and easy wandering” of the opening chapter involves a play of transformations and a dance through diverse perspectives. We tend to get stuck in the human perspective because the heart “is halted at whatever verifies its preconceptions.”34

Nietzsche suggests in a similar vein that “we only see what we’re familiar with,” and that the greater part of what we see “is not a sense-impression but a product of fantasy.” This highlights the unnoticed role of the imagining drives in the play of the world that is our experience: they make much of it up as we go along. Practice in seeing with other eyes weakens the sense of the ego, unsettling the faith that it’s I who own the show or me who runs it. If we can free the I from what Nietzsche calls the self-deception of possession, we can come to “recognize the affinities and antagonisms among things, multiplicities therefore and their laws.”35 That would really be something to recognize, those four items. And affinities and antagonisms among the myriad things are exactly what the ancient Chinese thinkers were concerned to understand, articulating such patterns in images of Yin and Yang, as exemplified especially in the Yijing 易經, or Book of Changes.
Nietzsche apparently stayed with the idea of “seeing with other eyes” through to his later work, as exemplified by the often-cited sentence from *On the Genealogy of Morality*:

There is only a perspectival seeing, only a perspectival “knowing”; the more affects we are able to put into words about a thing, the more eyes, various eyes we are able to use for the same thing, the more complete will be our “concept” of the thing, our “objectivity.”

That makes sense. But if we forget about concepts and the intellect that employs them, can’t we attain a complete experience of things as they are? A reason to suppose that we can is Zarathustra’s saying, at “Midday,” that “The world is complete.”36 So how does it get that way?

To be a good “student of nature,” Nietzsche writes in *The Joyous Science*, one needs to “get out of one’s human corner” and go beyond the “one-sided” view that sees life as “a struggle for existence,” in order to appreciate the overflowing abundance of the natural world as “will to power.”37 To get out of one’s Winkel is to open up the human angle on things to 360 degrees, as it were, while somehow shifting the center so that the perspective is no longer anthropocentric. And this is a point at which a comparison with Zhuangzi raises a further question: yes, multiplying perspectives all around is enlightening—but can’t we thereby go further to some kind of perspectiveless experience?

6. The Light of Heaven

Here’s a related question, which arises from an examination of the “Equalizing Assessments of Things” (qiwulun 齊物論) chapter of the *Zhuangzi* along with the “Before the Sunrise” and “At Noon” chapters of *Zarathustra*: How does the Daoist sage’s “letting all things bask in the broad daylight of Heaven” compare with Zarathustra’s blessing, “to stand over each and every thing as its own Heaven” and his experience of the world’s becoming “complete—round and ripe”? Complete: vollkommen, or “perfect.”

In the *Zhuangzi*’s second chapter the sage is said to begin from accepting his perspective as “this,” and then to proceed to entertain so many “that” perspectives in relation to his own that he begins to see through the relativity and interdependence of all “thises” and “thats.” In the end “he doesn’t proceed from any one of them alone but instead lets them all bask in the broad daylight of Heaven.”38 (The Chinese term for “Heaven” [tian 天] is often used as shorthand for “Heaven and Earth,” which means the natural world. Like Zarathustra’s Himmel it has no transcendent or otherworldly connotations.)

Zhuangzi then adds the retroflective comment: “And that too is only a case of going by the rightness of the present this”—emphasizing that these pronouncements about thises and thats are also made from a particular
perspective. It’s worth noting that Nietzsche makes a similar rhetorical move when he accuses the physicists of his day of misunderstanding the natural world through their anthropomorphic perspective: they only see nature as “lawful” because they project “the democratic instincts of the modern soul” onto the object of their study. “Everywhere equality before the law!” From his beyond-anthropocentric perspective Nietzsche understands the natural world as “will to power,” as having a “necessary” and “predictable” course [Verlauf], not because laws reign in it but because laws are absolutely absent, and every power draws its ultimate consequence in every moment.

Every particular thing or process, as a configuration of interpreting will to power, is at every moment construing all other things and is the product of their manifold interactions. The Daoist sage would understand this talk of the course of nature as both “necessary” (which is “freedom itself,” Zarathustra says, “blissfully playing with the thorn of freedom”) and “predictable” (intuitively, once you understand the rhythms and cadences).

But having dismissed the physicists’ “naïvely humanitarian” interpretation of nature and proposed his own view of the world as will to power instead, Nietzsche then adds this final twist: “Given that this is also only an interpretation—and you will be eager enough to raise this objection?—well, all the better.—” The last dash is there to give us time to reflect on what he’s doing here.

Both Zhuangzi and Nietzsche say the world unfolds in an array of diverse perspectives and interactions—and acknowledge their claims as perspectival, though proffering not just any perspective but one that affirms the plurality of perspectives and the possibility of entertaining that plurality. In both cases: yes, another interpretation—but in each case so powerful as to be not just any other interpretation. Their interpretations make good sense of what’s going on—but on the understanding that it’s in the nature of interpretations to be superseded. After all, the secret of life as will to power, which the figure of Life herself intimates to Zarathustra, is this: that she is “that which must always overcome itself.”

Returning to “the broad daylight of Heaven”: the Daoist sage goes along with the play of perspectives it reveals, “using various rights and wrongs to harmonize with others and yet remaining at rest in the center of the Potter’s Wheel of Heaven.” Zhuangzi explains what’s going on here by elaborating the image:

When “this” and “that”—right and wrong—are no longer coupled as opposites—that is called the Course as Axis, the axis of all courses. When this axis finds its place in the center of the ring, it responds to all the endless things it confronts, thwarted by none.

The “Course” is Brook Ziporyn’s translation of dao, or “Way,” and so it’s a matter of finding the axis of the Way things are unfolding, some kind of still center in the cyclical patterning of events and processes.
The same point can be made with reference to the other great classic of philosophical Daoism—the *Daodejing*—which uses the image of a cartwheel: “Thirty spokes are united in one hub. It is in its emptiness that the usefulness of the cart resides.” Just as a wheel can only rotate if its center is empty (otherwise you’d only have a disc or a potter’s wheel), so the world can go round, and things come and go in cyclical fashion, only thanks to emptiness within it. We generally experience through perspectives on the rim of the wheel, as it were, and often fail to appreciate that with a turn of the world—in a day, or a year, or a sequence of years in a lifetime—we can find ourselves on the opposite side, where “there” has become “here,” and “that” has become “this.” Most experience affords this opportunity, and with practice we realize there’s a point in the middle from where we can appreciate both. If it’s a circle cycling, the calmest place is the center—as long as you rotate on your axis.

After extension and expansion to the peripheries, this withdrawal to the center, the axis of the Course, the still point of the turning world (where the dance takes place), allows us to go beyond our customary, restricted, all-too-human perspectives, and get a sense of the whole. Not a transcendence to a God’s-eye view, nor a view from everywhere or nowhere, this drive to the heart of things, or withdrawal to the center, may let us see “the world from the inside,” as Nietzsche puts it when he writes of “the world as will to power—and nothing besides.”

The Daoist sage is wise thanks in part to his virtuosity in changing perspectives. In one of his last works, Nietzsche congratulates himself on a corresponding ability, acquired through long practice, to “switch perspectives.” And just as the sage can let all those perspectives bask in that way because he has made himself “one with Heaven,” so Zarathustra “Before the Sunrise” is on the deck of a ship out on the open sea, where the horizon affords the greatest expanse of sky—so vast as to be absorbing. By casting himself up into the light-abys of the sky he is able to merge with his “friend,” with which he has so many things “in common.” Here and in “At Midday” depth and height “are no longer coupled as opposites” but come together in a *coincidentia oppositorum*.

7. Before the Sunrise

Zarathustra rises before dawn to speak to the sky all around him, addressing it as a familiar: “O Heaven above me, so pure! so deep! You abyss of light! Beholding you I shudder with godlike desires.” His own depth, he tells Heaven, comes from casting himself *up* into the height of the sky. Opposites can now come together, in part because no Heavenly bodies are visible: no sky Gods—nor even one God—no providential forces loom behind or beyond.
“You do not speak,” Zarathustra remarks: this is how Heaven reveals its “wisdom.” Openness and reticence are likewise a central characteristic of Heaven in the Chinese philosophical tradition. Early on, when a student of Confucius asked him why he wished he didn’t have to speak, the Master replied: “Does Heaven ever speak? And yet the four seasons turn and the myriad creatures are born and grow within it. Does Heaven ever speak?”

The reticence of the Chinese Heaven comes from its impartiality: it casts its light, not to mention rain, evenly on all things. A remarkable feature of the pre-dawn sky (also true of post-sunset dusk) is the quality of light in the absence of direct sun: more so than on an overcast day, things appear to shine with their own light. When they are illuminated by the sun (symbol of the Idea of the Good) the light always comes from a particular direction, making one side of things bright and leaving the other in shadow. This would correspond in the *Zhuangzi* to perspectives that afford us a “this” and a “that.” By contrast the illumination of the pre-dawn sky is uniform and without directionality: no bias, no light casting dark shadow, and instead of exclusive opposites a smooth continuum.

Rising into the light-abyss of Heaven, Zarathustra reaches the ranks of those who “bless”:

And this is my blessing: to stand over each and every thing as its own Heaven, as its round roof, its azure bell and eternal security: and blessed is he who blesses thus!

For all things are baptized at the fount of eternity and beyond good and evil.

With respect to each particular thing that he encounters, Zarathustra stands as impartially and non-judgmentally as Heaven stands to him when he is open to it. When we deal with things from the perspective of utility, we confine them and restrict their possibilities. But Zarathustra’s new stance lets things be what they are, insofar as he frees and “redeems them from their bondage under Purpose.”

Verily, a blessing it is and no blasphemy when I teach: “Over all things stands the Heaven Accident, the Heaven Innocence, the Heaven Contingency, the Heaven Exuberance.”

Zarathustra is able to stand as Heaven over things together with these four other liberating Heavens because he is one with them: Heavens are like horizons in being non-obstructive.

Zarathustra calls Heaven “a dance-floor for Divine accidents,” showing his stance to be dynamic rather than static: he realizes that things chafe under the yoke of determination by something other than themselves and want instead “to dance on the feet of chance.” The Daoist thinkers call this freedom from necessity *ziran* 自然, “so of themselves,” spontaneous, or—
because it’s a dynamic condition—“self-so-ing.” It’s significant that in modern Chinese (and Japanese) this is the term chosen to translate the English word “nature.”

There’s a story in the Zhuangzi that anticipates Zarathustra’s point in almost a mirror-image. It’s a retelling of the ancient tale of how one day, when ten suns rose in the sky at once and threatened to scorch the Earth, the mythical sage-ruler Yao saved the world by having nine of them shot down by the legendary archer Yi. Since the sun is sometimes said to “govern” humans, the idea is that ten rulers are too many and one is best. But Zhuangzi turns it around: “Once upon a time, ten suns rose in the sky at once, and the ten thousand things were all simultaneously illuminated. And how much better are many virtuosities than many suns?” Multiple de’s means many perspectives, as well as sages who entertain them.

The Confucian philosopher Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (1619–92) commented: “When the ten suns shone, there was no this and that, no large and small, no right and wrong.” And Ziporyn could almost be referring to Nietzsche when he notes:

Yao thinks ten different standards of “rightness” will lead to chaos—there must be a single unified truth, a single ruler. Zhuangzi here allows all things their own rightness—and thereby there will be all the more illumination, with each thing its own sun.

A few episodes later in the Zhuangzi, there is this description of the sage:

He is there taking part in the diversity of ten thousand harvests, but in each he tastes one and the same purity of fully formed maturation. For to him each thing is just so, each thing is right, and so he enfolds them all within himself by affirming the rightness of each.

—Again turning out to be just like Zarathustra, who realized early on there was no point in wasting his time with followers: “Companions the creator seeks, and fellow harvesters: for all that is with him stands ripe for the harvest. But the hundred sickles are lacking.” And Zarathustra later affirms the rightness of all things on the grounds of their being “beyond good and evil.”

“Before the Sunrise” ends with Heaven’s blushing and Zarathustra’s realizing that the pre-dawn sky is about to disappear, to give way to day and its light. It’s then that he says: “The world is deep—and deeper than ever the day has thought.” The day and life perspectives reveal things we need to know to get through, to make it; while the night and death perspectives—deeper because they reveal the underworld we inhabit nightly in our dreams and dreamless sleep—complement and complete our experience. They round it out. Just as in the Zhuangzi, where life and death are often said to belong together, and waking life and dream are interchangeable.
Images of roundness, ripeness, and stillness abound in a chapter of *Zarathustra* “At Midday,” which is a reprise of the themes in the earlier “At Midday” and invokes the God Dionysus as well as Pan. Speaking hypnagogically to his own soul, Zarathustra says:

Do not sing! Still! The world is complete . . . a moment’s glance [Augenblick]—a little makes for the best happiness. What? Did the world not just become complete? Round and ripe? Oh the golden round hoop—whither does it fly? . . . Still! Did the world not just become complete? Oh the golden round ball!52

The golden round hoop is a larger version of the ring of eternal recurrence, which is generated by those moments when life assumes such fullness that one can want it to come around again, and innumerable times again. If you can get into the gateway of the moment the right way—behind which “all things have happened, and been done, and passed by already”—you realize that “all things are fastened together so tightly that this moment draws after it all things that are to come.”53 And so by affirming this moment, you are in a position to affirm all things.

There’s a passage in the *Zhuangzi* that resonates with the Potter’s Wheel of Heaven image discussed earlier, and seems strangely to anticipate Nietzsche’s thought of eternal recurrence. In the course of a description of the sage, who “gets through to the intertwining of things, so that everything forms a single body around him,” the text invokes the intense joy of contemplating “the old homeland, the old neighborhood.” (Perhaps also a matter of realizing one’s original nature.) And how much greater the joy “if you could still see what you had once seen and hear what you had once heard there”—which could happen if those moments came around again, if they recurred. How this might happen is suggested by a reversion to the sage who “found the center of the ring”:

He brought himself to completion by following along with things, staying right there with them no matter how they ended or began, no matter what their impulse or season. It is the one who constantly changes together with all things who is always one and unchanging—when has he ever had to abandon them for even a moment?54

When the center of the ring was found back in the second chapter of the *Zhuangzi*, the Axis of the Way was able “to respond to all the endless things it confronts, thwarted by none.”

The center of the ring can accommodate the axis and its endless turning because it’s empty, and we can find a place there only if we are empty of tangled weeds and conceptual clutter. The *Zhuangzi* suggests that you know you’ve fasted the heart well enough if what moves you to activity is not your self, but the forces of Heaven and Earth moving through the body unimpeded.
Here are the final pieces of advice concerning the practice of dealing with things—and people—after emptying the mind:

Concentrate on the hollows of what is before you, and the empty chamber within you will generate its own brightness. Good fortune comes to roost in stillness. To lack this stillness is called scurrying around even when sitting down... This is the transformation of all things, the hinge on which [the sage-emperors of old] used to move.

As one of the Outer chapters advises: “Let your body be moved only by the totality of things.” Paying attention to the openness that’s before us is a matter of realizing that things are empty of essences, that they are what they are only in relation to others and thanks to “the affinities and antagonisms” among them. Just as one can scurry around even when sitting down, one can also, with practice, stay still while moving about. The benefits of finding still points are praised in the Daodejing as well as the Zhuangzi. And to get in touch with our inner stillness, it helps to sit still for a while every now and then. A few words, then, on practice, before we conclude.

8. Methods and Practices

As is usual for East-Asian philosophies, the ideas in the Zhuangzi are rooted in certain kinds of physical or somatic practice. There are allusions in the text to breathing techniques, but the main task is “fasting of the heart” (xinzhai 心齋), emptying it and keeping it empty of all the mental and emotional furniture that obstructs the flow of experience. The practitioner also learns, whether through meditation or the consummate practice of crafts, to experience not through the senses and the heart-mind but rather through qi energies. The practices thus range along a spectrum from “passive” (as in sitting still) to active (as in carving awesomely beautiful bell-stands).

Nietzsche engaged in corresponding practices at either end of this spectrum: vigorous and prolonged hiking in the open air on the one hand, and what he calls “incubation” on the other. Incubation was the practice, in the cult of the divine healer Asclepius, of sleeping in sacred places in order to receive a dream, the interpretation of which would cure one’s ills. In Nietzsche’s case his migraine headaches would put him indoors and flat out on his back, often for three days at a stretch. “The poor guy,” people often say, but here’s what he himself had to say about this affliction.

Illness gradually liberated me, cleaning me out... Illness likewise gave me the right to a complete change in my habits... it bestowed on me the needfulness to lie still, to be idle, to wait and be patient... But that’s what is called thinking!
There's a good deal of lying still in the Nietzschean philosophical corpus, especially in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, where the protagonist is laid out flat before each intimation of the thought of eternal recurrence. Yes, Nietzsche thought best, perhaps, with the body in vigorous motion, but also when immobile and supine.

At the active end of the spectrum was Nietzsche’s hiking—or marching, he often called it—“six to eight hours” in the open air, a meditative exercise that emptied and opened out the mind and smoothed the body into energetic flow. He reports that his greatest creativity came when the muscles were working at their most supple pitch, such that the body is experienced not as recalcitrant matter but as a dynamic configuration of energies.59

The point of the preceding exercise has not been to deny the harder or harsher aspects of Nietzsche’s thought, but rather to show how the comparison with Zhuangzi highlights complementary aspects of “harmony” and “interconnection” in Nietzsche’s thought that are often overlooked. Restrictions of space and time permit no more than a brief look at how the comparison can reveal, conversely, the “creative” aspect to Zhuangzi’s philosophy, which is often regarded as calmly reflective and quietistic.

### 9. Creative Experience

When we ask what kinds of experience are the basis of an interpretation of the world as will to power or a field of dao and de, there comes a point where the views of Nietzsche and the Daoists appear to diverge. The Daoist sage practices fasting the heart and emptying the mind so that he can reflect the actual ongoing situation without distortion. And for Nietzsche, “seeing apart from human relations” and from a “death” perspective can lead to “knowing things as they are.” But then what are we to make of Nietzsche’s occasional praise of creative experience and repudiation of “mirror”-like perception?

In a chapter of *Zarathustra* titled “On Immaculate Perception” (or “Understanding”), the protagonist appears in a rather un-Daoist light when he ridicules those philosophers who aspire to “the immaculate perception of all things.” Their ultimate aspiration, he says, is

> to look upon life without desire and not like a dog with its tongue hanging out . . . To love the Earth as the moon loves her, and to touch her beauty with the eye alone . . . [and to be able to say] “I want nothing from things, except that I may lie there before them like a mirror with a hundred eyes.”

Such knowers Zarathustra brands unproductive because they have lost touch with “the unexhausted procreative life-will” that is will to power, and are thus incapable of loving the Earth “as creators, procreators, or enjoyers
of becoming." As a conduit for the procreative life-will that is will to power, as a conductor of the drives that play through the human body, the Nietzschean creator contributes to the play of life through understanding and acting.

But if, by contrast, the Daoist sage’s mind is to reflect the actual situation without distortion, wouldn’t this prevent him from being a creator and an enjoyer of becoming? After all, at the end of the Inner Chapters there is this injunction:

Fully realize whatever is received from Heaven, and never have personal gain in sight. It is just being empty, nothing more. The utmost man uses his mind like a mirror, rejecting nothing, welcoming nothing: responding but not storing. Thus he can handle all things without harm.

Without harm to him or to them. As long as the mirror reflects the broad daylight of Heaven, it impartially lets the things it reflects show themselves as they are, rather than as the partial mind would have them be—insofar as the partial mind rejects bad stuff and welcomes good things, and stores by holding on.

A lot depends of course on where the utmost man situates his mirror-mind. Think of the creativity of the great photographer, who gets the camera in the right place at the right time, and pointing in the right direction, before clicking the shutter. This is the registration moment of experience, but there is also the activation moment, which makes for creativity. The “Fathoming Life” chapter says that, if one is able to “let go of the world” and not hold on,

you are reborn along with each presence that confronts you . . . When the body is intact and the seminal quintessence of vitality restored, you are one with Heaven . . . Making the quintessence of vitality still more concentrated and quintessential, you return to the source, thereby assisting in the operations of Heaven.

In this way, the good Daoist can expand her awareness throughout the whole field, and through “sympathetic resonance” (ganying 感應) get the hang of what’s really going on.

This passage is followed by accounts of the awe-inspiring virtuosities of a cicada catcher, a ferryman, a maker of bell-stands, a charioteer, and an artisan. At the conclusion of these stories, a Master says of the conduct of the Consummate Person (or Daoist sage): “This is called taking action but not relying on it for any credit, helping things grow but not controlling them.” There are of course passages in the Zhuangzi that can be cited in favor of a more quietist reading, where the sage is detached from the human realm. But the comparison with Nietzsche reveals a more engaged aspect of the philosophy, where the sage practices non-attachment rather than
detachment. I find this aspect more appealing, and more relevant, because the way things are going these days, they need all the help we can give them.

The last sentence of Parkes (1983) trusts that “at least a few steps have been made along the way of the wandering dance.” The Dionysian move out of oneself, and into other persons and things of nature, requires a “lightness of foot” that’s attuned to the music of the world. As Zarathustra says, “the dancer has his ear—deep down in his toes!” Zhuangzi, wandering freely among diverse perspectives, is foremost among those few well-attuned thinkers who were able to go beyond talking the talk, and even walking the walk, to dancing the dance—in the light of the Heavens above and around.

Notes

1 Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Joyous Science*, 339 (KSA, 3: 569). Translations of Nietzsche’s texts are my own, for the sake of preserving the imagery. References to the published works are by section number, so that the passages can be found in any edition, followed by the volume and page number of the *Kritische Studienausgabe* (KSA) of the collected works. References to the unpublished notes are in the KSA, by volume and page number, and to the letters in the *Kritische Studienausgabe* of the *Briefe* (KSB).

2 The last syllables of both names rhyme with the last syllable of “feature” without the “r” sound, rather than with “(kim)chee.” In citations I have changed Wade-Giles romanization to Pinyin for the sake of consistency.

3 Nietzsche, letter to Heinrich Köselitz, May 31, 1888 (KSB, 8: 325); *The Antichristian*, 32.

4 Laozi, *Lao-Tse’s Tao Te King* (Leipzig: Fleischer Verlag, 1870), xxxii–xxxvii; see also the commentary to the first chapter on page 3.


6 Zhuangzi, *Zhuangzi: The Essential Writings with Selections from Traditional Commentaries* Brook Ziporyn (trans.) (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2009), 22 (86); Nietzsche, KSA, 11.610 = *Will to Power*, 1067 (1885). References to the Zhuangzi are to the chapter, followed by the page in Brook Ziporyn’s translation in parentheses.


9 Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 1:15, “On the Thousand Goals and One.” For more on will to power as interpretation, see xxi–xxii.


12 Ibid., 143–4.


15 Ames, “Nietzsche’s ‘Will to Power’,” 147, citing *Beyond Good and Evil*, 259.

16 Ibid., 146–8.

17 Nietzsche, KSA, 11.610 = *Will to Power*, 1067, 1885. (I’m admittedly enhancing the resonances with Daoism by rendering the word *Kraft* as “energy” rather than “force.”)


19 Nietzsche, *Dawn of Morning*, 31; *The Wanderer and His Shadow*, 338. Nietzsche also writes of how closely related he feels to the landscape in several of the letters he sent to family and friends during his first stay in the Engadine (June–September 1879). See also WHS 14, 17, 51, 57, 115, 138, 176, 205, 295, 308, and 332.


21 Nietzsche, KSA, 9: 454.

22 Zhuangzi, 4 (26–7).

23 Nietzsche, *The Wanderer and His Shadow*, 295. The aphorism’s title comes from a painting by Poussin, *Les bergers d’Arcadie*, showing a group of Arcadian shepherds examining the inscription *Et in Arcadia ego* on a sarcophagus. An earlier version has a skull on top of the sarcophagus, but here a shepherd points instead to the shadow of his companion’s head. Available online at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Et_in_Arcadia_ego


26 Zhuangzi, 2 (12).


28 Zhuangzi, 1 (8), 2 (18).

29 Some drives Nietzsche mentions in works from the so-called middle period: the drive to contradict; drive for justice, drive for truth, curiosity, fear of boredom, resentment, vanity, the drive to play (the *Untimely Meditation* on History, section 6); drive for security (*The Wanderer and His Shadow*, 16); drive for preponderance (*Übergewicht*) (31); drive to be sociable (70); the same drive: cowardice/humility (*Dawn of Morning*, 38); the drive to understand (45); the drive for calm, fear of shame, love (109); the drive for distinction (113).

31 Nietzsche, The Joyous Science, 57.
32 Nietzsche, KSA, 9: 466, 9: 454. For a description of Nietzsche’s inscapes, see Parkes, Composing the Soul, chapter 4.
34 Zhuangzi, 4 (26). We hear, for example, a talking cicada and turtle-dove in chapter 1 (4), and a talking tree in chapter 4 (30).
36 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, 3.12; Zarathustra, 4.10, “At Midday.”
37 Nietzsche, The Joyous Science, 349.
40 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 36.22.
41 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 3.12, “On Self-Overcoming.”
42 Zhuangzi, 2 (12), 19 (77).
44 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, 3.12; Ecce Homo, “Why I am So Wise,” 1. The German for switching perspectives is Perspektiven umstellen, to turn them round or reverse them.
45 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 3.4, “Before the Sunrise.”
46 Confucius, Analects, 17.19.
48 Zhuangzi, 2 (17); Ziporyn, 17n24; Zhuangzi, 2 (19).
49 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue, section 9.
50 “The world is deep” prefigures Zarathustra, 3.15, “The Other Dance-Song” (section 3).
51 Life and death: Zhuangzi chapters 1, 5, 6, 22, 23, and 25; dream and waking: 2 (numerous discussions) and 6.
52 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 4.10, “At Midday.”
54 Zhuangzi, 25 (108).
55 Ibid., 4 (27), 23 (99).
57 Zhuangzi, 4 (26).


61 *Zhuangzi*, 7 (54).

62 Ibid., 19 (77) (emphasis added).

63 Ibid., 19 (83).

64 Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 3.15, “The Other Dance-Song.”

References


