Heidegger and Japanese thought: how much did he know and when did he know it?

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One branch of the burgeoning literature on Heidegger has remained relatively stunted – that concerning the relations of his thinking to Asian thought. And while the occasional comparative study has appeared over the past decade or two, discussions of the influence of Asian ideas on the development of Heidegger’s thinking have been especially rare. It may still be too early to form an adequate picture of the influences on Heidegger’s thinking from East-Asian sources, and a thorough treatment would require extensive research in Germany and Japan. But given the enormous impact of Heidegger’s ideas on twentieth-century thought, and since the possibility of considerable influence on his thinking from non-Western sources has not been entertained in the Anglo-American scholarship, the amount at stake for the history of ideas calls for a provisional discussion in the meantime. All the more so since the answer to the question in the subtitle above would appear to be: ‘Quite a bit, and early on’ – and because the evidence suggests that during the 1920s and 1930s Heidegger may have appropriated a number of ideas from Chinese and Japanese philosophy into the central development of his own thought. Ultimately, the probability that Heidegger’s thinking was influenced in its formative stages by ideas from the East-Asian tradition surely calls for some different readings of the Heideggerian text in future.

1 Three thinkers from the Orient

It was in 1921, when Heidegger was a Dozent working under the imposing presence of Husserl at Freiburg, that the first of several eminent (or, at the beginning, imminently eminent) philosophers from Japan made what came to be known as ‘the Freiburg pilgrimage’ to study with Heidegger. His name was Yamanouchi Tokuryû. The same age as
Heidegger, Yamanouchi was a scholar of broad range who went on to found the Department of Greek Philosophy at Kyoto University and at the same time was one of the first thinkers to introduce phenomenology to Japan. He was also a younger colleague of Nishida Kitarô, a philosopher at Kyoto University whose epoch-making work *Zen no kenkyû (An Inquiry into the Good)* of 1911 is regarded as the first masterwork of modern Japanese philosophical thought. Later, during the 1930s, Yamanouchi was to become one of the few thinkers of sufficient stature to challenge Nishida’s formidable philosophical system.

The following year two more visitors — men destined to become major figures in modern Japanese philosophy — arrived in Germany: Tanabe Hajime and Miki Kiyoshi. Again, both were younger colleagues of ‘the Master’, Nishida Kitarô. Tanabe first went to Berlin to study with Alois Riehl, and from there he moved to Freiburg to study with Husserl. In Freiburg he was introduced to Heidegger, who, though four years his junior, impressed him as brilliant. Miki went first to Heidelberg to work with Heinrich Rickert, and then on to Marburg — where Heidegger had just moved — to study with the thinker whose thought subsequent generations of Japanese philosophers would find so congenial. There being less to say about Miki in relation to our present concerns, let us consider his case first.

Miki Kiyoshi had studied philosophy at Kyoto with Nishida and another major figure in the ‘Kyoto School’ of philosophy, Hatano Seiichi, as well as with Tanabe. After a year at Heidelberg, he was induced by Heidegger’s reputation to follow him to Marburg when he moved there in 1924. Deeply impressed by the ‘postwar anxiety’ that pervaded German society, Miki felt that this ‘existential’ atmosphere informed the development of Heidegger’s thinking and contributed to his growing popularity as a teacher. Miki’s first book, published in Japan in 1926 after a subsequent period of study in Paris, dealt with Pascal’s conception of the human being by way of an application of Heidegger’s hermeneutic analysis of *Dasein*. Since *Sein und Zeit* was not to appear until the following year, one assumes that Miki gained his understanding of Heidegger’s method through conversations during his year at Marburg. Ohashi Ryôsuke has suggested that Miki’s reading of Pascal, in which he emphasizes concern with death as the decisive element in our consciousness of time, is evidence of his appropriation of ideas Heidegger was developing at the time Miki had worked with him.

Although after his return to Japan Miki became more and more concerned with social and political philosophy, being deeply influenced by Marx, the existential basis of his thinking endured, as is evidenced by his continuing concern with the idea of nothingness. He had been acquainted since his student days with the ‘Pure Land’ Buddhism of the thirteenth-century thinker Shinran, and on arriving in Europe, he was
intrinsic to find how prevalent the idea of nothingness was there – albeit in the quite different context of European nihilism. Ohashi suggests (JH, pp. 27–8) that Miki’s engagement with das Nichts in Heidegger proceeds from a basis in the Buddhist conception of nothingness (mu). At any rate, the idea of nothingness is at the basis of what many regard as his philosophical masterpiece, Kősôryoku no ronri (The Logic of the Power of Imagination), which was clearly influenced by Heidegger’s discussion of the transcendental imagination in his 1929 book on Kant. But to appreciate the significance of the fact that the topics of death and nothingness come up in Miki’s engagement with Heidegger’s thinking, it will help to step back for a moment before considering the more complex case of Tanabe Hajime.

If one were to characterize in the broadest strokes the major difference between the philosophy of the so-called Kyoto School (of which the thinkers mentioned so far were the founding fathers), and the mainstream of the Western philosophical tradition, one could concur with the judgment often advanced by the Japanese that whereas Western philosophies have tended to be philosophies of life based upon inquiry into the nature of being, East-Asian philosophies in general (and that of the Kyoto School in particular) have tended to focus much more on the topics of death and nothingness. Now, much of what makes Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit such a revolutionary work is the central role played by the idea of das Nichts and his existential conception of death – as confirmed by the part they play in Heidegger’s subsequent pursuit of the Seinsfrage. A pertinent question, then, concerns the extent to which Heidegger had already developed his ideas on nothingness and death by the time of his first contact with the ideas of the Kyoto School thinkers.

A definitive answer to this question will be possible only when Heidegger’s complete Nachlass from the period up to 1922 has been published. However, a perusal of the currently available materials does not provide any evidence that Heidegger engaged the ideas of death and nothingness on an existential or ontological level before the treatment in Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffes in 1925. There is a brief discussion of das Nichts in Heidegger’s lectures of the Winter semester 1921/2 at Freiburg (shortly before Tanabe and Miki arrived); but the nothing in question is very much a ‘relative nothing’, relative to the kind of negation involved, or else is ‘the nothing of factual life’. And while there is a very brief mention in the lectures from the Summer semester of 1923 of such themes as das Man and Angst, there is no discussion of death or nothingness. Our question, then – whether Heidegger may have been prompted by his conversations with the Kyoto School philosophers to elaborate the idea of das Nichts at the level of fundamental ontology or develop his existential conception of death – remains interestingly open.
Tanabe Hajime is widely regarded as being the second greatest figure (after Nishida) in modern Japanese philosophy. His personal and philosophical relationship with Heidegger was much closer and more enduring than Miki's, who became sharply critical of Heidegger after the events of 1933. It was in part because of Nishida's interest in phenomenology that Tanabe had gone to Freiburg to study with Husserl. Whether it was disappointment with Husserl and original phenomenology, or else enthusiasm over the new turn the method was taking at the hands of the younger thinker, Tanabe politely bowed out of Husserl's classes in order to attend the lecture course Heidegger gave in the Summer semester of 1923 under the title *Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity*. Heidegger had, in turn, ample occasion to be impressed by the visitor from Japan, having gladly agreed to Tanabe's request for private tutorials in German philosophy. Over the ensuing decades the two men remained on cordial terms, and when Tanabe was awarded (in absentia) an honorary doctorate by the University of Freiburg, Heidegger sent him a congratulatory copy of the limited edition of his *Gespräch mit Hebel* furnished with a recent photograph.

An appraisal of the nature of the philosophical interchange between Tanabe and Heidegger is made difficult by the almost complete silence the latter maintained about his Japanese colleagues and their ideas. And while Tanabe continued to make reference to Heidegger's works throughout his career, he appears to have been a very reticent man, and relatively little of his correspondence has survived. However, approaching from the side of Tanabe's references to Heidegger, let us see what reconstruction of their philosophical relationship is possible – with respect first to the topic of death and then to the idea of nothingness.

After his return to Japan in 1924, Tanabe published an essay entitled 'The new turn in phenomenology: Heidegger's phenomenology of life'. Disregarding some book reviews that appeared between 1917 and 1919, this essay has the distinction of being the first substantial commentary on Heidegger's thought to have been published in any language. The essay is of particular interest since its concluding section gives us an idea of how Heidegger's 1923 lecture course ended. (The transcript published in the *Gesamtausgabe* is said by the editor to be lacking the last page or two: 'it breaks off suddenly in the middle of the train of thought.') It is interesting that a breach in the Heideggerian text should be fillable only on the basis of Tanabe's account – the ultimate topic of which is death.

Missing from the transcript of the lectures in the *Gesamtausgabe* – but prominent in the conclusion of Tanabe's discussion of Heidegger's phenomenology of life – is an account of the role played by the confrontation with death. Since the following passage apparently provides the
closest access to Heidegger's first words on the topic of death, it is worth citing at some length:

Just as life is not merely a passage [of time], so death is not the mere termination or breaking off of such a passage. Rather death stands before Dasein, as something inevitable. One can even say that it is precisely in the way life regards death and deals with it in its concern that life displays its way of being. If it flees from the death that stands before it as something inevitable, and wants to conceal and forget it in its concern with the world of relations, this is the flight of life itself in the face of itself – which means precisely that the ultimate possibility-of-being of life becomes an impossibility-of-being. On such a basis, to grasp Dasein in its primordial way of being is ultimately impossible. Because the way in which Dasein is concerned with death – from which it would like to flee but cannot – informs its very way of being, one must rather emphasize that it is just there, where life voluntarily opens itself to certain death, that it is truly manifest to itself.

(JH, pp. 107–8)

When translated into German this passage, written by Tanabe in 1924, sounds uncannily like the Heidegger of Sein und Zeit. The passage is all the more significant since Heidegger may not have written on the topic of death previously. In the event that he did not, then the fact that the first evidence of his interest in the topic comes from Tanabe is significant – since it suggests that Heidegger may have been encouraged to engage this issue, so central to the existential analytic and the theory of temporality presented in Sein und Zeit, precisely by his encounter with his Japanese colleague.15

This speculation is encouraged by some statements of Tanabe's that appear in his contribution to the Festschrift for Heidegger's seventieth birthday.16 The essay is a translation of the second half of a monograph published the previous year, in 1958, entitled 'Sei no sonzaigaku ka shi no benshôhô ka?' ('Ontology of life or dialectics of death?') – the original version of which bore the subtitle ‘A polemical engagement with Heideggerian ontology’. Ohashi Ryôsuke points out that the first half of the monograph, which was not translated for the Festschrift, contains some quite vehement criticism of Heidegger's 'ontology of life' (JH, p. 26). Tanabe begins his contribution to the Festschrift by contrasting the general orientation toward philosophies of life in the Western tradition with the more death-oriented approach characteristic of East-Asian philosophies. For thinkers in the Buddhist tradition, 'in thinking of the enigmatic inevitability of death, the ephemerality and fragility of life pervades us to the very marrow' (pp. 93–4). For this reason, Tanabe continues,
he had always been dissatisfied in his studies of Western philosophy — until he went to Freiburg in 1922.

He goes on to recall how deeply impressed he was to discover, on first attending Heidegger's lectures, 'that in his thinking a meditation on death had become central to philosophy and supported it from the ground up. I could not help feeling that I had now found a way to the philosophy I had been seeking.' The impression these remarks may give of Tanabe's having come upon a fully developed Heideggerian philosophy of death is misleading. Tanabe was an exceedingly modest man — even in the context of a general tendency of the Japanese toward (by Western standards) extreme self-effacement — and these remarks constituted the introduction to his contribution to the Festschrift for the seventieth birthday of the man regarded by the Japanese as the greatest living philosopher.

Given that Tanabe's scholarly output prior to his trip to Germany had been largely in the fields of science and mathematics (his first two books, published in 1915 and 1918, were on the natural sciences), it seems as if the encounter with Heidegger helped him to connect his academic work with a deeper level of his existence. This deeper level had to do with Tanabe's lifelong concern with philosophy of religion: Christianity had interested him intensely during his school days, and he devoted most of his later career to religious philosophy, undertaking numerous comparisons between Christianity and Japanese Buddhism. It is reasonable to suppose that at the time of his meeting Heidegger Tanabe was himself deeply concerned with the existential problem of death, and the discovery that Heidegger was working a number of existential concerns into his 'phenomenology of life' showed him that such topics could be engaged philosophically as well as on a personal level.

Another factor that is relevant here will bring us to the related issue of nothingness. For several years prior to his visit to Freiburg Tanabe had been a junior colleague of Nishida's at Kyoto. While Nishida was well acquainted with German thought — the mystical tradition, German Idealism, and neo-Kantianism in particular — the philosophy he had begun to elaborate in his masterwork of 1911 was experientially based on the practice of Zen Buddhism and to a large extent turned on the Buddhist conception of nothingness (mu).17 Tanabe himself was to make the idea of zettai mu (absolute nothingness) central to the philosophy of religion he elaborated in his mature thought — even though his different understanding of the idea was a major point of contention in his subsequent philosophical disagreements with Nishida.18

Not long after his arrival in Freiburg, Tanabe was invited to give a presentation on Nishida's philosophy to a select group of German philosophers — including Heidegger — at Husserl's home.19 They could not have found a speaker more qualified, since Tanabe had been following the development of Nishida's thought for the previous ten years. Unless
some record of Tanabe’s presentation is discovered, one can only speculate on its content. But since Nishida had been developing his idea of ‘absolute nothingness’ since 1911, and Tanabe was at the time the best interpreter of his mentor’s thinking, his talk must have dealt with Nishida’s conception of nothingness (especially since the idea of mu was to become so central to Tanabe’s own thinking).

At the conclusion of a chapter of An Inquiry into the Good entitled ‘The phenomena of consciousness as the sole reality’, Nishida argues that – in contrast to the situation in the physical world under the law of causality – in consciousness something can arise out of nothing (chap. 7). In a chapter dealing with his conception of God as the ground of reality, Nishida follows the via negativa of Nicholas of Cusa and the idea of God as total negation: ‘From this standpoint, God is absolute nothingness.’ He goes on to say that ‘precisely because He is able to be nothingness, there is no place whatsoever where he is not present, no place where he is not at work’. And in the context of a later invocation of Nicholas of Cusa and Jakob Boehme, Nishida writes:

Nothingness separated from being is not true nothingness; the one separated from the all is not the true one; equality separated from distinction is not true equality. In the same way that if there is no God there is no world, if there is no world there is no God.

The possibility that Nishida’s thought is behind Heidegger’s conception of nothingness deserves serious consideration – even though there are, of course, earlier prefigurations in the Western tradition. One thinks of the conceptions of ‘nothingness’ in such thinkers as Meister Eckhart, Nicholas of Cusa and Jakob Boehme, with whom Heidegger was familiar (if perhaps not as familiar as Nishida was at the time), as well as in the idealism of Hegel and Schelling. It is interesting that Hegel, in the context of his well-known formulation in Book I of the Wissenschaft der Logik: ‘Pure Being and pure Nothing are the same’, refers to Buddhist thought: ‘In oriental systems, and especially in Buddhism, nothingness or the void [das Leere], is the absolute principle.’ Just as interesting is the fact that Schelling (on whom Heidegger gave many lectures) mentions Lao Zi’s notion of nothingness in a passage in The Philosophy of Mythology:

The great art or wisdom of life consists precisely in attaining this pure potential, which is nothing and yet at the same time all. The entire Dao de jing is concerned with showing, through a great variety of the most pregnant tropes, the great and insuperable power of non-being.

An immediate (though generally unremarked) precursor with respect
to a radical notion of nothingness is Max Scheler, whom Heidegger refers to often in his lectures from the 1920s, as well as in the text of Sein und Zeit. In his essay ‘Vom Wesen der Philosophie’ of 1917, Scheler proposed as the fundamental basis of philosophical activity the insight “that there is anything at all or, put more precisely, that ‘there is not nothing’ (whereby the word ‘nothing’ . . . means absolute nothing . . .)”. After a discussion of how the circumstance that ‘there isn’t nothing’ prompts philosophical wonderment, Scheler goes on to say: ‘Whoever has not looked into the abyss of absolute nothing in this way will also completely overlook the eminently positive nature of the content of the insight that there is anything at all and not rather nothing.’ This phrasing will be familiar to those acquainted with Heidegger’s discourses on nothing published at the end of the 1920s.

In a discussion of religious activity in the essay ‘Problems of religion’ from 1920, Scheler returned to the topic of absolute nothing:

To believe in ‘nothing’ is something quite different from not believing. It is – as evidenced by the powerful emotional impact that the thought of ‘nothing’ exercises on our soul – a highly positive state of the spirit. Absolute nothing is to be sharply distinguished from every merely relative nothing as a phenomenon. Absolute nothing is not-being-something and not-existing in one, in utter unity and simplicity.

In a footnote at this point Scheler says that this unity distinguishes absolute nothing from the Buddhist idea of nirvana, which he understands (mistakenly) as ‘merely freedom and redemption from the actual world’. Although Scheler’s enterprise is more explicitly religious than Heidegger’s, his talk later in the same paragraph of ‘metaphysical Angst’ and ‘religious Schauder in the face of absolute nothing’ is a striking anticipation of Heidegger’s formulations several years later.

Assuming that Tanabe and Heidegger did talk about nothingness, it is probable that the precursor in the East-Asian philosophical tradition of the Japanese notion of mu was also a topic of conversation: the Chinese notion of wu, which figures prominently in the classical Daoist texts attributed to Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi. In his only reference to Tanabe in his published works, in the 1954 dialogue between a Japanese and an Inquirer, Heidegger has the Japanese say: ‘Professor Tanabe often came back to the question you once addressed to him of why we Japanese didn’t reflect upon the venerable beginnings of our own thinking instead of greedily chasing after the latest new things in European philosophy.’ The ‘venerable beginnings’ of Japanese Zen certainly include philosophical ideas from classical Daoism, and Heidegger knew this when he wrote the dialogue. As we shall see shortly, the relevant Daoist texts had been available in German since 1912, and so if Tanabe had referred
to them in their conversations Heidegger would have had access to the translations.

The influences on Heidegger’s developing conception of das Nichts are multiple and complex, and deserve detailed study when all the relevant manuscripts have been published. The question is of course complicated by the fact that Nishida, Tanabe, et al., were conversant not only with the German mystical tradition but also with the Idealists’ understandings of ‘absolute nothingness’ – a familiarity that no doubt affected the development of their own, essentially Buddhist elaborations of the idea. But for the time being one can say that it is highly probable that Heidegger was introduced to the East-Asian conception of nothingness before he began to develop his own radical thinking on the topic of das Nichts.

Back in 1921 another Japanese philosopher had arrived in Europe who was to spend eight years of study there: Kuki Shūzō, often known as ‘Count Kuki’ because of his aristocratic origins. One year older than Heidegger, Kuki had been one of the co-participants with Miki in Rickert’s seminar in Heidelberg in 1923. After three years in Paris studying French philosophy, Kuki returned to Germany in the spring of 1927 in order to work with Husserl in Freiburg. After meeting Heidegger at Husserl’s home, however, Kuki was sufficiently impressed by the younger philosopher that he moved to Marburg later that year in order to attend Heidegger’s lectures. Apparently Kuki was already acquainted with Heidegger’s philosophy, since it is mentioned in the first draft of his manuscript on the idea of iki, which he had completed in Paris the previous year. His book Haideggah no tetsugaku (The Philosophy of Heidegger) of 1933 would be the first book-length study of Heidegger’s thought to be published in any language.

Kuki was not only a brilliant philosopher but a man of supremely refined culture, and among the Japanese thinkers who visited Heidegger in the 1920s he seems to have made the greatest impression on the host. Kuki and his ideas play a major role in Heidegger’s dialogue ‘Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache’ – indeed one quite disproportional to their presence in the actual conversation on which the dialogue was based. While the dialogue in general bears only a tenuous relation to the original conversation, being for the most part Heidegger’s free invention, the Inquirer’s opening statement – ‘To Count Kuki belongs my enduring remembrance’ – is surely a genuine expression of the author’s feelings. It also rings true when the Inquirer remarks that his conversations with Kuki, ‘unfolded freely and spontaneously [wie ein freies Spiel] in our home, where Count Kuki sometimes came with his wife, who would wear traditional Japanese dress’ – and that ‘the East-Asian world would thereby shine more radiantly’ (US, p. 89/4).

The Inquirer goes on to say that his conversations with Kuki concerned
the latter’s notion of *iki* and, more broadly, ‘the essential nature of East-Asian art and poetry’. Since Kuki had completed a first draft of his seminal work on *iki* in Paris in 1926, one can well imagine its being a topical theme in his conversations with Heidegger.\(^{30}\) In fact we can probably gain a better sense of the content of these conversations from Kuki’s side than from Heidegger’s poetically processed recollections of some twenty-five years later. After his year at Marburg Kuki went back to France, and in August of 1928 he delivered two lectures in French at a colloquium at Pontigny under the title ‘Propos sur le temps’.\(^{31}\)

It is not unreasonable to suppose that Kuki was working on the ideas expressed in these lectures (and the subsequent book) while he was in Marburg and that he discussed them with Heidegger – especially since the second talk, entitled ‘The expression of the infinite in Japanese art’, deals precisely with what Heidegger’s Inquirer would later refer to as ‘the essential nature of East-Asian art and poetry’. In the first talk, ‘The notion of time and repetition in Oriental time’, Kuki deals mainly with Hindu and Buddhist ideas of temporality, but he also makes some interesting remarks about *bushidō*, the ‘way of the samurai’. In view of his keen interest in *bushidō*, it is likely that Kuki’s conversations with Heidegger touched upon the ethical code of the samurai – one of the major tenets of which is summed up in the maxim: ‘The way of the samurai is death’. Heidegger would have been struck by the remarkable similarity between the attitude advocated by *bushidō* toward death and the ideal of *vorlaufende Entschlossenheit* he had just presented in *Sein und Zeit* (1927).

Kuki’s second set of *propos* opens with a reference to the Japanese critic and philosopher of art Okakura Kakuzô, who introduced some of the theoretical background of Japanese art to the West with the publication in English of *The Ideals of the East* in 1903. If Kuki and Heidegger talked about Japanese art, then the former – who knew Okakura personally – must have recommended Okakura’s books. Incidentally, a contemporary Japanese philosopher has pointed out that the earliest use of the term *In-der-Welt-sein* (resplendent with hyphens) occurs not in *Sein und Zeit* but in a German translation of Okakura’s *The Book of Tea* published in 1919.\(^{32}\) If Heidegger did read Okakura, he would have learned a great deal about Daoism and the Zen-inspired arts of Japan, such as Noh drama and *tanka* and *haiku* poetry (with which he was certainly acquainted by the time he wrote the dialogue with the Japanese visitor). He would in any case have been introduced to these things by Kuki, since they figure prominently in the text of his talk about Japanese art.\(^{33}\)

In this second talk, Kuki quotes from no fewer than nine chapters of the *Dao de jing* by Lao Zi and also refers to the other major classic of philosophical Daoism, the *Zhuang Zi*. It is possible that Heidegger was already acquainted with these texts, there being several German trans-
lations available at the time. A translation of the *Lao Zi* with introduction and commentary had been published by Victor Von Strauss in 1870. An edition of *Zhuang Zi* edited by Martin Buber had appeared in 1910 – with which we know Heidegger was familiar at least by 1930. The following two years saw the publication of translations of both the *Lao Zi* and the *Zhuang Zi* by Richard Wilhelm which, like the Buber edition, have been in print more or less continuously since then. And so, assuming Kuki did quote the classical Daoist thinkers in his discussions with Heidegger, the latter would have had to go no farther than the university library or bookshop in Marburg to find German editions of the relevant texts. And in view of Heidegger’s acquaintance with the Buber edition of *Zhuang Zi* by 1930, it is more than likely that he discovered that text during the period of his conversations with Kuki in 1927/8 (if he had not come across it earlier).

The conclusion to be drawn from the account so far is that by the time *Sein und Zeit* was published, Heidegger had engaged in philosophical dialogue with three of the greatest thinkers of twentieth-century Japan, whose formidable intellects covered a range of fields: philosophy of science and religion (Tanabe), social and political thought (Miki) and metaphysics and aesthetics (Kuki).

### 2 Tracing the signs in the texts

The foregoing considerations should prompt us to view Heidegger’s texts from the late 1920s on in a somewhat different light. Reinhard May has documented a number of significant similarities between formulations in Heidegger’s texts and German translations of Daoist and Zen works which predate the respective writings by Heidegger. Limitations of space necessitate a restriction of the scope of what follows here to a few texts from Heidegger’s ‘middle period’ (1929–35). Let us begin with the 1929 essay ‘Was ist Metaphysik?’, the main aim of which is to pose and respond to the question of ‘how it stands with nothing’.

In a sense this essay is a reiteration and amplification of the discussion of *das Nichts* in *Sein und Zeit*. In both texts the basic mood of *Angst* plays a major role in revealing *das Nichts*, but there is a discernible change of tone. In *Sein und Zeit* there is something ‘threatening’ (*das Drohende*) that is so close ‘that it constricts and takes one’s breath away’ (*SZ*, pp. 186, 343 (*Bedrohung*)). In anxiety ‘it feels eerie [*unheimlich*] and there is an unpleasant sense of being ‘not at home [*un-zu-Hause*] in the world (*SZ*, p. 188). When *Angst* arises, ‘what is present . . . [shows itself] in an empty mercilessness’, and with all meaning drained out of the environment one is left clutching ‘at the nothing of the world [*ins Nichts der Welt*]’ (*SZ*, p. 343). The confrontation with *das Nichts* is a
shattering experience, and one quite distant from the Angst-free attitude one finds toward nothingness and death in the texts of the Daoists.

By 1929, however, the feeling tone of anxiety has changed. Heidegger begins by remarking that anxiety stops any kind of confusion arising and is rather ‘pervaded by a special kind of peace’ (eine eigentümliche Ruhe). He goes on to say that there is a certain ‘retreating’ in anxiety ‘that is no longer a fleeing, but rather a spellbound peace’ (p. 34). There is a certain equanimity now as Dasein watches beings in their totality ‘glide away’—as if the thinker were familiar with the line in the Lao Zi that says ‘Being and non-being give birth to one another’, or had been reading those magnificent passages in the Zhuang Zi that convey the serenity with which the Daoist sage participates in the cyclical interchanges between yin and yang that drive the transformations we call birth and death. And in view of the ineffability of the encounter with nothing—‘Anxiety deprives us of speech’ (p. 32)—and of the way the dao steers all things yet is itself no thing, the following remarks of Lao Zi’s about the Way come to mind: ‘Tao is empty’; ‘It is an abyss, like the ancestor of all things’; ‘Always it is nameless and reverts to non-being’.

A related difference between the two texts concerns the pronounced emphasis in the latter upon the unity of das Nichts and das Seiende im Ganzen: ‘Nothingness is encountered together with [in eins mit] beings in totality’, and ‘Nothingness announces itself precisely with and in what-is [mit und an dem Seienden] as it glides away as a whole’ (pp. 33–4). This formulation is strikingly reminiscent of the central insight of Mahayana Buddhism (on which Zen is based), which is that nothingness or emptiness (sunyatā) is not beyond, or different from, the things of the phenominal world. In the best-known formulation of the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra: ‘Form is not different from emptiness; emptiness is not different from form.’ Heidegger himself refers to this formulation in the ‘Gespräch von der Sprache’, when he has the Japanese say ‘We say: Without Iro [colour . . . and more than whatever is perceivable by the senses], no Ku [emptiness and the open]’ (US, pp. 102/14–15).

The first translation of any work of Heidegger’s was the translation into Japanese of ‘Was ist Metaphysik?’, which was published in Japan the year after the original appeared, in 1930. The essay was translated by Yuasa Seinosuke, who had come to Germany in 1926 and was to stay until the late 1930s. After studying with Karl Jaspers for a year in Heidelberg, he had gone to Freiburg in 1929 to study with Heidegger. In view of the parallels we have noted between Heidegger’s conception of das Nichts in that essay and East-Asian conceptions of nothingness, some remarks Heidegger made about the Japanese translation of the essay some thirty years later are revealing.

A philosopher by the name of Kojima Takehiko, who had studied
with Nishida and Tanabe in Kyoto, had visited Heidegger at his home in Messkirch in 1955. In 1963 he wrote a long letter to Heidegger which was subsequently published together with a lengthy reply as a pair of ‘open letters’ in both Japanese and German. Kojima starts out by saying that when an outline of Heidegger’s Gelassenheit was published in a Japanese newspaper, ‘it almost seemed to us as if you, Herr Professor, were directly addressing us Japanese’ (JH, p. 216). (Hardly surprising, in view of the allusions in that text to both Zen and Daoism.) At one point in his reply Heidegger refers to ‘What is metaphysics?:

That essay, which was translated into Japanese as early as 1930, was understood immediately in your country, in contrast with the nihilistic misunderstanding of what was said which is prevalent to this day in Europe. The nothing that is talked about there means that which in relation to what-is is never any kind of being, and ‘is’ thus nothing, but which nevertheless determines what-is as such and is therefore called Being.

(JH, p. 225)

Hardly surprising, again, that Heidegger appears not to have been so surprised at the immediacy of the understanding on the part of an apparently quite alien culture. The second sentence is significant in so far as it makes explicit the fact that Heidegger's concern to elaborate an original conception of nothing that is non-nihilistic is of a piece with the issue that drives his philosophical enterprise from beginning to end: the concern to reopen the question of Being.40

In 1930 Heidegger delivered a public lecture ‘On the essence of truth’, which he would give frequently over the years until its publication in 1943. If this has often been regarded as one of the most enigmatic of his texts, one factor may be that it was written at a time when Heidegger was working to assimilate ideas from Daoism. In the interests of narrative continuity, it will be helpful to look briefly at this text even though it requires temporarily expanding our focus to include Chinese thought.41 It may be more than simple coincidence that it was after one of the earlier presentations of this lecture, in October 1930 in Bremen, that Heidegger gave the first recorded public reading of a Daoist text: the story of the exchange between Zhuang Zi and Hui Shih on the joy of the fishes.42 Petzet remarks that the occasion for Heidegger’s asking his host to fetch his copy of the Zhuang Zi was a discussion of the question of whether it is possible to put oneself in the place of another. Petzet does not say how the discussion came out, but simply remarks that in Heidegger’s reading ‘the profound story put all those present under its spell’.
Heidegger had in fact been concerned with the question of putting oneself into another’s place in his lecture course of the previous semester. He appears to have devoted several sessions to a discussion of the extent to which it is possible for human beings to transpose themselves into other people, animals and even stones. (Plants are not considered in this section, though there had been some talk about the vegetal realm earlier in the course). Heidegger’s conclusion is that we can’t transpose ourselves into stones because the stone doesn’t have a world – is \textit{weltlos}; but that we can transpose ourselves into animals since the animal does have a world – \textit{weltarm} though it may be. He doesn’t think the question should even arise in the case of other human beings, since human being is essentially ‘being with [\textit{Mitsein mit}] others’ and ‘being transposed [\textit{Ver-setztsein}] into other human beings’. He even leaves open the possibility of such transposition into inanimate things – at least where human existence is attuned by \textit{myth} and also in the case of \textit{art}, which he characterizes as ‘fundamentally different \textit{kinds} of possible \textit{truth’}. In view of how little reference is made to animals in the enormous Heideggerian corpus, it is significant that the only extended discussion of the animal realm should occur in these lectures from the time Heidegger was apparently involved with the \textit{Zhuang Zi}.\textsuperscript{43}

In saying all this, Heidegger could just as well be giving an interpretation of Zhuang Zi’s story of the philosophers and the fishes – or indeed of the \textit{Zhuang Zi} as a whole. One of the most striking features of that text is the remarkable number of anecdotes about animals, fishes, birds and plants (trees especially) that aim to jolt the reader out of his or her anthropocentrism and into an experiential appreciation of the perspectives of other denizens of the realm between heaven and earth. The \textit{Zhuang Zi} is a text highly prized by the great Zen thinkers, and Heidegger could equally well be giving a reading of a text by Dōgen (or one of his successors) on the topic of the ‘Buddha nature’ of all living things.\textsuperscript{44} It is possible, too, that Heidegger heard his Japanese visitors ascribe similar views to Nishida, who argues that in order to know something one has to \textit{become} it. In chapter 13 of \textit{An Inquiry into the Good}, Nishida writes:

\begin{quote}
That we know a thing means simply that the self coincides with the thing. In seeing a flower, the self becomes that flower. To study a flower and illumine its nature means letting go of subjective conjecture to coincide with the nature of that flower.\textsuperscript{45}
\end{quote}

To return to the essay ‘On the essence of truth’: it is here that Heidegger gives the first definitive formulation of an opposition that was to remain central to the subsequent development of his thinking: that between the \textit{Stellen} (setting, placing, putting) of \textit{Vorstellen} (representing)
and the *Lassen* (letting) of the kinds of *Denken* he proposes as preferable to the representative and calculative modes of modern European thinking. There is, in other words, a move away from the projection (*Entwurf*) of a world of potential *Zuhandenheit* to a more open stance that holds back from dictating to things in advance how they are to appear.\(^{46}\) The consequences of such a move will be seen later in the use of terms like *Gelassenheit* and statements to the effect that it is *Sein* itself, rather than *Dasein*, that effects the historical projection of worlds.\(^{47}\) The shift is adumbrated in the somewhat gnomic pronouncement from the beginning of the fourth section:

Freedom for what is manifest from an Open [*zum Offenbaren eines Offenen*] lets the being in question be the being that it is [*lässt das jeweilige Seiende das Seiende sein, das es ist*]. Freedom now reveals itself as letting beings be [*das Seinlassen von Seiendem*].

By a nice turn of etymological development, both the German *lassen* and the English ‘let’ are well suited in their ambiguity between ‘allowing’ and ‘ordering’ (letting something happen as opposed to making it happen) to translating the central Daoist notion of *wu wei* or ‘nondisruptive activity’. According to the *Dao de jing*, the Daoist sage ‘dwells in effecting without acting’.

> Whoever acts in Dao reduces day by day; reduces and reduces to arrive at not-doing. He does not act, and yet he is not inactive.\(^{48}\)

In the next section of ‘On the essence of truth’, we learn that letting-be always involves a concealing. Speaking of ‘the openness of beings in totality’, Heidegger writes that, ‘although it constantly attunes everything, it itself remains the indeterminate, the indeterminable. . . . What attunes here is, however, not nothing, but a concealment of beings in totality.’ The first chapter of the *Lao Zi* reads (translated from Wilhelm):

> ‘Non-being’ I call the beginning of heaven and earth. ‘Being’ I call the mother of individual things. . . . In [their] unity it is called the mystery [*das Geheimnis*]. The yet deeper mystery of the mystery is the gate through which all wonders issue forth.

And chapter 25:

> There is a thing, completed in undifferentiation.
Before heaven and earth it was already there,  
so still, so alone. . . .

At the beginning of section 6 of his essay Heidegger writes that

the concealment of beings in totality . . . is older than any manifestation of this or that being . . . and older than letting-be itself . . . What preserves letting-be in this relation to concealing? Nothing less than the concealment of what is concealed in totality . . . the mystery [das Geheimnis].

The final thrust of Heidegger's essay has the essence of truth (das Wesen der Wahrheit) turn into the truth of Being (die Wahrheit des Wesens), which in turn turns on 'the simultaneity of revealing and concealing' (sect. 7) – an idea that is central to the Daoist understanding of the reciprocal powers of yin and yang (and that also figures prominently in Nietzsche's thought). And when the essay's concluding note says that truth means 'clearing protecting [lichtendes Bergen] as a basic trait of Being', it echoes a basic trait of the dao.

A striking feature of the Lao Zi is the poetry of its language, a fair amount of which can come across in translation – even though, to borrow an image from a Ming dynasty writer (quoted by Okakura), a translation is like the reverse side of a brocade: all the threads are there, but without the subtlety of the colours or the design. Indeed the texts of the Lao Zi and the Zhuang Zi are regarded by many to be among the most poetical ever written in classical Chinese (a language distinguished by the beauty of its poetry), and they are certainly two of the most poetic works of philosophy in any language. Heidegger's encounter with these texts appears to have a twofold effect on his thinking. For one thing his prose begins to change from the uncompromisingly functional language of Sein und Zeit to the more poetic evocations of 'On the essence of truth', and for another, he will soon begin to develop one of the major themes of his mature thinking – concerning the closeness of philosophical thought and poetry.49

In his lectures on metaphysics from the summer of 1935, Heidegger remarks that the only thing that is of the same order as philosophy and its thinking is Dichtung. Though they are not the same, he continues, the only people other than philosophers who are able to talk about das Nichts are poets. In a pronouncement that could have issued from the brush of a commentator on the thinker-poet Bashô (in whose work Heidegger developed a keen interest), he writes: 'In the poetizing of the poet and the thinking of the thinker, there is always so much world-space bestowed that in it any thing whatsoever – a tree, a mountain, a house, a bird-call – completely loses its indifference and ordinariness.'50
Heidegger's *Einführung in die Metaphysik* contains what may be the first published references to the Japanese, but they appear simply in lists of examples of *Seiendes*. But when it comes to a discussion of philosophies that have 'inquired about the ground of the things that are', no mention is made of the East-Asian traditions with which Heidegger was by that time familiar: only thinkers who think in the medium of Greek or German, 'the most powerful and spiritual language[s] with regard to the possibility of thinking'.

The essay 'The origin of the work of art' (1936) constitutes Heidegger's first and longest meditation on the topic of art and is, as such, another manifestation of a shift in the direction of his thinking. The original stimulus for his engagement with this topic may well have been his conversations about art with Kuki Shūzō in 1927 and 1928; this essay at any rate shows the most influence from East-Asian thought among the works of the middle period. A shorthand way of showing this is to recommend a reading of my 'Thoughts on the way' – part of which was intended as an excursus on resonances between Heidegger's texts of 1935/6 and Daoist philosophical ideas – as a catalogue of the influences of Daoism on Heidegger's thinking of the mid-1930s. On the assumption that Heidegger had read the Richard Wilhelm translation of the *I jing* (published in 1923), one can see his idea of truth as the Riss denoting the interplay of Welt and Erde as an adaptation of the notion of the dao as the common root of the cyclical forces of yang/chian and yin/kun. In the light of the discussion earlier of Kuki Shūzō’s influence on Heidegger, an obscure but central passage in 'The origin of the work of art' becomes clearer. In the course of a discussion of truth as the unconcealment produced by the struggle of world and earth, Heidegger says more about the Lichtung, the illuminated clearing that in *Sein und Zeit* had been equated with Dasein and which now appears coextensive with Sein itself and das Nichts.

Beings stand in Being [*Das Seiende steht im Sein*] . . .

And yet, beyond beings – though not away from them but this side of them – something Other is happening. Amidst beings in totality there is an open space. A clearing is there. From the perspective of beings it is 'being-er' than beings [seiender als das Seiende]. The open middle is thus not surrounded by beings, but the central illumining clearing itself encircles – like the Nothing we hardly know – all that is.

Here, complementary to the Daoist ideas, is the Zen Buddhist idea of nothingness: *mu*, or *kā* – emptiness, distinct but not different from form. Heidegger's Lichtung may be seen as the German version of Nishida's
mu no basho, or topos of nothingness. Around the time Kuki was in Freiburg, Nishida was using a striking image to express the way the topos of absolute nothingness envelops all the other spheres of human activity and thought: urazukeru, ‘to be lined’ (as with the lining of a garment). One could well imagine an evening at Heidegger’s home, with Madame Kuki sitting resplendent by her husband’s side as he talks about Zen art with the great philosopher, her ceremonial kimono allowing the East-Asian world to shine – as Heidegger himself said – ‘more brightly’ in the dusky environs of the Black Forest. Heidegger would be questioning his guest, once again, about the Japanese conception of nothingness. An illustration occurs to the Count, who responds in his impeccable German:

Professor Nishida uses an expression in his latest essay, ‘The Intelligible World’, that could perhaps help in this context. He speaks of the way nothingness ‘lines’ the concentric spheres of our existence, just as the kimono my wife is wearing is lined by a precious silk lining that one hardly sees, since it shows only at the ends – and which in a way envelops the kimono as a whole.\(^{55}\)

Heidegger himself drops an enigmatic allusion to the source of ‘The origin of the work of art’ in a Zusatz he added to the essay in 1956, the year after his dialogue between the Japanese and the Inquirer. (The editor of the new edition of Holzwege, in which the supplement is included after the Nachwort, remarks that ‘Heidegger repeatedly emphasized the importance of this “supplement” in conversation’.)\(^{56}\) The Zusatz is concerned mainly with resolving the apparent opposition between the ‘establishing of truth’ (in the work of art) and a ‘letting the advent of truth occur’, and emphasizes that ‘this Lassen is not any kind of passivity but’ – just like wu wei – ‘the highest kind of doing’. It is the last paragraph that is remarkable:

It remains an inevitable and distressing difficulty that the reader, who naturally comes upon the essay from the outside, immediately and in the long run thinks of and interprets its content not from the secret source of what is to be thought [nicht aus dem verschwiegenen Quellbereich des Zudenkenden]. For the author himself there remains the difficulty of speaking of the various stations on the way each in precisely the appropriate language. (Emphasis added)

One wonders why the source of what is to be thought should be so secret – if only because Quelle was the term Heidegger used the previous year in discussing the possible basis for dialogue between Western and East-Asian thought (US, pp. 94/8, 115/24; discussed below).

At the end of this highly productive period from 1935–6 another visitor
from Japan arrived, Nishitani Keiji, a pupil of Nishida’s with an intense interest in Nietzsche. Nishitani was to stay in Germany until 1938, attending Heidegger’s seminars in Freiburg and having many informal conversations with him at his home. Nishitani has written about how in 1938 he presented Heidegger with a copy of the first volume of D. T. Suzuki’s *Essays in Zen Buddhism*, only to find that he had already read the book and was eager to discuss it. Nishitani also reports that at that time Heidegger read an anthology of Zen texts entitled *Zen: Der lebendige Buddhismus in Japan*. In conversation in Kyoto in 1989, Professor Nishitani recounted how not long after his arrival in Freiburg Heidegger gave him ‘a standing invitation’ to come to his house on Saturday afternoons to talk about Zen. Heidegger was apparently most interested in the striking imagery that characterizes so many of the traditional Zen texts, and Nishitani concurs with other East-Asian interlocutors in saying that Heidegger was always a keen and insightful questioner when it came to the topic of Asian thought.

3 Oblique presentations and prognostications

In view of the amount of contact Heidegger had with East-Asian thinkers, the fact of his acquaintance with philosophical texts from that tradition, and the keen intensity with which he used to question his Japanese and Chinese interlocutors about those texts, the references to East-Asian ideas in his published works are remarkably few. There are only four instances, occurring between 1954 and 1958.

The first is the only extended discussion of East-Asian ideas in the entire Heideggerian corpus: the dialogue between the Japanese and the Inquirer, written over thirty years after the first contact with thinkers from Japan. This text itself deserves an extended discussion as a simultaneous revelation and concealment of the East-Asian influences on Heidegger’s thought. For now it will suffice to draw attention to a remark that becomes significant in the context of our discussion so far. At one point the Inquirer says to the Japanese that his visit is especially welcome since his experience in translating German literature (and Heidegger’s essays on Hölderlin) into Japanese will have given him ‘a keener ear for the questions that I addressed to your compatriots almost thirty-five years ago’ – and adds in his next speech the understatement: ‘and yet I think that in the meantime I have learned a thing or two [einiges] to help me inquire better than several decades ago’ (US, p. 94/8; emphasis added). This dialogue contains the only references to Japanese ideas in Heidegger’s works published in the West.

Three years later, in a discussion of the term *Ereignis* in ‘Der Satz der Identität’ (1957), Heidegger writes that the word ‘can no more be
translated than the Greek word *logos* or the Chinese *Tao*. At the time, probably no more than one reader of the essay would have known that Heidegger was speaking from experience – having spent a summer, ten years earlier, working with a Chinese philosopher on translating chapters of the *Lao Zì* containing the word *dao*. In 1958 Heidegger completed the essay ‘Das Wesen der Sprache’, in which two paragraphs on *Tao*, ‘the key word in the poetic thinking of Laotse’ (*US*, p. 198/92), shed light on Heidegger’s frequent use of the key word *Weg* in his writings before and since. Finally, an essay ‘Grundsätze des Denkens’, published in a journal the same year – and not included in any subsequent edition of Heidegger’s works – cites the line from the *Lao Zì*: ‘Whoever knows his brightness veils himself in his darkness.’ If the jaded reader takes this as an ironical comment on Heidegger’s attitude toward Light from the East, the less cynical commentator will still have to judge these few mentions of Daoist and Japanese thought as significant in their grudging paucity.

As if to supplement these scant references to Asian thought, Heidegger allows himself the occasional discussion of the possibility of dialogue between the Western and East-Asian philosophical traditions. Given his reticence concerning how much of his own thinking has appropriated from East-Asian thought, it is not surprising that one finds considerable vacillation in his position on the issue of inter-tradition dialogue.

In the essay ‘Wissenschaft und Besinnung’ (1953) Heidegger emphasizes that every meditation on the present situation must be rooted in ‘our historical *Dasein*’ by way of ‘a dialogue with the Greek thinkers and their language’ – and laments that such a dialogue has not yet begun. He then adds, almost in passing: ‘[This dialogue] has hardly even been prepared yet, and remains in turn the precondition for our inevitable dialogue with the East-Asian world.’ Despite its putative inevitability, doubts as to the very possibility of such a dialogue – based on the consideration that if language is the house of Being, ‘we Europeans presumably inhabit a quite different house from the East-Asians’ (*US*, p. 90/5) – are expressed by the Inquirer in the dialogue of 1954:

I do not yet see whether what I am trying to think as the essential nature [*Wesen*] of language is also adequate to the nature of East-Asian language – whether in the end, which would at the same time be the beginning, thinking experience can be reached by an essence of language that would ensure that Western European and East-Asian saying can enter into dialogue in such a way that there sings something that wells up from a single source [*Quelle*].

(*US*, p. 94/8)
Later in the conversation the Inquirer appears to be more sure that ‘for East-Asian and European peoples the essential nature of language \([\text{Sprachwesen}]\) remains quite different’ \((US, \text{p. 113/23})\). The Japanese visitor, however, seems decidedly more sanguine. In talking about his experience of translating Heidegger’s essay on Hölderlin’s *Heimkunft* and some poems by Kleist, he says:

In the course of the translating it often seemed as if I were wandering back and forth between two different language-essences, and yet in such a way that every now and then something shone forth that made me think that the essential source \([\text{Wesensquell}]\) of fundamentally different languages might be the same.

\((US, \text{p. 115/24})\)

Since ‘the Japanese’ in this dialogue is at least 90 per cent Heidegger, we can understand this discrepancy as representing ambivalence on the part of the author rather than a burst of objective reportage or a sudden ability to write dramatic dialogue.

The following year, in the context of a discussion of the possibility of ‘planetary thinking’ in ‘Zur Seinsfrage’, Heidegger remarks that neither side is equal yet to the encounters that the cultivation of planetary thinking will require: ‘This holds equally for the European and East-Asian languages, and above all for the realm of their possible dialogue. Neither of them can by itself open up and ground this realm’ \((Wegmarken, \text{p. 252})\). A hint of how this realm might begin to be opened up is given in a passage from the 1959 essay ‘Hölderlins Erde und Himmel’, where Heidegger speaks in vatic tones of the ‘great beginning’ of Western thought.

There can of course be no going back to it. Present as something waiting over against us, the great beginning becomes something small. But nor can this small something remain any longer in its Western isolation. It is opening itself to the few other great beginnings that belong with their Own to the Same of the beginning of the infinite relationship, in which the earth is included.\(^65\)

The opening anticipated here must at the very least be an opening to the ‘great beginning’ of East-Asian thought, wherever one locates it.

There is more talk of beginnings in the open letter of 1963 to Kojima Takehiko, where Heidegger writes of the necessity for a ‘step back’ \((\text{der Schritt zurück})\) if human beings are to escape the domination of *das Stellen* and find the way by which they can come into their own:

The step back does not mean a flight of thinking into bygone ages,
and least of all a reanimation of the beginnings of Western philosophy. . . . The step back is rather the step out of the track in which the progress and regress of *Bestellen* take place.

*(JH, p. 224)*

It is in the next paragraph of this letter that Heidegger talks about the immediate comprehension in Japan of his discussion of nothingness in ‘What is metaphysics?’ – which suggests that the step out of the progress-regress opposition that might be accomplished by our opening up to another great beginning could take us into the realm of nothingness as emptiness. This surmise is confirmed by a comment at the end of the letter, where he alludes to the possibility of a contemplative reconciliation with ‘the still hidden mystery of the power of *Stellen*’, which ‘is no longer to be accomplished by Western European philosophy up till now, but also not without it – that is, not unless its newly appropriated tradition is brought on to the appropriate path’ *(JH, p. 226)*. Again the implication is that the reappropriation of the Western philosophical tradition will require a preliminary move out of it, optimally by way of a tradition untouched by the metaphysical ideas that gave rise to the modern Western world view.

Heidegger’s next move with respect to this issue seems to be something of a *Schritt zurück*. In the 1966 interview that was posthumously published in *Der Spiegel*, his posture toward possible East–West philosophical dialogue appears negative and hints at a Eurocentric isolationism:

> I am convinced that it is only from the same part of the world in which the world of modern technology arose that a reversal can come about, and that it cannot happen by way of an adoption of Zen Buddhism or any other oriental experience of the world. In order to think differently we need the help of the European tradition and a reappropriation of it. Thinking is only transformed by a thinking that is of the same descent and provenance.66

The rejection of a wholesale substitution of Eastern wisdom for Western thinking is clearly unobjectionable. Nevertheless, quite apart from the question of how much Heidegger himself had ‘adopted’ from Zen Buddhism, the talk of a unilateral reappropriation of the European tradition rings somewhat hollow in view of the preceding pronouncements concerning the *unfeasibility* of precisely that – and the desirability of a bilateral approach involving East-Asian thought. One could have hoped for a more charitable attitude toward the possibility of our learning *something* from the Zen Buddhist tradition.

Suspicions that Heidegger may be speaking differently to a domestic audience and to the Japanese are confirmed by a passage written in 1968,
which appears to be his last remark on the topic. He is again optimistic about the possibility of opening up a realm for thinking dialogue between the cultures. In the foreword to the Japanese translation of his lecture ‘Zur Frage nach der Bestimmung der Sache des Denkens’, he writes:

By thinking the clearing and characterizing it adequately, we reach a realm that can perhaps make it possible to bring a transformed European thinking into a fruitful engagement with East-Asian ‘thinking’. Such an engagement could help with the task of saving the essential nature of human being from the threat of an extreme technological reduction and manipulation of human Dasein.  

Given the importance of that task, and Heidegger’s dialogue with Japanese philosophers over a period of forty years, one would like to read the quotation marks around the second ‘thinking’ not as indicative of second-rate thoughts but as acknowledging a difference between equals – so that we could take this last word on the topic as definitive.

What are we to make of all this? In the course of putting together Heidegger and Asian Thought, I had the opportunity for a conversation with H.-G. Gadamer. I asked him why, in view of Heidegger’s long-term acquaintance with and enthusiasm for Daoist thought (the question and response apply equally well to the case of Zen), there were so few mentions of Daoism in his published texts. He replied that a scholar of Heidegger’s generation and calibre would be reluctant to write anything about a philosophy if he were unable to read the relevant texts in the original language. In view of the foregoing exposition, this response may seem disingenuous. It is, of course, possible to understand Heidegger’s reticence as stemming from an intellectual modesty, from his being unsure whether he really understands these ideas from an alien tradition couched in a language he doesn’t know. But on the other hand, he did have numerous opportunities (which he apparently seized with alacrity) to question several of the greatest Japanese thinkers of the century precisely about the basic philosophical ideas of the East-Asian tradition.

As mentioned at the outset, more research needs to be done in order to flesh out that part of the evidence that is at present circumstantial. In view of the success with which Heidegger’s translation work on the Lao Zi was kept secret, little of substance is to be expected from his Nachlass, though records of books checked out from university libraries might provide pertinent information – as could, on the Japanese side, a perusal of diaries and letters written by the earlier Japanese visitors. It would be interesting, too, to learn the reactions of contemporary Heidegger scholars in Japan to the suggestion that the sympathetic resonances – so often remarked upon there – between Heidegger’s thought and ideas
from the Japanese tradition may be due in part to his having been influenced by such ideas. If this possibility has not been seriously entertained in Japan, it is because of the awe in which Heidegger has traditionally been held there – and the thinker’s guarded silence on the matter.

None of this preliminary presentation is intended to deny that Heidegger produced what may be the most profound, complex and influential philosophy of the twentieth century: the question is whether the provenance of that philosophy is as exclusively Graeco-Teutonic as its author would have us believe. Even at this stage of the investigation, the conclusion is unavoidable that Heidegger was less than generous in acknowledging how much he learned from the East-Asian (and especially the Japanese) tradition. But what is most important here are the implications for how we read Heidegger’s texts – especially as more and more comparative studies are undertaken, but also in the context of the Western tradition simpliciter. The possibility that he may have absorbed a considerable amount from a philosophical tradition that is relentlessly unmetaphysical prompts at the very least the adoption of a different perspective on Heidegger’s claims – however justified they may be – to have overcome or subverted the tradition of Western metaphysics.

Notes

1 A notable treatment of the topic is Otto Pöggeler, ‘West–East dialogue: Heidegger and Lao-tzu’, in Graham Parkes (ed.), Heidegger and Asian Thought (Honolulu, 1987 – henceforth abbreviated as HAT), pp. 47–78, the range of which is considerably broader than the subtitle might suggest. The only extended study to have appeared so far is Reinhard May, Ex oriente lux: Heideggers Werk unter ostasiatischem Einfluss (Wiesbaden, 1989 – hereafter EOL). As the subtitle suggests, the book is restricted to the influence of East-Asian (Chinese and Japanese) ideas on Heidegger’s thought; but then Heidegger appears to have had relatively little interest in Indian philosophy. Though some might find a few of its conclusions overdrawn, May’s study is required reading for anyone interested in the sources of Heidegger’s thinking. Since the main weight of this work is on the Chinese side, the present essay will place complementary emphasis on Japanese thought.

2 This is suggested by Hartmut Buchner in the introductory essay to his anthology Japan und Heidegger (Sigmaringen, 1989 – henceforth JH). This collection is an invaluable source on the relations between Heidegger and Japanese philosophers. Translations from this and other German texts will be my own.

3 Japanese and Chinese names will be given in the East-Asian order: family name first. Yamanouchi is cited as the first Japanese to study with Heidegger by one of his later students, Tsujimura Kōichi, in his speech on the occasion of Heidegger’s sixtieth birthday (reprinted in JH, pp. 159–65).

4 There are now two English translations of this text, which will be referred to shortly: A Study of Good, tr. Valdo Viglielmo (Tokyo, 1960), and An Inquiry into the Good, tr. Masao Abe and Christopher Ives (New Haven and London, 1990). It may be fair to say that Nishida is the only major figure in Japanese
philosophy of the first half of the twentieth century not to have been deeply influenced by Heidegger (perhaps in part because he was twenty years Heidegger's senior).


6 A brief account of Miki's relations with Heidegger can be found in Yuasa Yasuo, 'Modern Japanese philosophy and Heidegger', in *HAT*, pp. 155–74.

7 Ohashi Ryōsuke, 'Die frühe Heidegger-Rezeption in Japan', in *JH*, pp. 23–37, 27.

8 See Martin Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* (GA) 20 (Frankfurt, 1979), p. 403. Here the nothingness of *die Welt* is related, by way of the revelatory phenomenon of *Angst*, to the absolute nothingness of death in a way that prefigures the classic treatment in *Sein und Zeit* (§§49, 53, 57, 68b).


10 *GA* 63, pp. 31–2.


12 See *JH*, pp. 181–8. Yuasa (in *HAT*) discusses Tanabe only briefly, and his judgment that the influence of Heidegger on Tanabe is 'relatively small' may understate the case. Tsujimura Kōichi's claim that Tanabe maintained 'a thinking dialogue with Heidegger's thought until his [Tanabe's] death in 1962' (*JH*, p. 159) seems closer to the mark. See, for example, the references to Heidegger in Tanabe, *Philosophy as Metanoetics*, and also the brief discussion of Heidegger's influence on Tanabe by Ohashi in *JH*, pp. 25–6.

13 'Benshōgaku ni okeru atarashiki tenkō: Haideggah no sei no genshōgaku', *Shisō* (Tokyo), October 1924. A German translation of this essay can be found in *JH*, pp. 89–108.


15 My friend Charles Guignon has made the very plausible suggestion that Heidegger's taking up the issue of death may also have been prompted by his reading of Luther around this period. Given Tanabe's interest in Christianity, this consideration would make it all the more likely that the two thinkers would spark one another's interest in the topic of death.


17 See Hans Waldenfels, *Absolute Nothingness*, tr. J. W. Heisig (New York, 1980), pp. 37–9. Nishida practised Zen meditation regularly during the ten years leading up to the publication of *An Inquiry into the Good* – although he apparently gave up formal sitting as he began to develop his own philosophy. The characterization of his enterprise as the attempt to work out a new philosophy of Zen Buddhism in Western philosophical terms is perhaps too simple, but it is not misleading.

18 See Nishitani, *Nishida Kitarō*, chap. 9, 'The philosophy of Nishida and Tanabe'.

19 See the foreword by James Heisig to Tanabe, *Philosophy as Metanoetics*, p. xi.

21 Nishida, *An Inquiry into the Good*, chap. 31 (Heisig translation, p. 41). Nishida’s understanding of God, conditioned as it is by the Buddhist idea of *mu*, is one Heidegger would not have found uncongenial.


23 Quoted by May in *EOL*, p. 45. May also points out that Martin Buber writes in his edition of *Zhuang Zi* that Lao Zi ‘overcomes the official wisdom [of his age] with his doctrine of “non-being” ’ (*Reden und Gleichnisse des Tschuang-Tse*, deutsche Auswahl von Martin Buber (Zürich, 1951), p. 185).


26 Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Pfullingen, 1959), p. 131; *On the Way to Language*, tr. Peter D. Hertz (New York, 1971), p. 37 (hereafter abbreviated as *US* followed by the page numbers of the German original and the English translation). The Inquirer says earlier (*US*, pp. 87/3) that he often discussed this question with Kuki Shūzō – whom we are about to meet.

27 Kuki then went back to Paris, and it was then that he came to know the young Jean-Paul Sartre. On this relationship, and other information about Kuki, see Stephen Light, *Shūzō Kuki and Jean-Paul Sartre* (Carbondale and Edwardsville, 1987 – hereafter *KS*), which also contains translations of some of Kuki’s brief essays from the period just before he met Heidegger.

28 This acquaintance came at least in part from Tanabe’s 1924 essay on Heidegger. See Ohashi in *JH*, p. 29.

29 According to the account of the original interlocutor, Professor Tezuka of Tokyo University, while Heidegger spoke of Kuki in the warmest terms, they spoke of him only briefly at the beginning of their talk – and Kuki’s notion of *iki* was not a topic of conversation at all. Although Heidegger (in the *Hinweise* in *Unterwegs zur Sprache*) gives the date of composition of the dialogue as 1953/4, Tezuka’s visit actually took place at the end of March 1954. Tezuka’s account of the conversation, ‘Haideggah to no ichi jikan’ (‘An hour with Heidegger’), is reprinted in the original Japanese with a German translation in *EOL*, pp. 81–99, and a different German translation is included in *JH*, pp. 173–80. Stephen Light cites a report to the effect that in 1957 Heidegger expressed (to Tsujimura Kōichi) his desire to write a preface to an anticipated German translation of one of Kuki’s books – a significant desire when one considers that by that time Heidegger can hardly have been casting around for books to write prefaces for.

30 The final version of Kuki’s best known work, *’Iki’ no kōzō* (*The Structure of ’Iki’*), was first published in the journal *Shisō* in early 1929 and issued as a book the following year.

31 The texts of these lectures were published as a book, *Propos sur le temps*, in Paris in 1928; English translations can be found in *KS*, pp. 43–67. Kuki’s mention of Heidegger’s theory of temporality at the beginning of the first talk constitutes one of the earliest introductions of Heidegger’s ideas in France – the discussion of which was later to become a major industry.

32 Imamichi Tomonobu, *Betrachtungen über das Eine* (Tokyo, 1968), p. 154. Okakura uses the term with reference to Daoism, calling it ‘the art of being in the world’ (see the chapter ‘Taoism and Zennism’ in *The Book of Tea*). Heinrich
Petzet quotes Okakura in the context of a discussion of Heidegger’s acquaintance with Asian thought, though he does not say explicitly that Heidegger was acquainted with his writings; see Heinrich Wiegand Petzet, Auf einen Stern zugehen: Begegnungen mit Martin Heidegger 1929-76 (Frankfurt, 1983), p. 177. Petzet does make it clear that Heidegger came to be very interested in Chinese and Japanese art, and he relates how, when he (Petzet) had to write a review of a large exhibition of Zen paintings and drawings, Heidegger ‘brought [his] attention to the literature on the subject that seemed to him important’ (ibid., pp. 178–9).

33 The discussion in the dialogue with the Japanese about the pregnant gestures of Noh drama, where the Japanese demonstrates a gesture evoking a mountain landscape (US, pp. 107–18), echoes a line in Kuki’s propos on Japanese theatre: ‘Hands shading the eyes will make one think of a mountain landscape’ (KS, p. 75 – Kuki is actually quoting from a French commentary: Albert Maybon, Le théâtre japonais (Paris, 1925)).

34 Lao-Tse’s Tao Te King, translated from the Chinese, with Introduction and Commentary by Victor Von Strauss (Leipzig, 1870). Heidegger actually refers to this translation in an article published in a journal in 1958; see below, note 63. This edition, by the way, is probably the textual basis for Nietzsche’s occasional remarks about Lao Zi. On the topic of Nietzsche and Asian thought, see Graham Parkes (ed.), Nietzsche and Asian Thought (Chicago, 1991).

35 Reden und Gleichnisse des Tschuang-Tse, tr. Buber (Leipzig, 1910). On Heidegger’s familiarity with this text, see Petzet, Auf einem Stern zugehen, pp. 23–4; and also the discussions by Poggeler and Parkes in HAT, pp. 52–6 and 105ff.

36 Laotse, Tao te king: Das Buch des Alten vom Sinn und Leben, translated from the Chinese with comments by Richard Wilhelm (Jena, 1911); Dschuang Dsi: Das wahre Buch vom südlichen Blütenland, translated from the Chinese with comments by Richard Wilhelm (Jena, 1912). Petzet, Auf einem Stern zugehen (p. 183) reports Heidegger’s admitting to being a reader of Lao Zi and that he only knew the text through the mediation of Richard Wilhelm.

37 Was ist Metaphysik? (Frankfurt, 1969), p. 32. Page references in the next two paragraphs will be to this (tenth) edition.


39 Dao de jing, chap. 4 (Von Strauss); chap. 4 (Wilhelm); chap. 14 (Von Strauss).

40 Both these themes are adumbrated in the dialogue with the Japanese, which was written the year before Kojima’s visit. After a discussion of the emptiness (Leere) of the stage used in Noh drama, there is the following exchange:

Inquirer: The emptiness is then the same as nothingness, that Being [jenes Wesende] which we try to think as the Other to all presence and absence.
Japanese: Certainly. That is why we in Japan immediately understood the lecture ‘What is Metaphysics?’ when it reached us in translation in 1930 . . . We are still amazed that the Europeans could misinterpret the nothingness discussed in that lecture in a nihilistic way. For us emptiness is the highest name for that which you would like to speak of with the word ‘Being’ . . .

41 It is important to bear in mind that Daoist ideas are an important element
in the development of Zen thought, in so far as Zen has its roots in Chinese (Chan) Buddhism and the Chinese assimilation of Indian Buddhism involved the incorporation of ideas from the indigenous philosophy. A consideration of Daoism at this point will also serve to fill out the picture given by May in EOL.


43 Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik (GA 29/30), pp. 295–310 (quotations from pp. 300 and 301). The discussion of the animal realm ranges from pp. 261–388. My colleague Ronald Bontekoe has pointed out that there are, of course, two thinkers from the German tradition who had dealt similarly with the question of the transposition of awareness: Wilhelm Dilthey and Max Scheler (with both of whose work Heidegger was familiar at this time). As in the cases of death and nothingness, I would like to suggest that influence from the Western tradition was complemented by East-Asian sources.


45 Nishitani, Nishida Kitārō, p. 116. The context of Nishitani's discussion of this passage in Nishida is interesting for the parallels it suggests with Heidegger.

46 There are very few uses of the verb lassen in Sein und Zeit, and most of those are in the compound bewendenlassen which refers to situating things in a context of Zuhandenheit.


48 Dao de jing, chap. 2 (tr. from Wilhelm) and chap. 48 (Von Strauss). The term wu wei occurs in eight other chapters of the Dao de jing: 3, 10, 37, 38, 43, 57, 63, 64.

49 It is also around this time, in the mid-1930s, that Heidegger turns his attention to the poetry of Hölderlin – the first of several German poets whose work will inspire his philosophical thinking. Later, in the Letter on Humanism, he writes: 'We have hardly begun to think the mysterious relations to the East that have been given voice in Hölderlin's poetry' (Wegmarken, p. 169). My colleague Manfred Henningsen has suggested that Heidegger's turn to Hölderlin was in part a reaction against the events of 1933–4 and a defence against the subsequent co-option of his work by the National Socialists. See, also, Otto Pöggeler's discussion of Heidegger's interest in the poets in the light of his acquaintance with Daoism (HAT, pp. 62–8).


52 Graham Parkes, 'Thoughts on the Way: Being and Time via Lao-Chuang',
in *HAT*, pp. 105–44, especially the ‘Epilogue’. Footnote 9 stands in need of revision: as Reinhard May has pointed out, the Buber edition of the *Zhuang Zi* was first published in 1910, not 1921; and so there was ample time for Heidegger to discover the text (perhaps as a result of his talks with Kuki Shūzō) and assimilate its ideas by the time he wrote his own texts of the mid-1930s.

53 See Richard Wilhelm, *I Ging: Das Buch der Wandlungen* (Düsseldorf, 1970), pp. 14–16, 25, 30, 272–6. The assumption that Heidegger had read the *I jing* is not necessary: he could have gleaned an adequate sense of the ideas in question from his readings of the other Daoist classics, and especially from the commentaries of the translators or editors.


55 See ‘lining’ in the glossary of Robert Schinzinger’s translation of *Kitarō Nishida: Intelligibility and the Philosophy of Nothingness* (Honolulu, 1966), which includes a translation of the 1928 essay ‘Eichiteki seki’ where this expression occurs. Since Kuki mentions Nishida several times in his *propos* of 1928 – in ‘Bergson in Japan’ (*KS*, p. 72) and at the end of ‘General characteristics of French philosophy’ (*KS*, p. 97) – he surely discussed Nishida in his talks with Heidegger. D. T. Suzuki reports that in a conversation with Heidegger in 1953 he asked him what he thought of Nishida’s philosophy; Heidegger’s response was: ‘Nishida is Western’ (*Erinnerung an einen Besuch bei Martin Heidegger*, in *JH*, pp. 169–72). Since only four essays by Nishida had appeared in German at the time – three of them in a well-nigh unintelligible translation – this judgment of Heidegger’s was probably based on conversations about Nishida with his Japanese visitors.

56 Heidegger, *GA* 5, pp. 70–4; editor’s note, p. 377. I am grateful to a correspondent, Holger Krüger of Essen, for bringing the following remark from the *Zusatz* to my attention.

57 Two of Nishitani’s works containing some discussion of Heidegger have been translated: *Religion and Nothingness*, tr. Jan Van Bragt (Berkeley and London, 1982), and *The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism*, tr. Graham Parkes with Setsuko Aihara (Albany, 1990). This latter text devotes an entire chapter to Heidegger’s thought, although – written a dozen or so years earlier than *Religion and Nothingness* – the Heidegger in it appears comparatively ‘undigested’.


59 In an appendix to the Japanese translation of ‘Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache’, Tezuka Tomio recalls how during his meeting with Heidegger in 1954, the latter brought the conversation around to a *haiku* by Bashō he had read in translation:

He asked me about the poem in Japanese and posed a number of perspicacious questions about the special nature of Japanese thought as it manifests in language and in art. During my rather inept explanations it seemed as if various thoughts occurred in rapid succession to this prominent thinker. He took notes with great zeal.

(*JH*, p. 179)

See also the remarks by Paul Shih-yi Hsiao in *HAT*, p. 98.

60 See May’s discussion in *EOL*, especially pp. 25–36; also Yoneda, pp. 88–96.
As mentioned earlier, Tezuka Tomio's account of the conversation is indispensable for an informed reading of Heidegger's dialogue. Yoneda (p. 91) cites a note appended by Tezuka to his Japanese translation of the text, in which Tezuka says that he did not know Kuki personally or attend his lectures, that he himself was actually not very conversant with Heidegger's writings, and that he could not have uttered many of the things ascribed to the visitor from Japan.


62 See Paul Shih-yi Hsiao, 'Heidegger and our translation of the *Tao Te Ching*, in *HAT*, pp. 93–104. On how well kept a secret this translation work was until Heidegger's death, see *EOL*, p. 19, n. 37. This secrecy may account for the fact – strange in view of how much of Heidegger's *Nachlass* has been preserved – that no written record of his summer's work with Professor Hsiao has been found.


68 Hans A. Fischer-Barnicol reports that Heidegger once said to him, after remarking that from early on he had worked with Japanese philosophers, that 'he had nevertheless learned more from Chinese [visitors]' (Erinnerung an Martin Heidegger, ed. Günther Neske (Pfullingen, 1977), p. 102). This is an extraordinary remark for Heidegger to have made – and perhaps a revealing one – in view of the fact that none of his Chinese visitors came close, as philosophers, to the calibre of Tanabe, Miki, Kuki or Nishitani.