Re-Politicising the Kyoto School as Philosophy

Edited by
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Nationalism manifests itself along a spectrum of forms and a variety of contexts. When espoused by a people oppressed by a colonial power in the cause of achieving independence, it can surely be a good thing, whereas the form prosecuted by the National Socialists in 1930s Germany exemplifies the phenomenon at its most pernicious. Since the philosophy of the Kyoto School has been dismissed as ultranationalist ideology merely masquerading as philosophy, it is worth asking what kind of nationalism it advocates. If it turns out to be the kind that is compatible with, or even naturally leads to, internationalism, there may be little point in complaining about it. We may also find that what the Kyoto School philosophers have to say about internationalism is relevant to issues that still confront us in the globalizing world of the early twenty-first century.

In his well-documented presentation of the School’s founder, Nishida Kitarō, as a significant and decidedly un-nationalistic political thinker, Christopher Goto-Jones helpfully sketches some of the relevant sources for Nishida’s thinking in Neo-Confucianism and various schools of Japanese Buddhism (Goto-Jones 2005: 25–46). I shall begin by tracing some older and broader philosophical ideas from these traditions that naturally incline the Kyoto School philosophers away from nationalism, as background for an overview of internationalist ideas in the works of Nishida Kitarō and Kuki Shūzō. Similar ideas are to be found in the work of Nishitani Keiji, but space permits only a brief account of his contribution rather than the longer treatment it deserves. Although scholars have explored the relations between nationalism and internationalism in Japan from the Meiji to early Shōwa periods, there has been little discussion of the contributions of the Kyoto School philosophers. With respect to Kuki in particular: since neo-Marxist portrayals of him as an ultranationalist have obscured the internationalist dimension of his thinking, that false picture will have to be corrected.

∼500 BCE

The Kyoto philosophers belonged to one of the last generations of scholars to be raised on the classics of Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist philosophy – after which they went on to study Western thought. This already made them internationalist by comparison with their counterparts in the West, none of whom took the trouble to
learn an East-Asian language. What the Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist schools of philosophy have in common, by contrast with Western thought, is a thoroughgoing relational (as opposed to a substance) ontology. The world is viewed not as an aggregate of substantial things, but as a field of processes in dynamic interaction – a view that tends to stress the inter of the relations rather than the end-points of the relata. Once the ethnocentrism born of ignorance of the world beyond one’s own ethos is dissipated, a pluralist internationalism comes far more naturally than a monocentric nationalism.

In the case of the human self in particular, there is a tendency in Western philosophy to think of it as some kind of mental substance (Descartes’ idea of res cogitans, a thinking thing, is paradigmatic), as something independently subsistent; whereas for the East-Asian traditions the self is regarded as empty of any inherent ‘nature’ and as relational through and through. An idea underlying much political theory in the West is that social groups are formed by autonomous individuals bringing themselves into association under some kind of social contract (as in Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau). In the East-Asian traditions social relations are primary, and so the basic ontological unit is not the individual human being but rather the family, as a paradigm of human beings in relation to each other.

Thanks to a predilection for correlative thinking in terms of microcosm and macrocosm, Confucian thought moves from the family as microcosm to the Central Kingdom as macrocosm, such that the emperor is supposed to care for the people as a father does for his family, while the people are meant to show appropriate deference to the emperor as paterfamilias. The system is patriarchal but not necessarily authoritarian, since goodness in a ruler naturally elicits deference on the part of the ruled, while a bad ruler loses the ‘mandate of heaven’– just as a father who is bad will forfeit deference from his family. The system traditionally extends no farther than the borders of the Central Kingdom, since beyond those are the barbarians and the realm of the not-fully-human. But when barbarians are conquered they are drawn into the relational network through being assimilated. And so once Sinocentrism is overcome – as it had to be after the subjugation of parts of China at the hands of the colonialist powers of Europe – the relational understandings of individual, family, and people can be expanded to include other nations.5

This relational understanding of the world developed somewhat differently in Japan, which shares the tendency of island nations to be insular. The island situation allowed for independent development at first, while proximity to the Asian mainland later exposed the islands to powerful influences. As Nishida puts it: ‘The Japanese people, who already had distinctive features, formed an original and independent culture through assimilation of Chinese and Indian cultures’ (Dilworth et al. 1998: 28). By the time the Japanese relational understanding of the world came to be thematized in writing, the country’s insularity had already been undermined by assimilation of the ‘Other’ — insofar as much of Chinese thought and culture was imported when their writing system was adopted in the fifth century CE. This established a pattern of assimilative relations between Japan and the world beyond its shores that has lasted (though interrupted by two centuries
of sakoku, or ‘closed nation’ policy) to the present day. Through its tradition of cultivating relations with other cultures, Japan has distinguished itself as the nation most successful at assimilating features of the Other while remaining – at least until recently – distinctly Itself.

When it comes to the politics of international relations, the Western tendency to think in terms of autonomous selves prompts a move from the idea of self-interested individuals forming associations into nations, which will then compete against one another to further their self-interest, to that of self-interested nations entering into some kind of contract whereby they agree to cooperate, as with the League of Nations. On the East-Asian view, by contrast, one would expect a plurality of nations to behave more as different members of a family (which would by no means rule out competition and disputes between members) than as discrete units negotiating themselves into some sort of trans-social contract.

In view of their background in traditions of relational philosophies, it would be surprising if the Kyoto School philosophers had in any way favoured nationalism over internationalism – and all the more so since they all undertook comprehensive studies of Western thought and culture in the original languages, and all except Nishida himself spent time in Europe. Nevertheless, Rolf Elberfeld has shown the extent to which Nishida’s philosophy is radically ‘intercultural’, and thereby prepares the ground for subsequent intercultural philosophizing (Elberfeld 1999).

1911

The important political dimension to Nishida’s first book, Zen no kenkyū (A study of the good) of 1911 has been recently pointed out by Goto-Jones (Goto-Jones 2005: 47–67). In chapter twenty-six of this seminal work Nishida argues for a relational understanding of the self insofar as ‘our individual consciousnesses emerge from and are nurtured by’ an antecedently existing ‘social consciousness’. This social consciousness, for Nishida, ‘consists of various levels’ ranging from the family to the nation (kokka), which he characterizes as ‘the expression of the communal consciousness that constitutes the foundation of our minds’ (Nishida 1911/1990: 138–40). In considering what ‘the purpose’ of the nation might be, he dismisses the Rousseauvian notion that the nation exists for the sake of ‘the harmonious development of individual personalities’, as well as the Hobbesian idea that its purpose is ‘to ward off enemies on the outside and protect life and property on the inside’. What Nishida proposes in place of these ideas is remarkable:

At present, the nation is the expression of unified communal consciousness. But the expression of our personality cannot stop there – it demands something greater: the unity of a ‘human-society’ that includes all humanity . . .

A meaningful purpose runs consistently throughout the development of humanity, and the nation appears to be something that rises and falls in order to fulfill part of humanity’s mission. (The history of nations is the development of Hegel’s so-called ‘world spirit’.) But genuine globalism (sekaishugi) does
not mean that each nation ceases to be. Rather it means that each nation becomes increasingly stable, displays its own distinctive characteristics, and contributes to world history.

(Nishida 1911/1990: 141; emphasis added)

Already in 1911, Nishida sees the nation as only an intermediate phenomenon, a stage on the way to a future ‘genuine globalism’. The first discussion of the nation in Kyoto School philosophy thus already signals the desirability of going beyond the nation, from nationalism to internationalism – and anticipates by eight years the establishment of the League of Nations.

1930a

Most members of the Kyoto School traveled to Europe, and one of them, Kuki Shūzō, stayed there for seven years. While he was in Paris, Kuki wrote an essay on the aesthetic idea of *iki*, which he completed in 1926. Two years later, Nishida recommended him for a teaching position at Kyoto Imperial University, which Kuki took up when he returned to Japan at the beginning of 1929. The following year he published an expanded version of his essay on *iki*, ‘*Iki* no kōzō (The structure of *iki*)’, which went on to establish itself as a classic of modern Japanese aesthetics.

In the English-speaking world, by contrast, the reception of Kuki’s masterpiece got off to an inauspicious start with the rough treatment by Peter Dale in his book *The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness* (1986). While Dale’s book skilfully exposes much of the silliness of *Nihonjinron*, understood as ‘theories of Japanese uniqueness’, its treatment of ‘*Iki* no kōzō’ is sloppy and infected by the author’s animus toward any Japanese who presumes to write about things Japanese. Dale also distinguishes himself by being the first critic of the Kyoto School (he takes wild swipes at Nishida, Tanabe Hajime and Watsuji Tetsurō) to play the ‘guilty-by-association-with-Heidegger’ card.

In his first sentence on Kuki, Dale establishes him as having ‘studied under Martin Heidegger’ while in Marburg (Dale 1986: 68). This formulation seems to be generally accepted, but is actually misleading. Kuki was a year older than Heidegger and impressed the (admittedly more famous) German philosopher as brilliant and intellectually sophisticated. Kuki sat in on several of Heidegger’s lectures at Marburg, but nothing that either thinker says about the other suggests that either one thought of their relationship as one of student to teacher. It is good to resist the inclination to suppose that the non-white philosopher must have been intellectually subordinate to the Aryan genius.

Dale then launches into a discussion of Heidegger’s ‘Conversation on Language between an Inquirer and a Japanese’, which he claims ‘fictively recreates his discussions with Kuki’ (Dale 1986: 69). While there are a few references to Kuki in the conversation, no less reliable an authority than Heidegger himself notes that the ‘Conversation’ was ‘occasioned by a visit from Professor Tomio Tezuka of the Imperial University of Tokyo’ (Heidegger 1959: 269). There is no reason
to disbelieve this, since we also have an account of the actual conversation from the hand of Professor Tezuka (May 1989/1996: chaps. 2 and 7). But so eager is Dale to damn Kuki through his association with Heidegger that he completely misreads and misrepresents Heidegger’s text: if we were to read the ‘Conversation’ as ‘recreating’ the author’s discussions with Kuki, we would have to understand Kuki-as-the-Japanese referring to himself-as-long-since-deceased whenever Tezuka refers to Kuki (whom Tezuka says he never even met).

Dale goes on to recount how Kuki in ‘Iki’no kōzō finds no exact equivalent to the idea of iki in several European languages. Then:

Having summarily adjudged the elusive iki to be peculiar to the Japanese language (nothing remarkable since all words are by definition unique), Kuki feels justified in asserting that, ‘Nothing stands in the way of our considering iki as one of the conspicuous forms of self expression of the unique existential modes of Eastern culture, nay, rather of the Yamato race itself.’

Iki, being untranslatable, must refer to a ‘specific character of the race’.

(Dale 1986: 70)

But Kuki’s text is less racial than Dale’s translation makes it sound, which perversely renders minzoku as ‘race’ rather than ‘people’ or ‘ethnic group’.

Dale is not alone in this emphasis on ‘race’. Leslie Pincus, in her book on Kuki titled Authenticating Culture in Imperial Japan, has this to say about Kuki’s use of the term minzoku:

The word means...variously or even simultaneously ‘race’, ‘people’, ‘nation’, and ‘ethnic group’. Kuki drew, no doubt, on the semantic resources of the German Volk – ‘folk’ in English – and as a translation, ‘folk’ would have the advantage of invoking the German fascist politics associated with the term.

(Pincus 1996: 55)

‘No doubt’? Why should Kuki need to draw on the semantic resources of the German Volk in using the ordinary Japanese term minzoku? And ‘advantage’ to whom? Who could possibly find such a bizarre-sounding translation as ‘folk’ to be an advantage, unless it were someone intent on forging a damning link between Kuki and German fascist politics (in the face of no evidence whatsoever concerning his attitude toward National Socialism)?

Harry Harootunian is another ‘folk’ enthusiast, who presents an especially jingoistic Kuki through clever translations in his book Overcome by Modernity. Rendering the passage from near the beginning of ‘Iki’no kōzō that we saw Dale discuss above, Harootunian has Kuki making the ‘confident boast’ that ‘he had “no trouble in thinking that iki is one of the most illustrious self-manifestations of the unique conditions of the life of the Yamato folk, nay in Oriental culture”’

(Harootunian 2000: 234). But Kuki’s tone in this passage is not unduly confident or boastful: the term ‘illustrious’ comes from Harootunian, who for good measure
transposes the priorities between the Yamato people and Oriental culture. Nara Hiroshi translates the passage accurately, with no trace of the illustrious, and the priorities between Oriental culture and the Yamato people the way they are in the original: ‘Iki can be safely considered to be a distinct self-expression of an oriental culture or, more precisely, a specific mode of the Yamato people’ (Nara et al. 2004: 17).

If the ‘folk’s in Pincus’s and Harootunian’s renderings ring oddly, so they should. As David Williams has aptly asked in the case of the second great figure in the Kyoto School, Tanabe Hajime: ‘Why exploit the Nazi nuance of the word Volk in English when the words “nation”, “people” or “ethnic group” provide a sound rendering of the Japanese term in question [minzoku]?’ His answer: ‘To translate minzoku as Volk in English allows one to link Tanabe and Nishida, vaguely but damningly, to the horrors of the Third Reich’ (Williams 2004: 160). Kuki similarly needs to be saved from vague damnation at the hands of the morally superior.

Dale’s accusation of nationalism appears to rest on the fact that Kuki chooses to write about a term in Japanese aesthetics, iki (urbane, plucky stylishness), which he thinks might be ‘a way of “life” that is particular to our people’ (Nara et al. 2004: 13). This seems at first blush an unobjectionable strategy on Kuki’s part: he has lived in Europe for seven years, studying French and German philosophy and aesthetics. He realizes that certain terms, such as the French esprit or the German Sehnsucht, refer to ideas that are specific to certain peoples or ethnic groups, and so he begins to develop an aesthetics based on a Japanese term that refers to something specifically Japanese (Nara et al. 2004: 15). No one accuses Kant or Hegel of being nationalistic if they choose examples from the German tradition when they philosophize about art, or Benedetto Croce when he draws from the Italian tradition. Why shouldn’t Kuki discuss a distinctively Japanese aesthetic term with reference to examples drawn from Japanese culture, especially when he makes it clear from the outset that iki is no less translatable across cultures than certain European terms and ideas?

At any rate, after showing that Kuki’s analysis in ‘Iki no kōzō draws on a number of European sources, Dale reaches this final judgement:

Kuki’s book exploits the new rhetoric of existentialism and Husserl’s phenomenology for nationalistic ends. Published around the time of the Manchurian ‘incident’ [actually the year before], it subtly clothes a spirit of reaction in the idiom of racial uniqueness. We remind ourselves of the intimate conjunction between Heidegger’s boldly obscurantist philosophy and the brash jargon of Nazi rhetoric. The cosy affinity of this perplexing philosophy with völkisch thought suggests hints as to the character of Kuki’s own brand of aesthetic nationalism.

(Dale 1986: 72)

So: having provided minimal justification for supposing ‘Iki no kōzō to have ‘nationalistic ends’, Dale resorts to the crassest innuendo in order to make his
case. Unable to argue from a basis of textual evidence, he slyly relies on his readers’ reminding themselves of a certain ‘intimate conjunction’ for which he provides no evidence whatsoever – and indeed could provide none because the conjunction is non-existent. Even if we were to acknowledge the possibility of the ‘cosy affinity’ alluded to in the last sentence, we would need to be told just what hints it suggests – since any hint of völkischness in Kuki’s book has been introduced through Dale’s biased mistranslation.

The only grounds Dale has provided for his contention that ‘Iki’no kōzō is tainted by nationalism are Kuki’s discussions of an aesthetic idea that he thinks is peculiar to Japanese culture. Probably conscious at some level of their flimsiness, Dale plays the Heidegger card again near the end of his book.

It is disturbing to note that much of the conceptualisation of Japanese nationalism owes a deep debt to the influence exercised over Japanese scholars by both popular and sophisticated currents of German ultranationalism from late Weimar times through to Hitler’s exercise of power. In particular we might note the impact of Heidegger’s ideas on such men as Kuki Shūzō and Watsuji Tetsurō.

(Dale 1986: 215)

It seems we know that Heidegger was an ultranationalist, and presumably, if we note his putative impact on Kuki, we will find that this ultranationalism impelled the latter toward nationalism. But that would be plausible only if Dale had demonstrated which specifically political ideas of Heidegger’s had influenced Kuki, and in what ways. This he doesn’t even try to do – because there is absolutely no evidence of such influence. Nor could there be, since Heidegger didn’t publish (or even entertain, as far as we know) any kind of ultranationalist ideas before 1928, when Kuki left his sphere of influence by going back to Paris. (It’s hard to imagine that the single occurrence of the term Volk in Being and Time was sufficient to stimulate paroxysms of nationalism in the even-tempered visitor from Japan.) In 1933, three years after the publication of ‘Iki’ no kōzō, Heidegger did indeed give voice to some nationalist ideas – and was immediately criticized by Kuki’s senior colleague at Kyoto University, Tanabe Hajime, for doing so.8

The larger context for such attacks by Dale (and other non-philosophers) on the Kyoto School philosophers is what David Williams has aptly called ‘Pacific War orthodoxy’, which is based on the assumption that the Western imperialism that provoked the war is a noble enterprise, and that forceful resistance to it, especially if accompanied by nationalist aspirations or imperialist ambitions on the part of a non-white people, is morally reprehensible. Williams shows convincingly that ‘Pacific War revisionism’, which exposes the orthodoxy for what it is, demands that we question the self-righteousness of passing moral judgement on the Kyoto School thinkers and instead take them seriously as political philosophers (Williams 2004: xxiv, passim).
Leslie Pincus’s *Authenticating Culture in Imperial Japan: Kuki Shūzō and the Rise of National Aesthetics* is the first comprehensive study of Kuki in English. It is valuable in providing an informative account of Kuki’s years in Europe and the figures and ideas he encountered there, as well as of late Edo culture during the period known as ‘Kaiseki’. But the picture that Pincus’s book presents of Kuki’s philosophy is distorted, insofar as she continually associates her subject, as her subtitle indicates, with nationalism – and even with ultranationalism and fascism. Her treatment is far more extensive than Dale’s, but the evidence provided for the accusations of extreme political incorrectness is minimal. She has apparently decided in advance that Kuki simply must have been complicit in the Japanese fascism that came to prevail in the course of the 1930s, and so her narrative continually asseverates without argument or justification.

Pincus plays the Heidegger card for all its worth, suggesting that ‘the contrast between Heidegger and Kuki was not as great as many of Heidegger’s Japanese readers believed, especially when it came to the *minzoku*, the folk’ (Pincus 1996: 176). The grounds for the lack of contrast are apparently to be found in the penultimate chapter of Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, where ‘the hard-won authenticity of Dasein...is abruptly and somewhat mysteriously collectivized in the form of an “authentic folk”’. The ‘collectivization’ of Dasein will seem abrupt or mysterious only to a reader who had neglected to read chapter four of Heidegger’s masterpiece, ‘Being-in-the-world as Being-with’, in which Being-with-others is said to be ‘equiprimordial with Being-in-the-world’ (Heidegger 1967: 114). But the real problem here is that the phrase ‘authentic folk’ (or its German equivalent – *eigentliches Volk*?), the punctuation around which suggests a direct quotation from Heidegger’s text, doesn’t appear in *Being and Time* at all. In fact the word *Volk* occurs only once in that lengthy tome, at the point where Heidegger explains that because Dasein is always Being-with-others, its occurrence as historical (*Geschehen*) is always a *co*historical happening (*Mitgeschehen*) as destiny (*Geschick*): ‘By this we mean the occurrence of the community, of the people *[des Volkes]*’ (Heidegger 1967: 384). Perhaps sensing that her mention of the non-existent ‘authentic folk’ may fail to convince, Pincus ends the paragraph with the final flourish: ‘In the early 1930s, Heidegger added further resolution to both the collective and the conservative dimensions of Dasein in his theoretical writings and in his more practical association with National Socialism’ (Pincus 1996: 176). Not a flourish that will convince any but the already converted.

In a similar fashion, Harootunian introduces Kuki into the discussion in *Overcome by Modernity* in the obligatory association with Heidegger, and describes him as ‘one of [Heidegger’s] principal students in Japan’ (Harootunian 2000: 222). What is so damning about this particular association we learn five pages later: ‘Germany was supplied with an official national narrative, based on an enduring “heritage”, by the National Socialists; Heidegger provided its philosophic possibility’ (Harootunian 2000: 227). And what evidence is provided for this generous provision on Heidegger’s part? None whatsoever. Harootunian
the historian has apparently transcended such an old-fashioned requirement: just play the guilty-by-association-with-Heidegger card and, since we all know that Heidegger joined the Nazi party in 1933, that will trump any doubts we may have concerning the enabling relations of Heidegger’s pre-1933 writings to the National Socialist narrative and/or heritage.

Following a strategy pioneered by Richard Wolin in his The Politics of Being, where he tries in vain to show that National Socialist ideas are to be found even in the early Heidegger of Being and Time, Pincus attempts to establish a continuity between putatively ‘ultranationalist’ ideas in Kuki’s writings from the late 1930s and similar ideas in the earlier ‘Iki’ no kōzō. The index entries under ‘Iki’ no kōzō and fascism’ make reference to five pages of the text, but neither there nor anywhere else in the book do we find any actual evidence for this insalubrious conjunction. Pincus herself is eventually forced to acknowledge how poor in grist for the political mill that text really is: ‘Despite the very rare references to nation or state in “Iki” no kōzō, the cultural community that the text presupposes may in fact represent the preferred idiom for the expression of nationalism’ (Pincus 1996: 181). Given her prevarications concerning the ‘folk’ in ‘Iki’ no kōzō, one may justifiably wonder how much rhetorical weight this remarkable ‘may in fact’ is able to bear.

One reason that painting Kuki as a fascist is a difficult task is that it goes against the view of responsible scholarship on Kuki in Japan. Pincus cites Sakabe Megumi, one of the foremost contemporary Japanese philosophers and an expert on Kuki, as someone who distances him from emperor-system ideology, and claims that this is an illegitimate rescuing of Kuki from ‘embroilment in what is considered by a number of postwar Japanese thinkers to be a historical scandal – the complicity of prewar intellectuals with a family-state ideology that underwrote the repression and militarism of the 1930s and 1940s (Pincus 1996: 31–32)’. Such complicity may rightfully be considered a scandal, but Kuki will have to be shown to be embroiled in it before rescuing could be in order, and such embroilment is what Pincus absolutely fails to demonstrate. Once again, she eventually admits that ‘the culturescape in “Iki” no kōzō . . . did [not] resemble, at this stage, the kazoku kokka, the “family state” ideology systematically promulgated in national textbooks and public documents’ (Pincus 1996: 235). Did it then resemble it at a later stage? Well, in a manner of speaking:

> Despite the marked absence of the state on the surface of the text, ‘Iki’ no kōzō in fact represented the state in another form. I use the word ‘represent’ here in its complex sense, as both a political and a textual act, to suggest not only common interests with a state for which its author spoke but also the reconfiguration of state in the medium of discourse.

(Pincus 1996: 236)

If this is ‘deconstructive’ reading, it is here taken to absurdity: because Kuki makes no mention of the state, his book is really about the state, of which its author was an
advocate. The more obvious conclusion to be drawn from this ‘marked absence’ is that the text is more or less lacking in political implications. Indeed the prevailing view of Kuki in Japanese scholarship is summed up by Nara Hiroshi when he writes, after surveying Kuki’s papers and the correspondence with colleagues surrounding the publication of ‘Iki’ no kōzō: ‘Conspicuously absent in all this faded correspondence is any suggestion that The Structure was seen as a work with political aspirations of any kind.’ And about its author he concludes: ‘Like many aesthetes, Kuki was politically inert’ (Nara et al. 2004: 119; 123).

In her epilogue Pincus cites the opinion of two prominent Japanese interpreters of Kuki on his use of minzoku in ‘Iki’ no kōzō (Pincus 1996: 213). Yasuda Takeshi says: ‘Even though he initiated the concept of minzoku, there’s not the slightest suspicion of fascism. It’s got nothing to do with the kind of fanaticism of people who invoked minzoku at every turn after 1931.’ Tada Michitarō agrees: ‘Anyway, at the stage of ‘Iki’ no kōzō, there’s none of that in Kuki.’ ‘To the contrary’, writes Pincus, ‘the theoretical framework elaborated in “Iki” no kōzō served as a firm foundation for the more militant pronouncements of the later texts’. Moreover, in these later essays, ‘Kuki enlisted the discursive tactics and objects first deployed in “Iki” no kōzō in a widening movement to suppress pluralism at home and mobilize the Japanese populace for an expansionist war in Asia’ (Pincus 1996: 214). We shall look at these more militant pronouncements shortly; but the immediate questions are: precisely which features of the theoretical framework elaborated in ‘Iki’ no kōzō ground the later militancy? And: which tactics and objects led to even grimmer consequences later? An examination of the ensuing thirty pages of epilogue turn up nothing in the way of an answer: we are left with mere assertion, without evidence or argument.

1934

As ultranationalist forces began to dominate Japanese politics in the early 1930s, steps were taken to make the educational system more appropriately nationalistic – much to the distress of Nishida Kitarō. The turn that events were taking in Japan and the world beyond prompted him to reinforce the internationalist stance he had taken in Zen no kenkyū. At the conclusion of a lecture to an audience of schoolteachers in January of 1934, Nishida said that ‘Japan must consider its mission as a country in an international world, and educational goals must be set by taking in this vision of Japan’s role in the global world’ (Nishida in Yusa 2004: 258). Two months later he wrote in a letter to his friend Harada Kumao:

For Japanese politicians to consider world affairs with the Japanese interest as the central concern certainly makes sense, but they have to think of Japan not as something that exists in itself but as a nation existing in the world. Otherwise a slogan like ‘Greater Asianism’ makes no sense. Contrary to some schools of thought that maintain the future of the world depends on independent countries permeated by nationalism, I rather think it will depend on global collaboration.

(Nishida in Yusa 2004: 258)
As international events in 1934 provoked Nishida to express his geopolitical views, he continued to promote the ‘genuine globalism’ he had so presciently championed in 1911, but now together with explicit criticism of the shortcomings of Japanocentric nationalism.

That same year he applied his idea of globalism to the realm of culture, in the conclusion of an essay entitled ‘The Forms of Culture of the Classical Periods of East and West Seen from a Metaphysical Perspective’:

The world’s cultures are, of course, essentially plural. They cannot be reduced to unity because when they lose their specificity they cease to be cultures... A true world culture will be formed only by various cultures preserving their own respective viewpoints but simultaneously developing themselves through the mediation of the world. In that respect... we must clarify on what basis and in what relations to other cultures each particular culture stands... We [Japanese] can learn the path along which we should advance only insofar as we deeply fathom our own depths and at the same time attain a profound understanding of other cultures.

(Nishida in Dilworth et al. 1998: 36)

If these ideas are nationalistic, they lack any trace of the chauvinism, jingoism, or imperialism to which an internationalist stance is opposed.

In 1935 Nishida was asked to serve on a government committee for ‘the renewal of education and scholarship’, but he stopped attending after the first meeting, having been alienated by the nationalism of the members of the Ministry of Education. In another letter to Harada he wrote:

I think the nationalists in our country must deeply consider the fact that today nationalism is simultaneously globalism. It is no use thinking about their own country independently, rather we must think in a broader, global way. We cannot simply return to the past.

(Nishida in Goto-Jones 2005: 72–73)

Here Nishida makes it clear that nationalism without internationalism or globalism is unacceptable, just as a regressive return to the past is impracticable in the modern world. There is no contradiction in recommending, as Nishida and his colleagues do, that connections with one’s cultural traditions be maintained in the process of modernization. Yet a large part of the neo-Marxist animosity against Kyoto School philosophy is provoked by the latter’s emphasis on the importance of Japanese cultural traditions. Any thinker who fails to immediately embrace the rational modernism promoted by the West falls under suspicion of being a nationalist with fascist tendencies. Or this seems at least to be the main principle on which Pincus condemns Kuki.
1937
In a lengthy epilogue in *Authenticating Culture in Imperial Japan*, Pincus discusses "those of Kuki’s later essays in which the affinities with fascist cultural discourse stand out in clear relief".

These essays are part of a larger discourse in the 1930s that served to veil but also to validate brutal forms of aggression within Japan and on the Asian continent... Kuki’s later essays presented Japanese readers with a cultural fait accompli, hailing them as involuntary members of an imaginary community rendered largely in ethical and spiritual terms. Brooking no deviation, this imaginary community served in turn to eliminate dissent and mobilize the populace for ‘total war’.

(Pincus 1996: 220)

A reader familiar with the refined aestheticism of ‘*Iki’ no kōzō* will have to brace himself for the encounter with the brutal political animal into which its author has apparently been transformed during the intervening seven years. But what is the nature of the ‘cultural fait accompli’ that Kuki presents his readers with in these essays? And what specific passages hail them as ‘members of an imaginary community’? (One imagines this last is a version of Benedict Anderson’s nation as imagined community.)

Pincus writes of the beginning of Kuki’s 1937 lecture ‘*Nihonteki seikaku ni tsuite*’ (On the Japanese character) the following: ‘The moderate tone of the opening rhetoric is belied by a vocabulary turned militantly nationalist, “Japan” having conspicuously yielded to “Japanism”’ (Pincus 1996: 222). If one looks at the context in which Kuki talks of ‘Japanism’ (*Nihonshugi*) here, it is difficult to discern any kind of ‘militantly nationalist’ turn in his language. Here is what Kuki actually writes:

If one asks what globalism [*sekaishugi*] is, it is the view in which, rather than thinking in a self-centered way of one’s own country as the absolute standard of value, one recognizes the uniqueness and the positive aspects of countries other than one’s own, aiming at the co-existence of all human beings by respecting their legitimate rights... Furthermore, one can say that globalism is also *internationalism* [*kokusaishugi*].

Concerning, then, the question of how to understand the relationship between the Japanese character and world character, and so between Japanism and globalism, and more broadly between nationalism [*kokuminshugi*] and internationalism, one might say it comes down to the relationship between the particular and the general. And therefore these pairs are not mutually incompatible.11

(KNS III: 367–68)

The kind of nationalism advocated here is not at all militant, but is rather to be cultivated together with globalism. Pincus appears to acknowledge this when
she writes: ‘The binary opposition of particular/universal exposes itself in the
less mediated form of Japanism/cosmopolitanism. This latter pair, claims Kuki,
is in no way mutually incompatible’ (Pincus 1996: 222). But then, strangely, she
reproaches Kuki by adducing passages from the Marxist Tosaka Jun that criticize
unthinking adulation of ‘the Japanese spirit’, and concludes:

While Kuki makes rhetorical gestures toward internationalism, those gestures
hardly sustain Tosaka’s hopes for a materialist critique of Japanism. Kuki’s
claim that Japanism is compatible with internationalism holds true only to
the extent that the international is deprived of substance and reduced to a
mental synthesis. (The precise nature of this synthesis... presumably could
be mandated by the national culture that attains global hegemony.)

(Pincus 1996: 223)

On what grounds does Pincus reduce Kuki’s statements about internationalism
to mere ‘rhetorical gestures’? And why should these gestures, if that is all they
are, be expected to sustain Tosaka’s hopes for a materialist critique of Japanism,
when Kuki – no Marxist – was poles apart from Tosaka as a thinker, and is
here advocating a Japanism that is cultural, cross-cultural, and international in its
orientation?

Throughout Pincus’s book, whenever Kuki writes something that contradicts her
understanding of him as an ultranationalist fascist, she either ignores it, dismisses
it as a mere rhetorical gesture, or else drops in a neo-Marxist herring to throw
the reader off the track. Kuki doesn’t simply assert that Japanism is compatible
with internationalism: he argues the case over the course of his lecture. Nor is
the international ‘deprived of substance and reduced to a mental synthesis’: he
writes quite robustly of the necessity for the Japanese to develop ‘an open-minded
interest that surveys the world’s cultures broadly and adopts their good features’
(KNS III: 398). And is the arch parenthesis at the end meant to suggest that Kuki
is advocating the global hegemony of Japanese culture? His lecture contains no
such idea, but rather advocates the development of national culture so that Japan
can thereby make a genuine contribution to international or global culture. Nor
is Japan unique in being considered unique: ‘The culture of the world as a whole
is advanced through the exercise of each culture’s uniqueness. Through an emphasis
on the particular the general can shine forth, and through an emphasis on the parts
the whole will come to glow’ (KNS III: 370).

Kuki characterizes the relations between the individual person (kojin), and the
people or nation (kokumin), and the ‘world-person’ (sekaijin), by means of three
concentric circles: the smallest representing the individual, the next largest the
nation, and the largest the world. Explaining the coinage sekaijin, Kuki writes:
‘This world-person is precisely an international society constituted by each nation
as a member, and is the largest circle which contains many circles representing the
various nations in common and in solidarity’ (KNS III: 372; emphasis added). But
Pincus dismisses this internationalism by citing the example that Kuki gives from

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the 1936 Olympic Games which shows, she claims, that ‘the middle circle – national culture – has expanded out of proportion and drawn both individual and world wholly into its orbit’ (Pincus 1996: 224). That would indeed be a distortion; but let us look at the story.

A Japanese athlete at the awards ceremony looks up at the Japanese flag while the national anthem is playing, and he weeps. A commentator in a publication of the German Olympic Committee explains this by invoking ‘the ethical-religious emotion of [the athlete’s] having done his duty to Japan’. Kuki endorses this explanation on the part of the Germans, saying that the incident truly reveals ‘the Japanese character’. And yet, he goes on, this does not mean that every Japanese athlete would weep like this: this athlete’s ‘particular mode of expression’ is seen here, and ‘his individual character is revealed’. And since non-Japanese have no trouble understanding this phenomenon: ‘In this explanation and the possibility of understanding we can see an international world citizen common to all nations . . . an event that transcends national borders . . . a world character.’ Kuki concludes that ‘Just as the individual and the Japanese character coexist, both the Japanese character and world character must coexist . . . [and] are formed in reciprocal relationship’ (KNS III: 373–74). The point of the story is that individual character, national character, and world character optimally coexist in one individual: Pincus’s claim that ‘national culture has expanded out of proportion and drawn both individual and world wholly into its orbit’ has no basis in the text whatsoever.

Kuki is careful to distinguish his emphasis on the importance of Japanese culture from the concerns of the Nativist schools of the Tokugawa period, which insisted upon the uniqueness of Japanese culture by contrast with Indian culture as represented by Buddhism and Chinese as represented by Confucianism. He criticizes those who would adopt a Nativist-style nationalism on the grounds that Japanese culture is what it is precisely through its having integrated multiple influences from India and China. His concern in the contemporary historical situation is that Japanese culture is in danger of being effaced by an excessive absorption of Western influences. Himself an ardent admirer of European culture, Kuki also acknowledges the superiority of Western civilization as manifested in its ability to dominate the natural world by means of technology, as well as the benefits to Japan’s growth that have accrued from transnational influences. But his admiration is not unconditional: ‘We respect Europe and America, and we should learn in a spirit of humility what we have to learn from the West, and we should be profoundly grateful for it. However, it is a mistake to take western civilization as an object of blind worship’ (KNS III: 376). He is by no means trumpeting the superiority of Japanese culture, but is simply advocating its development in the face of indiscriminate submission to the West.

The conclusion of Kuki’s lecture reinforces this point, though without trying to resolve the tension between Japanism and globalism, since ‘nationalism and internationalism do not contradict one another’:

The guiding principle for Japanese culture in the future has to be something apparently paradoxical, such as Japanese globalism or global Japanism.
On one hand, as for the future of the Japanese character or the path taken by Japanism we must clearly follow the ideal that guides world history. On the other hand, we must clearly understand that the world-historical mission of the Japanese people cannot be fulfilled in the absence of national awareness of the Japanese character.

(KNS III: 398)

The emphasis on world history is typical of Nishida and the other Kyoto School philosophers, and indeed Kuki’s overall position on internationalism and globalism reflects Nishida’s ideas (he refers to his ‘Forms of Culture’ essay), though with a greater emphasis on culture. In this respect, Nara Hiroshi is surely right to suggest, contra Leslie Pincus, that ‘Kuki’s agenda for the future of Japan was cultural, not political’ (Nara et al. 2004: 115).

1941

In 1941 Nishitani Keiji published a book entitled World-view and Nation-view (Sekaikan to kokkakan) – a title that already suggests that he is considering the nation in the context of the world. In characterizing the beginning of the 1940s as ‘a turning point in world history’, Nishitani writes that ‘politics itself has become world-political in the true sense’ (Dilworth et al. 1998: 381). ‘Of course’, he continues, ‘political developments in the past have also occurred within the framework of international relations, but such developments did not necessarily have what I am calling a world-political significance’. In seeing Japan as a pivotal factor in a turn from what he calls the Atlantic to the Pacific period of world history, by virtue of which ‘the Pacific has now come on to the stage of world history’, he anticipates a shift toward what has since become known as the ‘Pacific Rim’ – which demarcates an increasingly significant arena in geopolitics. This is a case of what he calls ‘a tendency toward bloc formation’, something based on ‘a shared subjectivity [among groups of nations] that takes the world itself as their common foundation’ (Dilworth et al. 1998: 383). So, although Nishitani sees Japan as playing a pivotal role in the formation of a bloc in East-Asia, this is only within a development toward a radically polycentric world order: ‘The fact that the world, no longer having a specific center, . . . has come to have various geographical centers constitutes the simplest and, moreover, the most universal impetus for this new world order’ (Dilworth et al. 1998: 384).

In a section of the book on ‘The Worldview of the New Japan’, Nishitani begins by expressing discomfort with the phrase ‘new Japan’, even as he writes of ‘the great tasks that face Japan in international relations’ (Dilworth et al. 1998: 385). In keeping with his Kyoto School colleagues, he sees an important role for Japan in the world of the near future: ‘The worldview of the new Japan . . . should have as its mission the transmission of the particular values that the traditional spirit of Japan possesses, thereby becoming a fundamental motivating force in the formation of a worldview for the global future of mankind’ (Dilworth et al. 1998: 390). This process is made possible by the structure of the state as Nishitani understands...
it, which has ‘globality immanent in its very existence’ insofar as it harbours an abyss of ‘free subjectivity’ in its depths, which ‘represents the horizon of a globality opening up within the substrate of a citizenry’ (Mori 1995: 322).12

On 7 December 1941 the Japanese bombed the US naval base at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii (just a few miles from where this sentence is being written), which had not at that time been claimed as American soil. The islands had merely been ‘annexed’ in 1898, five years after a gang of American colonialists backed by US marines had staged a coup and overthrown the Hawaiian monarchy. Nishitani has been severely criticized for ‘approving’ of the attack on Pearl Harbor in the course of the famous Chūō Kōron symposia. But David Williams dissents:

The Kyoto School was prepared to support the use of force to break the West’s colonial hegemony over Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific. They viewed Pearl Harbor as an inevitable event because one day Western hegemony of the Pacific had to be forced back.

(Williams 2004: 72)

Williams is surely right to maintain that the discussions by a group of Kyoto thinkers of the justifications for the attack is an epochal event insofar as it marks the beginning of a ‘non-White’ philosophy of global politics.

1942

In July of 1942 Nishitani participated in a symposium that was held in Tokyo under the auspices of the magazine Literary World and with the title ‘Overcoming Modernity’. His presentation understands the Pacific War (then in its eighth month) as an opportunity for ‘the establishment of a new world order’ that could result from a successful Japanese challenge to ‘Anglo-Saxon domination in Asia’. Japan has the capacity for successful resistance thanks to its high level of ‘moral energy’ (a term derived from the German historian Leopold Ranke), but Nishitani emphasizes that this moral energy must be cultivated as something transnational:

[If it is only a Japanese ethic] it has no connection to the ethics of the world, and in certain circumstances can be linked to injustices like making other peoples and nations objects of colonization. It can be put at the service of the personal grudges of a nation, as it were. In our country today the moral energy that is the driving force of national ethics must at the same time directly energize a world ethic.

(Minamoto 1995: 219)

Minamoto Ryōen describes the conclusive thrust of Nishitani’s contribution as follows:

[Nishitani] expounded ‘a correlation between nation and world’ and argued that the nation must get beyond a standpoint centred on itself alone and direct
Nishitani’s argument is complex but, simply put, it develops an analogy between the Buddhist negation of the ego-self (anatman, or muga) at the level of the individual, a realization of oneself as a network of relations in the field of dependent co-arising, and a corresponding process on the level of the nation. As Nishitani describes it in a postscript he added a few years later:

Finally I reached the standpoint of national non-ego, or a horizon of globality, that becomes immanent in the nation through a self-negation of the nation’s self-centredness. The basic point at which my thought broke with nationalism is that it regarded the global nature of the nation as a subjectivity of non-ego brought about through self-negation, and that this standpoint must somehow open up not only within Japan but within all nations.

(Minamoto 1995: 322)

Once again, we have a Japanese philosopher who is nationalistic in his support for the war against the powers of Western imperialism, but who is at the same time internationalist is encouraging Japan to contribute to ‘a world ethic’ and the establishment of a ‘communality of nations’.13

1943

In May 1943, some eighteen months into the Pacific War, Nishida was invited to meet with a group of politicians and government officials to discuss a draught of a document entitled ‘Proclamation of the Greater East Asiatic Nations’. At this meeting he criticized Japanese policy in Asia for being imperialistic and emphasized that Japan should not behave in a ‘colonialist’ way overseas. In response to a request to articulate what Japan’s role in the world should be, he wrote a short essay entitled ‘Fundamental Principles of a New World Order’ (Yusa 2004: 321).14 This piece has been criticized as nationalistic propaganda, but since Nishida very much wanted the government to take his views into account, he apparently felt obliged to make some concessions in terminology in order to get his main point across. At any rate, that main point is a logical extension and fitting capstone to his previous ideas about internationalism.

The essay begins by characterizing the nineteenth century as ‘an age of national self-awakening, an age of so-called imperialism’, in which nations fought each other for power and without any sense of a ‘world-historical mission’ beyond their nationalistic goals and aspirations. By contrast, Nishida sees the world of
1943 as being in ‘an age of global self-awakening’ in which nations become aware of themselves as existing in a global world comprising a multiplicity of particular worlds. Anticipating the effects of rapid advances in the technologies of transportation and communication, he writes:

Today, as a result of scientific, technological, and economic development, all nations and peoples have entered into one compact global space. Solving this problem lies in no way other than for each nation to awaken to its world-historical mission and for each to transcend itself while remaining thoroughly true to itself, and to construct one ‘multi-world’ (sekai teki sekai).

(Dilworth et al. 1998: 73)

The force of calling the goal a ‘multi-world’, or ‘world-of-worlds’, is that the world of each nation will not simply merge into one undifferentiated totality, but rather ‘Each nation and people is established on its own historical foundation’ insofar as they will all ‘transcend themselves while remaining true to themselves’ (Dilworth et al. 1998: 74).

In the context of the Pacific War, Nishida supposes that in uniting against Western imperialism the nations of East Asia will first form a ‘particular world’ (corresponding to a regional bloc in Nishitani) together on the way to a more comprehensive globalization, thereby achieving ‘their own world-historical missions as East-Asian peoples’. He goes on to suggest that the formation of this ‘particular world’, the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, will take place around a ‘core’ – namely, Japan, with its ‘national polity’. This move of Nishida’s has been especially criticized, but surely he makes it for diplomatic reasons, in order to retain the attention of his prospective readers in the government and the military. An obvious reason for taking Japan as the core is that it was the only country in East Asia not to have been ravaged by the Western colonial powers. But a core is not actually required by the logic of what Nishida calls ‘world-formation’, and is even contradicted by it:

In historical world-formation each people must at every point be the centre. This is the basic motivating force of world-formation. Even if one speaks of a co-prosperity sphere, the peoples that become its constituents must be formed historically and not selected abstractly as in the League of Nations . . . However, a racialism that centres only on its own people and is devoid of true worldhood within itself – a racialism that merely thinks of the rest of the world only from its own perspective – is nothing but a racist egotism; and what emerges from that cannot but degenerate as a matter of course into aggression or imperialism.

(Dilworth et al. 1998: 76)

If the formation of a world-of-worlds takes place historically, with ‘each people must at every point be the centre’, the process of world-formation is – as it is for Nishitani – radically polycentric, and there is no need for Japan, or any other
country, to be the ‘core’. The second part of the passage just quoted exposes the absurdity of the accusations against Nishida for complicity with Japanese aggression and imperialism. The emphasis on polycentricity also contradicts Nishida’s occasional claims for the centrality of the Japanese ‘national polity’ (kokutai), which can be seen in context as aberrations from the main line of his political thinking for diplomatic reasons.15

2006

This has by no means been a defence of the political philosophies in toto of these prominent Kyoto School thinkers: the precondition for such a formidable task – serious and detailed textual study of those philosophies in their historical context – has only recently begun to be met in the Anglophone academy. The aim has simply been to point out patterns and motifs in their writings, whereby a nationalism stimulated in part by Western imperialism in Asia develops into, and coexists with, an internationalist stance that anticipates and encourages a genuine globalism.

In some respects Nishida and his colleagues were ahead of their time in anticipating a globalizing world when they did, though they were by no means the first to assert the compatibility of nationalism with internationalism. They were probably familiar with Friedrich Meinecke’s classic work on cosmopolitanism and nationalism from 1907, Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat, which discusses the ideas of figures like Herder, Fichte, Humboldt, and Schlegel. With such thinkers, as Meinecke puts it, ‘Cosmopolitanism and nationalism stood side by side in a close, living relationship for a long time’ (Meinecke 1970: 94). They may also have been aware of the ideas of Giuseppi Mazzini, whose efficacious Italian nationalism was always informed by a cosmopolitan perspective, as evidenced by his well-known exhortation to the Italian working man in 1844: ‘Your first duties... are toward Humanity. You are men before you are either citizens or fathers’ (Mazzini 1898: 57).

In writing about Western influences on the Japanese character, Kuki was probably unaware that he was echoing John Stuart Mill’s famous dictum from 1848: ‘There is no nation that does not need to borrow from others, not merely particular arts or practices, but essential points of character in which its own type is inferior’ (Mill 1848: 119).

If Japanese nationalism sometimes seems deeper than the German or Italian versions, that is perhaps because the Japanese had been assimilating aspects of Chinese, Korean, and Indian culture for well over a thousand years before they fully opened up to Western influences, thereby making the question of what is Japanese more pressing over a longer period of time. But it is important to distinguish between the particularistic nationalism of the Nihonjinron theorists (and reactionary right-wing movements in Japan today) and the internationalist stance of the Kyoto School thinkers. Indeed a significant implication of Nishitani’s work on nihilism is that to find the meaning of existence in one’s belonging to a particular nation is a symptom of a nihilism that is not even conscious of itself.16

When Nishida in 1934 exhorts Japanese politicians to reject their particularistic nationalism, acknowledge Japan’s interdependence with other nations, and work
toward ‘global collaboration’, this sounds like eminently sensible advice for those responsible for conducting United States foreign policy in 2006. And when the same year he exhorts his compatriots to preserve their national viewpoints as they strive to understand other cultures, the relevance to the early twenty-first century is again striking – as the countries of Europe struggle to maintain their cultural integrity within the context of the European Union, and many of the world’s cultures falter under the global-capitalism-powered onslaught of American ‘culture’. Similarly, Kuki’s internationalist attitude toward the development of Japanese culture serves as a salutary corrective to the nationalistic censoring of school history books that is again in vogue with a new regime in Japan, whose aim is to inculcate in the young ‘patriotism’ and ‘pride in their country’ – as if this could not be done more effectively by honestly acknowledging past crimes and atrocities (of the kind perpetrated by almost all nations of the world). That way, remembered nationally, they are less likely to be repeated. Of course, national self-glorification is the norm in school textbooks, and the United States is no exception. American colonialist brutality and the lethal results of the Manifest Destiny doctrine are usually omitted or glossed over: the difference is simply that such censorship has not been the cause of long and bitter complaint on the part of the neighbours (as it has been for China and Korea).

In many respects, then, Nishida, Kuki and Nishitani anticipate what Kwame Anthony Appiah has recently advocated as a ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’: the ideal of maintaining one’s ties to, and focusing one’s energies on, a certain geographical place and cultural space, while at the same time engaging in dialogue with others’ perspectives and values, with the idea of broadening one’s own toward a global horizon (Appiah 2005: chap. 6). Yet in many countries today, the situation is the same as it was for the Kyoto School thinkers: the ones who need to be persuaded, the politicians, are simply not listening.

Notes
1 Kuki Shūzō, ‘Nihonteki seikaku ni tsuite’, in Kuki Shūzō Zenshū, vol. III, has been referred as KNS. I have made the very occasional, very slight modification to others’ translations where I thought it appropriate. My thanks to colleagues at the Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales (INALCO) who made helpful comments on the first presentation of this paper, in Paris on 2 December 2006.
2 While it is not an explicitly elaborated theme in his study, Nishida’s internationalism is a topic that Goto-Jones discusses intelligently in several parts of his book, and I shall draw copiously from these discussions in what follows.
3 Kuki is regarded by some as a peripheral member of the Kyoto School, though he taught at Kyoto Imperial University from 1929 until his death in 1940.
4 See Stegewerns 2003, in which not one of the contributions mentions Nishida or any other member of the Kyoto School.
5 Tanabe Hajime, the second most prominent figure in the Kyoto School, develops a more complex and sophisticated model of the relations between the family and the state: see David Williams’s translation of his essay ‘On the Logic of Co-prosperity Spheres: Toward a Philosophy of Regional Blocs’, in Williams 2004: 188–99.
6 For a trenchant criticism of Dale’s mistreatment of Tanabe Hajime, see Williams 2004.
Most scholars agree that the term *iki* is untranslatable, and so is best left untranslated. ‘Urbane, plucky stylistliness’ is a gloss suggested by Nara (p. 1).


9 Pincus borrows the term ‘national aesthetics’ from Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, who uses it in connection with Heidegger in his *Heidegger, Art, and Politics*. See the substantial number of entries in the index under ‘Fascism’ and ‘Kuki’s fascist affinities’ – under the latter heading are references to 25 of the book’s 250 pages. When Goto-Jones (2005) writes (in an endnote) that ‘Kuki is well served by Pincus’, one has to suspect a moment of mental aberration and beg to disagree, at least as far as nationalism is concerned (Goto-Jones 2005: 161). In fact Kuki’s ideas about internationalism turn out to be similar to, though less well elaborated than, the ideas that inform Nishida’s political thinking in this area.

The exception here is Karatani Kojin, who follows Dale in criticizing Kuki’s politics on the basis of an association with Heidegger, and who is followed in turn by Pincus. For a discussion of Karatani’s criticisms, see Parkes 1997.

My thanks to Setsuko Aihara for assistance with translations from the Japanese.

David Williams has intimated how important the concept of ‘subjectivity’ (*shutaisei*) is in the political philosophy of the Kyoto School, subjectivity understood as a combination of ‘national self-discipline and rational self-mastery’ (Williams 2004: 63).

For a nuanced and somewhat critical view of Nishitani as an internationalist thinker, see the section entitled ‘Nishitani Keiji’s Globalist Nationalism in John C. Maraldo’s ‘Questioning Nationalism Now and Then’ in *Rude Awakenings*, where he writes: ‘I suggest that in the 1940s Nishitani did not set himself up as an advocate of state or ethnic nationalism, but of a globalism that seriously mistook his nation’s capacity to negate itself and overcome self-centeredness’ (Maraldo 1995: 355).

Afraid that the military would find Nishida’s rather dense text incomprehensible, the convener of the meeting had it revised to make it accessible to a non-philosophical audience. See the illuminating comparison of the two versions in Goto-Jones 2005: 75–80.

For a fuller account of the political significance of Nishida’s late philosophy, see Goto-Jones 2005: 47–67, and on the notion of *kokutai* especially pp. 80–94.

Keiji Nishitani 1990: chap. 10.


Loewen (1996) provides, in spite of the hyperbolic subtitle, a valuable survey of the field. Zinn (2005) is an exemplary presentation of complementary narratives.

References


Nishida Kitarō (1911/1990), *An Inquiry into the Good*, Masao Abe and Ives, Christopher (trans), New Haven: Yale University Press.


