

THE OVERFLOWING SOUL: IMAGES OF TRANSFORMATION IN NIETZSCHE'S *ZARATHUSTRA*

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Bless the cup that wants to overflow,
that the water may flow from it golden and
carry everywhere the reflection of your de-
light!

See! This cup wants to become empty
again, and Zarathustra wants to become
man again.

— Thus began Zarathustra's going under.

Zarathustra to the sun; Prologue, § 1

Also Sprach Zarathustra is, as the subtitle *Ein Buch für Alle und Keinen* intimates, a book for everybody and no one. It may be understood on many levels, yet Nietzsche despaired of its ever being fully fathomed. It demands a psychological transformation on the part of the reader, but the call is hard to hear and difficult to respond to. While *Zarathustra* is many books, just as Zarathustra's speeches are many, it is possible to discern two major currents of discourse: one is a dialogue with the history of Western philosophy and religion, the other — my primary interest here — the related story of a soul overflowing, a stream of images inviting participation in their play.

The psychological aspects of *Zarathustra* have not been well understood, having been largely overlooked. Such oversight derives in turn from a tendency to try to comprehend the work as an articulation of various concepts rather than entertain it as a carefully orchestrated play of images. In what follows I suggest a reading which, through focusing on the ways some of the images work, opens up the psychological dimension of the book and at the same time contributes to our

understanding of its major philosophical themes.

I follow Heidegger in taking the three principal ideas in *Zarathustra* to be the overman, will to power, and the eternal recurrence of the same.¹ Heidegger emphasizes that these ideas are intimately related, and I take this interrelationship as grounds for the otherwise over-ambitious attempt to engage more than one of them in the confines of a brief essay. My approach distinguishes itself from previous efforts through being responsive to the imagery through which these major ideas are presented. Their logic is different from that of concepts, which define by excluding opposites; rather, by playing along continuums of gradations, they speak through a *logos* of imagination, whose perspectives open up multiplicities of meanings, in a speech incomprehensible to reason alone.

In what follows, the primary focus will be on images of the overman, approached from the perspective of will to power; and, incidentally, some light may be shed on that heaviest and most difficult of thoughts, the eternal recurrence.

I. Will to power

It is much easier to say what will to power is *not* than what it is. Willing is no kind of wishing, nor power merely physical force; nor – most important of all – does will to power have much to do with will-power. The agent of will-power in the psyche is the I (*das Ich*), and especially the I imagined as *hero* – the strong one in charge, who attacks problems and gets things done through exercising firm control over the musculature. In *Zarathustra* the I is something to be overcome,² and Zarathustra and the overman are shown to be quite anti-heroic: “[The sublime one] should discard his heroic will...the ether itself should elevate him, the will-less one....To stand with relaxed muscles and unharnessed will... For this is the secret of the soul: only when the hero has abandoned her does there approach, in a dream – the overhero” (G147–8, E 118–9). The overhero is will-less in that his power comes from a deeper and broader source than that of the heroic I. *Zarathustra* is full of allusions to the Homeric epics – but they continually liken Zarathustra to the wily Odysseus, as opposed to the classical hero, Achilles: he is “vulnerable only in the heel” (G 143, E 113), and would *prefer* to “be a day-labourer in the underworld, amongst the shades of the past” (G 150, E 120).

Whereas will-power is a prerogative of human beings, will to power

is an all-pervasive life-force. “Where I found the living, there I found will to power,” says Zarathustra (G 143, E 114); and in a passage from the *Nachlass* the scope of the term is broadened beyond all life to all existence: “*This world is will to power – and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power – and nothing besides!*”³ Heidegger understands the question with which Zarathustra is faced at the beginning of the book to be: “Does my will correspond to the will that as will to power prevails through the totality of existence?”⁴

While an important precursor of Nietzsche’s idea is Schopenhauer’s *Wille*, which is a similarly cosmic force and not merely a human faculty, more significantly analogous is, I think, Plato’s *eros*. One often misunderstood feature of will to power highlighted by this analogy is that, like *eros*, it is neutral with respect to opposites such as good and evil, beautiful and ugly. It is not that will to power is in itself a good thing, and the more you have the closer you are to becoming an overman: ascetic priests – martyrs especially – manifest enormous amounts of will to power, but are far from Nietzsche’s ideal.⁵ It is rather a question of the *style* with which it is channeled: does it weigh one heavily down to the ground, or let one dance lightly over the abyss? Does it manifest in collective and life-inhibiting evaluations, or through individual and creative affirmations beyond good and evil?

The first published mention of will to power is in *Zarathustra*, in the section entitled “On the Thousand and One Goals,” where its *interpretative* character is made clear. Power is attained over oneself, other people and things, through interpreting the world in terms of opposite value-judgments. Such a mode of interpretation is at first a collective phenomenon, with a tendency towards rigidification, and only later arises the possibility of creative, individual interpretation (G 71, E 59). The book’s first image for will to power is the “tablet of the good” which hangs over every people. The significant feature here is rigidity, and Nietzsche emphasizes the need to hammer away at and break the tablets of petrified values. The interpretative fluidity at which he aims is reminiscent of Platonic *eros*, often conceived of as a flow, and anticipates the similarly labile *libido* of psychoanalysis.

While the parallel with *eros* finds further support through the recurrent emphasis in *Zarathustra* on love and desire as “arrows of longing for the overman,” one can press the analogy even further back to *eros* as the kind of cosmogonic force described in Orphic mythology, or even to the more “primitive” but universal idea of *mana* as a soul-energy that pervades all existence, albeit in heavier concentrations in more “animate” things such as human beings than in rocks and streams.⁶

In relating will to power to soul, it is important to realize that two very different notions of soul are to be found in Nietzsche's writings. One is the Christian/Cartesian conception, which sees the soul as unitary, immortal, and self-encapsulated – and which Nietzsche is out to subvert. The other is a pagan Greek idea, which views the soul as multiple, radically mortal, and totally upon in its participation in the world soul: this is the sense of soul which Nietzsche would like to see restored and re-interpreted,⁷ and which is central to the idea of *Zarathustra*. Let us briefly reflect on some of the images Nietzsche employs to express the soul's participation in the realms of natural phenomena and the worlds of animals and plants.

In Presocratic thought the human soul is associated with the world soul through each of the four elements. If the soul is not related to the earth per se, it is at least always imagined as being *material*, however rarefied the matter. Thales holds that the entire universe is ensouled, and that everything is ultimately *water*. Anaximenes understands the soul to be a portion of the cosmic *air* that has been temporarily separated from it through being enclosed in the body. And Herakleitos sees the soul as being composed of the ever-living *fire* that constitutes the universe. In *Zarathustra* we find the soul associated with each of the elements, although primarily with water. Let us follow these streams of imagery which relate the soul's participation in the cosmic ocean of will to power, beginning from their source in the Prologue.

We learn early that Zarathustra loves “him whose soul squanders itself, who wants no thanks and does not give back: for he always gives and does not want to preserve himself” (G 13, E 15). And, a few lines later: “I love him whose soul is overfull, so that he forgets himself and all things are in him: thus all things become his going under” (G 14, E 16). When one forgets the separate self, when one dies away from the encapsulated soul, one comes to participate in all things. Later Zarathustra speaks of “the soul that loves itself most, in which all things have their flow and counterflow, their ebb and flood...” (G 257, E 209). This kind of self-love, which Nietzsche sees as hard to cultivate, is far from narcissistic egoism, and is achieved rather through dissolving the boundaries which separate the self from the world.

Many forms of water contribute to the theme of the overflowing soul – *Zarathustra* abounds in floods and fountains, lakes and ponds, dew and ice, rivers and streams, waterfalls and wells – but the greatest aquatic presence by far is the *sea*. The sea is a recurring image for man, the overman, life – and the world.⁸ Throughout Nietzsche's writings it plays in counterpoint to the *land*: whereas the land provides solid

ground on which to take a stand, the sea with its ceaseless turmoil calls for Protean changes of perspective and the seafarer's dance over scintillating quanta of interpretative will to power.

But what is most striking about the water imagery of *Zarathustra* is that presentations of the sea in the text outnumber by more than twelve to one appearances of lakes. This is all the more remarkable since the place in which *Zarathustra* was conceived, the Upper Engadin, affords numerous lakes capable of reflecting a wide variety of psychical conditions. It is significant, too, that the book's first sentence tells of Zarathustra's "leaving the lake of his home" to go up to an even more complete isolation in the mountains. We find lake and sea joined together in an especially significant image which appears at the opening of Part Two:

My impatient love overflows in rivers, downwards, towards rising and setting. Out of silent mountains and thunderstorms of suffering my soul rushes into the valleys. ...

And may my river of love plunge into pathless places! How should a river not finally find its way to the sea!

Indeed, a lake is in me, solitary and self-sufficient; but my river of love tears it away down — to the sea!

(G 102, E 84)

The lake is the soul contained, the waters of *eros* enclosed, where calm can reign and reflection take place.⁹ But when desire (what the depth psychologists call "libido") overflows into rivers — sometimes torrents rushing down, sometimes a slow and circuitous meander — it eventually finds its way to the sea, where the soul merges with the world as waves of will to power. Our relation to the ocean is a good analogue for the paradoxical nature of participation. On the one hand, its apparently infinite expanse and abysmal depths, together with the endless rhythms of its waves, intensify the sense of our spatio-temporal finitude. On the other hand, prolonged contemplation of the ocean tends to lessen its otherness: we come to feel that the rhythms of its waves are a breathing, the movements of its tides those of the body's internal secretions, that its motions mirror human emotions, from placid calm through agitated turbulence to the orgasmic crashing of waves against a rocky shore. The sea out there is experienced as the same as the watery inner realms of the body; the soul overflows. On the shore, we feel apart from, yet a part of the totality.¹⁰

An experiential understanding of this kind of participation is also

possible while still on *terra firma* – as long as one heeds Nietzsche’s admonition to “*Sit* as little as possible; don’t believe any thought which was not born outdoors and in free movement – in which the muscles too are not celebrating a feast.”¹¹ The “feast of thinking” is most propitiously celebrated in a country like the Engadin: walking in such a place, the body (and perhaps especially the sick body) itself comes to surge and pulse with the power of nature, with the power of torrent rushing and tree thrusting and the still, silent power of the mountain.

We are further asked to understand the entire world as a *dynamic play* of will to power – a world that has been frozen into a still tableau of stable and substantial things by the muscle-bound I in an attempt to affirm its own substantiality.¹² As we let the energy that animates the rest of nature move our muscles in walking, we enter into the dance of the world; and if we look with unprejudiced eyes, we become – as mountain peaks turn slowly through the sky, trees drift across faces of rock, pathside flowers swing through hedges and bushes, and clouds skim over puddles – not only spectators of but actors in the dynamic play of the cosmos.

II. The overman

Zarathustra presents an image of the *Übermensch*, a term best translated as “overman.” (While the German “*Mensch*,” meaning “human being,” is actually neutral as to gender, “overperson” would be too inelegant a neologism.) The traditional translation of “*Übermensch*” as “superman” is misleading in that it places undue emphasis on the *above* aspect of the “*über*”: while the above is *one* of the term’s connotations, it is in this case a subsidiary one. But given how long the “above” has held sway, and since the depths are more important in *Zarathustra* than the heights, it may be good to redress the balance by going to the other extreme and reading the “overman” entirely in relation to self-overcoming and going *across*. Nietzsche is clearly thinking neither of the ultimate product of Darwinian evolution nor of a higher type of human being, since both these types appear in *Zarathustra* (the “last men” in section 5 of the Prologue, the “higher men” throughout Part Four), and Zarathustra himself takes great pains to distinguish these from the overman of whom he is advocate. In this section I shall focus primarily on the Prologue, since with Nietzsche’s imagery the first presentations are all-important, and the Prologue offers *in nuce* a

full picture of the overman.

The overman is introduced in the context of Zarathustra's first encounter with society after his withdrawal to the mountain-top, as he arrives in the market place of a town where a crowd of people have gathered to see a tightrope dancer perform. Zarathustra's first words to the people are: "*I teach you the overman. Man is something that shall be overcome*" (G 8, E 12). The condition is to be realized by overcoming man as he has been so far, and especially the idea of the encapsulated self. The rope dancer is himself an important and generally ignored image for the overman: he is a *dancer*,¹³ and he goes under while going *over*. This going over is a going *across*: man, for Nietzsche, is a being in transition, always underway. Zarathustra's second speech to the people begins:

Man is a rope, fastened between animal and overman, — a rope over an abyss.

A dangerous across, a dangerous on-the-way, a dangerous looking back, a dangerous shuddering and stopping.

What is great in man is that he is a bridge and no goal; what can be loved in man is that he is a *going over* and a *going under*.

(G 10–11, E 14–15)

In the next few pages we encounter several more telling images of the overman. At the same time as he is presented as a *sea*, his connexion with the *earth* is firmly established. "The overman is the sense of the earth. ...I beseech you, my brothers, *remain faithful to the earth* and do not believe those who speak to you of otherworldly hopes." (G 8–9, E 13) The overman is the "*Sinn*" of the earth, a word that means "meaning," "aim," "purpose," as well as "sense"; but this last translation is preferable since it brings out the connexion with the *body* ("*die Sinne*" are "the senses") that constitutes the overman's relation to the earth. Rejecting the path of transcendent escape to a supra-celestial spiritual realm or a Christian heaven, the overman maintains a sense for the body: "O despisers of the body! You are no bridge to the overman!" (G 37, E 35)

Because man is a being in transition, the bridge to the overman is nothing fixed, nothing substantial, but rather a rainbow: "I shall join the creators, the harvesters, the celebrants: I shall show them the rainbow and all the steps to the overman" (G 22, E 24). The rainbow is a bridge on which it is impossible to get a foothold, since its ends continually recede when approached. The way over is elusive, impos-

sible to grasp – as is its prerequisite (the transformation of the will into a harmony with the eternal recurrence) in its first proclamation: “*That man be delivered from revenge, that is for me the bridge to the highest hope and a rainbow after long storms*” (G 124, E 99).

A more substantial bow releases a less substantial image of the way over in the curved form of the trajectory of the arrow: “I love the great despisers, for they are the great reverers and arrows of longing for the other shore” (G 11, E 15). In speaking of the most despicable as the “last man,” Zarathustra expresses his fear that “The time is coming when man no longer projects the arrow of his longing over past man, and the string of his bow has unlearned its whirring!” (G 13, E 17) The arrow, as an image, has a point, the aim of which is death. (The Greek language let *Herakleitos* point out that “The name of the bow (*biós*) is life (*bíos*) but its work is death.”) The way across to the overman is a going under, and the appropriate virtue is “the will to go under and an arrow of longing” (G 11, E 15). For Zarathustra, going under goes together with loving (G 153, E 123), and this connexion is emphasized in the repetition of the phrase “arrows of longing for the overman” and in the erotic aspect of the arrow which pierces and wounds and makes suffer those whom it hits.

Later in the Prologue, the soul’s affinity with *fire* is suggested by a striking image of the overman: “So where is the lightning to lick you with its tongue? Where is the madness with which you must be inoculated? See, I teach you the overman: he is this lightning, he is this madness!” (G 10, E 14) When the weather in the world of the spirit becomes ever heavier and more oppressive, the reduction of tension in “the dark cloud of man” is effected by thunder and lightning. The release that the lightning of the overman brings is sudden and violent, and the illumination he provides intermittent and temporary: the ways things are is seen in a flash (as of the lightning in *Herakleitos*, which steers the whole universe), rather than under the steady shining of a Platonic sun. Similarly, the enlightenment of the overman must appear to normal consciousness as *Wahnsinn* – sense deranged, Dionysiac madness. And yet, unlike most forms of Dionysiac madness which are collective, the madness of the overman strikes the *individual* in his individuality: the crucial stages of self-transformation take place “in the loneliest desert” (on land with *no* water) or in “one’s loneliest loneliness.” The earlier phases of self-overcoming occur outside the accepted social and political framework: “Where the state *ends* – there...[are] the rainbow and bridges of the overman” (G 60, E 51).

And yet there is a solar aspect to the overman also: the image of the

Idea of the Good shines through the obscurity of *Zarathustra*, in spite of Nietzsche's opposition to Plato. (It is the ascetic/puritan side of Sokrates/Plato that Nietzsche opposes; this does not preclude his being in sympathy with Plato's mytho-poetical inclinations.) "The great noon" is the hour that awaits Zarathustra; his will must become creatively solar; the Dionysiacs must merge with the Apollinian: one-sided beings would "flee from the burning sun of that wisdom in which the overman joyously bathes his nakedness" (G 181, E 144). But the sun that recurs as an image for the will and wisdom of the overman differs from the Platonic sun in *not* being absolutely transcendent. Nietzsche's ambivalent inversion of the Platonic tradition (which pervades the entire work) is announced in the book's opening scene in a pair of playful images: whereas for Sokrates the cave is a place of ignorance within the earth, for Zarathustra it is a place of enlightenment on the mountain-top; and while in Plato the Idea of the Good is absolutely transcendent to all life in the sensible realm, Nietzsche's sun *needs* Zarathustra and his animals in order to be what it is.

For a more integrated set of images for the transition to the overman, we move to the animal realm and to the series of transformations of the spirit from camel to lion to child, introduced in the first of Zarathustra's speeches proper, "Of the Three Transformations" (G 25–7, E 25–7). The human spirit first takes on the burden of the heaviest and most difficult demands laid on it by its heritage.¹⁴ The spirit must suffer the full weight of this burden before a throwing it off can effect an authentic transformation. But, as we see from the other passage in which the camel appears, to take upon oneself these values borne down upon the spirit from the past brings with it alienation, landing the camel in the midst of an arid desert.

But it is only man who is a difficult and heavy burden for himself! That is because he carries on his shoulders too much that is alien to him. Like the camel, he kneels down and lets himself be well loaded. ...he loads himself with too many *alien* words and values that are heavy and difficult, — then life seems like a desert to him!

(G 239, E 193)

Once the burden of the past has been properly shouldered, the strength and violence of the *lion* is needed to throw it off. A creature with the power of the lion is necessary because the hundreds of commandments that come down from tradition have become embodied in the figure of the great *dragon*. "Thou shalt," on whose scales shine "values thou-

sands of years old” (G 26, E 27). To acquire the lion’s strength sufficient to overcome the dragon is no easy task: Zarathustra laments at the end of Part Two that he still lacks “the lion’s voice for commanding” (G 185, E 146); and even later he has still not found “the strength and the lion’s voice to summon” his most abysmal thought – the thought of eternal recurrence (G 201, E 162).

But to reach the stage of the lion is still not enough: if the spirit stops there it is left with too much pride, in ruthless and nihilistic rejection of all traditional values – a stance ascribed to Nietzsche and the overman by superficial readers. The lion must give up its arrogant if splendid isolation from society, and assume the innocence and spontaneity of the *child* for the transition to the overman to be effected. The image of the child in *Zarathustra* is complex, and operates on several different levels simultaneously. While Zarathustra has the task of himself becoming a child, a part of which is the redemption (in the psychoanalytic sense) of his own personal childhood,¹⁵ he also must himself become pregnant and give birth to the children of his soul (in the sense discussed by Sokrates and Diotima in the *Symposium*). Again the spirit of Dionysos animates this theme, in that he is one of the few Greek deities of whose childhood the myths tell – of his being torn to pieces and devoured by the Titans, and being subsequently reborn.

The infant does not know the distinctions between inner and outer, self and world, good and evil; all these the adult has to unlearn, yet remember. In the child the forces of life find uninhibited expression in *play*, which at the level of the overman becomes cosmic play, the dance of the universe. But a necessary preliminary is the coming to terms with one’s personal childhood. In the first of a series of four dreams which prepare Zarathustra for his announcement of the thought of recurrence, a child comes to him carrying a mirror – one of the toys given to the infant Dionysos (G 101, E 83). In the second dream Zarathustra finds himself in the “lonely mountain-castle of death,” where the redemption of his childhood is imagined as the tombs of his past bursting open: “And from a thousand grimaces of children, angels, owls, fools, and butterflies as big as children, it laughed and roared and mocked at me” (G 170, E 159). And just before the culmination of the first major epiphany of the recurrence, Zarathustra experiences a vivid flashback to his early childhood (G 197, E 159).

While Zarathustra’s children are something he has to *search* for – he is embarked, Odysseus-like, upon a voyage across the farthest sea, leaving mother- and father-land behind for his “children’s land” (G 151, E 121) – he has also, through having turned his *eros* back upon his own

psyche, himself become pregnant:

...for his children's sake Zarathustra must perfect himself.

For at bottom one loves only one's child and one's work; and where there is great love of oneself, it is a true sign of pregnancy: so have I found it.

My children are still green for me in their first spring, standing close to each other and shaken by the same winds, the trees of my garden and my best soil.

(G 200, E 161)

Here the idea of Zarathustra's thoughts as children connects with a strain of agricultural and botanical metaphors that runs throughout the work, and which effects a balance between the ideas of the natural and organic development of thoughts and of the need to plant and tend and harvest, to help the natural process along (by participating in it) towards more abundant fulfillment. Of particular importance is the extended metaphor of Zarathustra's *ripening*. Having earlier likened his teachings to ripe figs falling from the trees (G 105, E 85), in the great dialogue with his soul that follows the second major attempt at imparting the idea of recurrence, Zarathustra sings:

O my soul, I gave your soil all wisdom to drink, all new wines and all immemorially old and strong wines of wisdom.

O my soul, I poured upon you every sun and every night and every silence and every yearning: — then you grew up for me like a vine.

O my soul, overrich and heavy you stand there now, a vine with swelling udders and crowded brown gold-grapes: — pressed and crowded by your happiness, waiting in your overflowing and still bashful about waiting.

O my soul, nowhere is there a soul more loving and embracing and comprehensive than you!

(G 275, E 222–3)

The transition from lion to child recurs at the very end of the book, tying several strands of imagery together. Sitting on the stone near the entrance to his cave, Zarathustra suddenly finds himself surrounded by a flock of doves and a lion stretched out at his feet (G 402, E 325). (He had already predicted that the sign that his hour had come would be “the laughing lion with the flock of doves” — G 246, E 196). His final speech begins: “Well then! The lion came, my children are near,

Zarathustra has ripened, my hour has come..." (G 404, E 327).

It may be illuminating to understand the series of transformations from camel to lion to child, which forms the link between the elemental/vegetative and the human realms, against the background of a tripartite schema which articulates the vicissitudes of the soul's relationship with the world. In the first phase (that of the camel), whether as a neonate or a so-called "primitive," one's individual soul is hardly differentiated from the world soul, one participates relatively unconsciously in the phenomena of the world. Gradually, as the individual or the race develops, self becomes more differentiated from other, subject distinguished from object, and one reaches a condition of *observing* rather than participating in the phenomena. (This would be the stage of the lion.) Such separation of the self from the world, the forging of an individual identity, is difficult, and takes various forms, ranging from objective, scientific detachment to spiritual withdrawal of the kind from which Zarathustra comes down at the beginning of the book. But there is a third possibility, which constitutes the "synthesis" phase of a quasi-Hegelian triad: after unconscious participation and (self-) conscious detachment, there is the possibility of the reintegration of self and world, of *reflective* participation on a higher plane in which the first two stages are *aufgehoben*. It is the process of arriving at this third stage (that of the child), that is Zarathustra's major task throughout the book.

The important point to emerge from a consideration of these images of self-transformation in *Zarathustra* is that the condition of the overman is not one of detachment from the world, but rather of reflective participation. This is expressed through the preponderance of images of natural phenomena – of rocks and stones, winds and waves, trees and plants, sun, moon and stars – and, above all, of animals (over seventy species are mentioned by name in the text). One focus has been on participation in the cosmos of nature, but necessary too is reflective participation in human society (the story of *Zarathustra* can be seen as a succession of attempts on his part to re-engage his fellow men), and also in the history of the race (achieved through the realization of the possibility of eternal recurrence and the interrelatedness of all things).

The way to the overman involves remembering the detached stance of the lion while at the same time forgetting both collective camel and individualistic lion for the spontaneous innocence of the child. The past of both the individual and the race is to be remembered and affirmed in order to be subsumed in the creative radiance of the over-

man's solar will. And as the soul overflows its bounds, spreading out through all things, its former condition of containment is both remembered and forgotten as it merges with the ever-living ocean of will to power.

NOTES

1. See Martin Heidegger, "Wer Ist Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" in *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, (Pfullingen: Neske, 1967); English translation by Bernd Magnus in David B Allison (ed.), *The New Nietzsche* (New York: Delta, 1977).
2. G 40-1, E 37. All references to *Zarathustra* will be made within the body of the text: "G" followed by page number referring to the German original in the *Kritische Gesamtausgabe* of Nietzsche's *Werke*, edited by Colli and Montinari (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1968), Vol. VI 1, and "E" followed by page number to the English translation by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin, 1978). The page numbers to the (same) translation in Kaufmann's *The Portable Nietzsche* (hereafter abbreviated "PN") can be found by adding 112. While I have in many cases consulted Kaufmann's translation, and have at times been unable to improve on it, all translations from the German are my own.

For a depth-psychological characterization of the subordinate position of the I in the multiple psyche as understood by Nietzsche, see my essay, "Nietzsche as Psychologist: Speaking the Depths of the Soul" (forthcoming).

3. *Kritische Gesamtausgabe* (hereafter abbreviated KGW) VII, 38 [12]; Walter Kaufmann (ed.), *The Will to Power* (New York: Random House, 1968), § 1067.
4. Heidegger, *op.cit.*, p. 104; *The New Nietzsche*, p. 66.
5. Cf. *Morgenröthe (Dawn)*, § 113, and *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft (The Gay Science)*, § 13.
6. In Section 4 of the Prologue Zarathustra declares his love for "him who prepares earth, animal and plant for [the overman]" (G 11, E 15). F.M. Cornford has shown, in his *From Religion to Philosophy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), the continuity between the ideas of *mana*, of *phusis* in Presocratic thought, and of the world soul in the Platonic and Neoplatonic traditions. Cf. also Owen Barfield's insightful discussion of the vicissitudes of the notion of participation in the Western tradition in his *Saving the Appearances* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World).
7. See, especially, *Jenseits von Gut und Böse (Beyond Good and Evil)*, § 12. I have discussed this issue at length in "Nietzsche as Psychologist," and so have made my treatment here correspondingly brief.
8. In the *Nachlass* passage cited in note 3, Nietzsche speaks of the world as an ocean of will to power: "...a sea of forces storming and flowing together, eternally transforming, eternally flooding back, with enormous years of recurrence, with an ebb and flood of its forms...."
9. Cf. Wallace Stevens, as another who has pondered deeply the differences between calm and turbulent waters: "Lakes are more reasonable than oceans." "Esthétique du Mal," XIV, in *Collected Poems* (New York: Knopf, 1978), p. 235.

10. Cf. *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft (The Gay Science)*, §§ 60 and 310.
11. *Ecce Homo*, "Warum ich so klug bin," § 1; Kaufmann (ed.), *On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo* (New York: Vintage, 1969), p. 239. Cf. also Nietzsche's remark, *contra* Flaubert's contention that one can think and write only while sitting: "Only thoughts reached by *walking* are of value", in *Götzendämmerung (Twilight of the Idols)*, "Sprüche und Pfeile," § 34; *PN*, p. 471.
12. Cf. *Götzendämmerung*, "Die 'Vernunft' in der Philosophie," §§ 2–5, and "Die vier grossen Irrthümer," § 3; *PN*, pp. 480–3 and 494–5. This idea has a parallel in the Hindu ideas of *lila*, cosmic play, and of Shiva as the God who dances the universe into existence.
13. Kaufmann's translation of "*Seiltänzer*" as "tightrope-walker" misses this important allusion. The old saint in the woods, whom Zarathustra has just met on his way down to the town, asks him whether he doesn't "walk like a dancer."
14. Kaufmann's translation of "*schwer*" as "difficult" loses its equally important connotation in this section of "heavy."
15. "...whoever wants to become a child must still overcome his youth too." (G 185, E 147); see "Nietzsche as Psychologist" for a discussion of this theme.