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NIETZSCHE, PANPSYCHISM
AND PURE EXPERIENCE:
AN EAST-ASIAN CONTEMPLATIVE
PERSPECTIVE

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In one of his more incisive provocations Nietzsche ridicules the realists' naïve belief in the neutral purity of their experience:

That mountain there! That cloud there! What is 'real' about those? Try taking away the phantasm and the entire human *contribution*, you sober [realists]! Yes, if only you could do *that!* If you could forget your heritage, your past, your training – your entire humanity and animality! For us there is no 'reality' – nor for you either, you sober ones. (*GS* sec. 57, *KSA* 3:421)¹

In other words, it is impossible to extract from our current awareness the sedimentations, accumulated over millennia, of previous animal as well as cultural experience, impossible to escape the ways in which "some phantasy, some prejudice, some unreason, some ignorance, some fear and who knows what else" have woven their way into our "every feeling and sense-impression" (*ibid.*). And especially, it appears, when it comes to our experience of the natural world. However, one also finds passages in Nietzsche's works suggesting that it may after all be possible to check that ancient positing, perhaps through some kind of phenomenological *epochē*, and let natural phenomena like mountains and clouds simply show themselves, from themselves – perhaps even as they are in themselves? If this were possible, what would it be like? How would nature look?

Behind these questions is a practical concern. Insofar as things tend to go wrong when we lack clear awareness of the situation, any improvement of the currently dismal state of the world is probably going to come from a clarification of our experience. A particularly dismal situation is the ongoing devastation of the earth and its climate. One reason it is so difficult to persuade people in the developed countries to care about this crisis is that they have so little direct experience of natural phenomena,

given the extent to which contemporary urban life enables us to insulate ourselves from them. It would surely be helpful if one could escape or subvert the "social construction" of the natural world that some theorists claim must always condition our experience, in order to get back "to the things [of nature] themselves". Nietzsche's talk of the possibility of our experiencing the natural world as "de-anthropomorphised", "de-divinised" or "newly redeemed" prompts the question of what exactly we would encounter under such circumstances². The short answer is "will to power", which means that Nietzsche's monism of will to power can aptly be described as "panpsychist"³.

Such a de-anthropomorphised engagement with the natural world could also be called "pure experience", since Nietzsche anticipates the use of this term by William James, and subsequently by the Japanese philosopher Kitarō Nishida, to describe a similar phenomenon⁴. Nishida came to the idea of pure experience from his Zen Buddhist practice, and it turns out to be illuminating, in outlining how Nietzsche effected such a transformation of his experience, to adduce some ideas and techniques from Daoist and Zen Buddhist philosophy. This shows that a way to begin to respond to Nietzsche's exhortation, through the person of Zarathustra, to "Stay true to the earth" is to cleanse the doors of our perception by removing all the egocentric clutter that we have pushed up against them, which gets in the way of seeing what the Buddhists call our "true nature" as well as the nature of the world around us⁵. This involves getting rid of consciousness, which is for Nietzsche "superficial" and ultimately "superfluous", and the language associated with and supportive of such consciousness. This undertaking does not preclude, but rather prompts, a change to a different kind of language, a more poetic discourse, which can conduce to more fulfilling lives – and perhaps even to saving the planet.

I.

As a way of showing the power of collective constructions of the natural world, Nietzsche emphasizes in his earlier work the vast difference between ancient and modern forms. He discusses the relations of the first humans to nature in connection with the origin of the religious cult, "The whole of nature is for those early religionists a sum of activities of conscious and volitional beings, an enormous complex of arbitrariness" (*HAH* I, sec. 111, *KSA* 2:112). This complex lacks any kind of natural causality, but is rather infused with unpredictable wills, magical forces, demons and gods, and inspirited things, all of which might be cajoled or

compelled through affection or sorcery. A life in which "things (nature, tools, possessions of any kind) were animate and ensouled, capable of injuring and evading human purposes," gave rise to an extraordinary feeling of impotence on the part of human agents. Such a lack of power eventually engendered desire for the opposite, for a feeling of power, and this was later granted when Western science formulated laws of nature, which enabled people to exercise unprecedented power over the natural world – with a vengeance – by means of increasingly sophisticated technologies. Modern humans, for Nietzsche, tend to be impressed by the uniformity of the laws of nature, understood as utterly impersonal and devoid of irrational spirits. Nietzsche suggests that this uniformity derives from a change in the notion of the subject, which is now richer and more polyphonic than before, such that the uniformity comes to some extent from a projection of the human desire for order.

Although most early societies practised various kinds of ritual ceremonies and even magic in order to ensure success in the hunt or for agriculture, it was also clearly advantageous for our ancestors, especially when they were hunters and gatherers, to develop an accurate understanding of natural processes. But Nietzsche points out, on grounds that we would today call evolutionary-biological, that looseness in drawing certain kinds of conclusions also had considerable advantages.

Whoever, for example, did not know how to find the 'similar' often enough, in the context of food or of dangerous animals, whoever subsumed too slowly or too carefully, would have a smaller probability of surviving than one who immediately assumed sameness in the case of similarities. (*GS* sec. 111, *KSA* 3:471)

These yellowish berries, for example, are not quite the same colour as those which my gathering companion so greedily devoured yesterday, just an hour before the stomach convulsions set in which killed him with gruesome rapidity. But they are similar enough in appearance for me to think twice about eating them. And that slight rustling sound is not quite the same as the sound I heard the day before, just seconds before the sabre-toothed tiger leapt upon my hunting companion and devoured him. But it sounds close enough, and sufficiently similar, for me to look for the nearest tree to climb, to a height beyond the range of a tiger's upward leap.

In order, then, for certain kinds of practical reasoning to take hold, it was necessary, Nietzsche goes on,

for a long time not to see or feel what is changing about things; beings that did not see precisely had an advantage over those who saw everything 'in flux'. In and for itself every high level of carefulness in drawing conclusions, every tendency towards skepticism in this regard, posed a great danger for life. (*GS* sec. 111, *KSA* 3:472)

To get on more efficiently with the business of living, it is better not to pay too close attention to what is really going on. Nietzsche later draws an analogy with the process of reading. Just as a reader skims quickly over the individual words on a page,

so we scarcely see a tree exactly and completely, with regard to its leaves, branches, colour, shape; it is so much easier for us to phantasize an approximation of a tree. Even in the midst of the strangest experiences, we still do the same thing: we make up the greater part of the experience. (*BGE* sec. 192, *KSA* 5:113f.)

This passage suggests we might be able train ourselves to do what is less easy than phantasizing the bulk of our experience, namely, to "see through" the persistent web of concepts and categories and linguistic labels to what is simply there. Given the survival value of the tendency to "phantasize approximations" of things, the strategy would be to suspend this aspect of what phenomenologists call "the natural attitude" – thereby effecting a switch from what one might call a "life perspective" to a "death perspective"

In an aphorism titled "Midday", Nietzsche writes of how "a strange longing for repose" can overwhelm the soul of one who has reached "the noontide of life",

Upon a meadow hidden among the woods he sees the great god Pan asleep; all the things of nature have fallen asleep with him, an expression of eternity on their faces – so it seems to him. He wants nothing, he frets about nothing, his heart stands still, only his eyes are alive – it is a death with open eyes. Then the man sees much that he has never seen before, and for as far as he can see everything is spun into a net of light and as it were buried in it. (*HAH* II, *WS*, sec. 308, *KSA* 2:690)

Nietzsche calls this condition a means of "procuring the advantages of one who is dead" – a condition not well appreciated, because of what he calls a "fundamentally false evaluation of the *dead* world on the part of the *sentient* world" (*KSA* 9:11 [35]).

The dead world! eternally in motion and without erring, force against force!...It is a *festival* to go from this world across into the dead world...Let us see through this comedy of sentient being and thereby enjoy it! Let us *not* think of the return to the inanimate as a regression! We become quite true, we perfect ourselves. *Death* has to be reinterpreted! We thereby *reconcile* ourselves with what is actual, with the dead world. (KSA 9:11 [70])

For Nietzsche this is also a way of getting beyond the human, all-too-human, "To think oneself away out of humanity, to unlearn desires of all kinds, and to employ the entire abundance of one's powers in *looking*" (KSA 9:11 [35]). And yet what often happens under such conditions (he is in the magical landscape of the Upper Engadine at the time) is that the ancient phantasms return, the immortals reappear, the mythic background comes to the fore,

Et in Arcadia ego. [Even here, perhaps especially here, I – *death* – am.] I looked down, over waves of hills, through fir-trees and spruces grave with age, towards a milky green lake: rocky crags of every kind around me, the ground bright with flowers and grasses...The beauty of it all made one shudder and reduced one to mute worship of the moment of its revelation; involuntarily, as if nothing were more natural, one projected into this pure, clear world of light (in which there was no longing, expecting, or looking forward and back) Greek heroes; this is how Poussin and his pupil must have felt: heroic and idyllic at the same time. (HAH II, *WS*, sec. 295, KSA 2:686f.)

A few years later (in 1881) Nietzsche elaborates these ideas in a series of passages in his notebooks. He praises "the will to know things as they are". For this, he writes, "What is needed is practice in seeing with other eyes: practice in seeing apart from human relations, and thus seeing objectively [*sachlich*]! To cure this enormous delusion of human beings!" (KSA 9:11 [10]). But then he presents a contrasting view,

The task: to *see* things *as they are*! The means: to be able to see with a hundred eyes, from many persons! It was a mistake to emphasize the impersonal and to characterize seeing with the eye of one's neighbor as moral. To see from the viewpoint of *many* neighbors and with purely personal eyes, that is the right thing. (KSA 9:11 [65])

But there need not be a contradiction here, as suggested by a similar move that one finds in the Chinese tradition.

Confucius, for example, advocates the cultivation of reciprocal

perspectives – "putting oneself in the other person's position" or "seeing the situation from the other person's point of view" – as a way of reducing self-centredness and promoting social harmony. Not long after Confucius the classical Daoists thinkers (Zhuangzi in particular) recommend expanding the practice of experiential reciprocity beyond human beings to animals, birds, fishes, and even trees. Zhuangzi famously likens our normal, anthropocentric perspective to the situation of a frog at the bottom of a well who believes he commands a view of the whole world.

Some 1500 years later, in Japan, the Zen master Dōgen similarly encourages going beyond "looking through a bamboo tube at a corner of the sky" by entertaining the perspectives of an even broader range of beings, "dragons, hungry ghosts, celestial beings, mountains, and drops of water"⁶. In a similar vein, the Zen poet Bashō advises poets who wish to write about pine trees or bamboo – advice taken to heart also by many ink and wash (*sumi-e*) painters in Japan – to learn from the things themselves, "About the pine learn from the pine, about bamboo from the bamboo"⁷. A major tenet of East-Asian theories of creativity is that the artist needs to "enter into the spirit" or "resonate with the energies" of the subject of the work.

For Nietzsche this kind of understanding came easily in the Western tradition too, at least in the old days,

During the great prehistoric age of humanity one presupposed spirit everywhere and never thought to honour it as a privilege of the human being...There was thus no shame attached to being descended from animals or trees...and one saw spirit as that which connected us to the natural world rather than as separating us from it. (*D* sec. 31, *KSA* 3:41)

Such a view is still possible in the modern age, at least for someone like Nietzsche, who writes in an aphorism with the title "Nature as Doppelgänger" that "the ultimate joy is found in being able to say of one's physical environment: 'This [nature] is intimate and familiar to me, related by blood, and even more than that'" (*HAH* II, *WS*, sec. 338, *KSA* 2:699)⁸.

But what does it mean to say that the landscape of the Ober-Engadin is related to him "even more than by blood"? For one thing, from the "death perspective" mentioned earlier, from a standpoint beyond biocentrism, he appreciates the contribution to our lives that comes from the inorganic realm,

The inorganic conditions us through and through: water, air, earth, the shape of the ground...How distant and superior is our attitude towards what is dead, the anorganic, and all the while we are three-quarters water and have anorganic minerals in us that perhaps do more for our well- and ill-being than the whole of living society! (*KSA* 9:11 [210], [207])

Nietzsche was fascinated by what he knew, which was quite a lot, about the biology of his day – but he would have been truly delighted, had he been capable of registering it, by the discovery by Carl Benda in 1897 of *mitochondria*⁹. Mitochondria are organelles that reside within all cells in the human body and generate the energy necessary for the cells' activities and the body's life. There are some 10 million billion mitochondria in the body of the average adult, and they constitute almost half its "dry weight" (what remains after all the H₂O is extracted). The remarkable thing about mitochondria is that their DNA is quite different from the DNA of the body's own cells – and quite similar to the DNA of the mitochondria that power the cells of all multicellular organisms, whether animals or plants. One implication of this is that, if I attempt to assert my identity by pointing to my body and saying "This is me", most of what I am pointing to is water, and almost half the rest consists of mitochondria, which are very definitely *not* me. And it is this substantial "not-me" in the form of mitochondrial DNA – "even more than blood" – that relates this body physically to all other living bodies.

For Nietzsche, if one is going to understand the natural world properly, and aside from various human projections on to it, an appropriate research method is called for, "As a researcher into nature, one should get out of one's human corner" and thereby realise that "what *reigns* in nature is...abundance, extravagance...in accordance with the will to power, which is precisely the will to life" (*GS* sec. 349, *KSA* 3:585f.). One factor that allows us to get out of our human corner would be our intimate mitochondrial relationship to the natural world, on the basis of which we can entertain the perspectives of any other life-form. Nietzsche goes on to offer this advice to the natural scientists of his day,

Above all one should not want to divest existence of its *polysemic* [*vieldeutig*] character: that is what *good* taste demands, gentlemen, the taste of reverence in the face of everything that goes beyond your horizon! (*GS* sec. 373, *KSA* 3:625)

And in the next aphorism, "Our new 'Infinite'", he goes on to argue that the human intellect, being ineluctably perspectival in its view of itself and the world, is incapable of determining,

how far the perspectival character of existence reaches or whether it even has any other character, whether an existence that lacks interpretation loses its 'sense' to the point of becoming 'nonsense', whether on the contrary all existence is not essentially existence that *interprets*... (GS sec. 374, KSA 3:626)

Leaving aside the question of whether something other than the intellect may be capable of determining such a thing, Nietzsche continues,

But I do think that today at least we are far from the laughable immodesty of decreeing from our own little corner that it is permissible to have perspectives *only* from this corner. Rather the world has become 'infinite' for us once again: insofar as we cannot dismiss the possibility that *it includes within itself an infinity of interpretations*. (GS sec. 374, KSA 3:627)

Not only multiple interpretations from each human being, but also from all other living and, ultimately, non-living beings.

II.

Another way of looking at this whole issue is in terms of what Nietzsche calls the drives (*die Triebe*). One of his most important statements about the drives makes the remarkable claim, generally ignored by the secondary literature, that the forces driving our psychical life do so with almost no awareness on our part,

However far we may drive our self-knowledge, nothing can be more incomplete than the picture we have of the totality of *drives* that constitute our being. We can scarcely even name the cruder ones: their number and strength, their ebb and flood, their play and counterplay, and above all the laws of their *nourishment* remain quite unknown to us. (D sec. 119, KSA 3:111)

Whether we are awake or dreaming, "our drives do nothing other than interpret nerve-impulses and posit 'causes' for them according to their own needs" (KSA 3:113). Since the patterns of stimulation received by the body during sleep are minimal, the drives have much more freedom of interpretation in their imagining – hence the phantastic nature of the dream. They are more constrained while we are awake and active, since the patterns of neural stimulation then are much denser, but Nietzsche emphasises that "there is no *essential* difference between waking and dreaming" insofar as the drives continue their interpretations during the

day, dreaming and phantasising occasions for their fulfillment.

So, insofar as "all existence interprets", and the drives in particular interpret, and "will to power interprets", so that "interpretation itself [is] a form of will to power" (*KSA* 12:2 [148]), we end up with the picture Nietzsche proposes in *Beyond Good and Evil* section 36 of "the world as will to power and nothing besides". There, on the basis of the assumption that we cannot get to any reality other than the reality of our drives, Nietzsche asks,

Is it not permitted to make the experiment and ask the question whether this given does not *suffice* for understanding on the basis of things like itself the so-called mechanistic (or 'material') world as well?...as a kind of drive-life, in which all organic functions...are still synthetically bound up with each other – as a *preform* of life? (*BGE* sec. 36, *KSA* 5:54f.)

It surely is permitted to make that experiment, and the results will be the realisation that as the drives interpretively project our (waking) world, what they encounter is will to power – as Nietzsche puts it, "'Will' can of course work only on 'will' – and not on 'matter' (not on 'nerves', for example)". Thus the drives encounter "will" in the form of *other interpreting drives* – not only the drives of our fellow human beings, but also those that animate animals, plants, and all other natural phenomena. In other words: panpsychism.

So what is ultimately going on, according to Nietzsche, if we manage to de-anthropomorphise the natural world, and "*naturalise* ourselves", as he puts it, "with pure, new-found, newly redeemed nature" (*GS* sec. 109, *KSA* 3:469)? He declines to elaborate, but it is helpful to consider here the traditional East-Asian practice of "emptying the heart-mind", referred to by the classical Daoist thinkers and followed to this day by Chan and Zen Buddhist practitioners, all of whom are engaged in a similar enterprise.

As one simply sits in the prescribed upright posture, following the inhalations and exhalations of the breathing, over time the internal dialogue – the incessant conversations and commentaries, thoughts and feelings, memories and phantasies, fears and anticipations that occupy our minds for so much of our waking lives – gradually quiets down. What supervenes is a calm openness and clarity. The Daoist and Buddhist thinkers account for this in terms of a falling away of the conceptual frameworks, ingrained thought-patterns, and emotional overlays and underpinnings that usually condition, and so preclude, our immediate

experience of what is going on. Along with this comes a fading of the egocentric self that generates all this psychical clutter. Nietzsche describes this kind of self as,

...a phantom of ego, which for most people has been formed in the heads of those around them and communicated back to them, as a result of which they all live together in a fog of impersonal and semi-personal opinions and arbitrary, almost poetical valuations, each one in the head of the other, and this head in other heads again: a wondrous world of phantasms! This fog of opinions and habits grows and thrives more or less independently of the people it envelops. (*D* sec. 105, *KSA* 3:92f.)

This "general pale fiction" of the ego has internal as well as external origins, insofar as it also derives from the plurality of the drives. A contemporaneous note reads,

The I is not the attitude of one being to several (drives, thoughts, etc.) but the ego is *a plurality of personlike forces*, of which now this one now that one stands in the foreground as ego and regards the others as a subject regards an influential and determining external world...As the drives are in conflict, the feeling of the I is always strongest precisely where the preponderance is. (*KSA* 9:6 [70], emphasis added)

Human reason "believes in the 'I', in the I as being and as substance, and *projects* its belief in the I-substance on to all things – thereby *creating* the concept of 'thing'" (*TI* "'Reason' in Philosophy", sec. 5, *KSA* 6:77). When this belief in the I is undermined, the concept of the "thing" is correspondingly weakened, and what comes to the fore as substance recedes is *relationships*. As we free ourselves from what Nietzsche calls "the error of the I", we come to recognise "the affinities and antagonisms among things, *multiplicities* therefore and their laws"¹⁰. This corresponds perfectly to the idea of "no-self" (*anatman*), which is central to Buddhism and, on the basis of a radically relational ontology, applies equally to the I and to things.

The practice of meditation has one simply sit, waiting for the words to subside and language to fade away altogether. Not something one can do when driven by the instinct for self-preservation, but rather in some temporary disengagement from the business of making a living in society. When this is working, a field opens up for the sitter that can persist through her rising from the cushion and returning to the opposite pole of dynamic activity.

With a diminishing of the thought-flow and a falling silent of language comes a dying down of consciousness, which is for Nietzsche a phenomenon that is "for the most part *superfluous*",

The human being, like every living being, is thinking constantly, but without knowing it; the thinking that becomes *conscious* is only the smallest part, we say, the most superficial and worst part: – for it is only this conscious thinking that takes place in words, in signs that communicate, whereby the origin of consciousness itself is revealed. In short, the development of language and the development of consciousness ...go hand in hand...Our thoughts are continuously generalised by the character of consciousness...and translated back into the perspective of the herd...An increase in consciousness is thus a danger; and whoever lives among the conscious Europeans knows that it is even an illness. (*GS* sec. 354, *KSA* 3:592f.)

A less sick way to live, then, would be to let the drives that give rise to our everyday consciousness and its thinking in words become quiescent, no longer interpreting the situation from their own perspectives, and to thereby allow what is going on beneath thinking to flow through the body in silence, without commentary. What is going on is basically drives – not exfoliating into consciousness or commenting on the text of experience, not the egocentric drives that sustain the illusion of the I – but now only the more ancient, deeper drives that through millennia of adaptation have kept the human body attuned to its physical environment. Paradoxically, it is by putting ourselves in a situation where we do not need to be concerned with preserving ourselves that we can get to a condition in which it is only those natural, environment-related and life-preserving drives that are operative. Under such conditions, one's responses to the world are naturally spontaneous, and one's actions stem not from the narrow confines of the small self, but from the forces of heaven and earth as they operate through the well-trained body. One thinks of Nietzsche's praise of Goethe in *Twilight of the Idols*,

Goethe conceived of a strong, highly cultured human being, adept in a range of physical skills, self-controlled and with reverence for himself, who can dare to grant himself the full range and richness of naturalness, and who is strong enough for this freedom. (*TI*, "Expeditions of an Untimely Man", sec. 49, *KSA* 6:151)

And whatever thoughts may come when the chatter of consciousness has quietened down will then be genuinely results of Nietzsche's famous "*Es denkt*" (*BGE* sec. 17, *KSA* 5:31) rather than opinions of the egocentric self.

But, since Nietzsche did not engage in any formal meditation practice, how did he arrive at such Buddhist ideas and experiences? By walking – or, as he often puts it, *marching* – six to eight hours a day. When he was in the Engadin, and hiking the paths around Sils-Maria, he kept to the well-trodden paths, avoiding dangerous terrain in which he would have to slow down and pay close attention to where he was putting his feet. (Several of his letters express gratitude for the successful efforts of the local authorities to keep the paths around the town smooth and even and clear of obstructions, so that he could march along them without fear of stumbling.) By keeping to ways that were safe and secure – whether around Sils-Maria, or among the lanes of Venice or the streets of Genoa – Nietzsche was able to practise a vigorous form of walking meditation (corresponding to the slower *kinhin* in the Zen tradition) that allowed him to hear the "inner voices" of his thoughts rather than the chatter of his I¹. No wonder he reports that his creativity was always at its highest when the muscles were working at their most supple pitch, such that the body is experienced not as recalcitrant matter but as energetic flow (*EH*, "Why I Write such Good Books", "Thus Spoke Zarathustra", sec. 4, *KSA* 6:341).

To conclude with a return to the things of nature: how are things, then, when the body-flow is fully underway? Borrowing from the lyrical language of *Zarathustra*: Redeemed from their bondage under Purpose, the things of nature dance on the feet of Chance, and above each one: the Heaven Accident, the Heaven Innocence, the Heaven Contingency, the Heaven Exuberance. Zarathustra's gnarled tree at midday, wound around by the love of the vine. The world become perfect and we ourselves falling – Still! – into the well of eternity, up into the abyss of the heavens, from whence soul falls as dew, baptising all things in the vast transformative process of earthly becoming.

Notes

¹ From a concern to bring out certain nuances from the original, I have used my own translations throughout.

² For a discussion of these themes, see my essay "Nature and the Human Redivivized: Mahāyāna Buddhist Themes in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*", in John Lippitt and James Urpeth (eds.), *Nietzsche and the Divine*. Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2000, 181-99.

³ David Skrbina's all-too-brief presentation of Nietzsche as a panpsychist in his comprehensive study *Panpsychism in the West*. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 2005, 137-39, aptly adduces the thesis of "the world as will to power and nothing besides" in *BGE* sec. 36, but he fails to mention the central role played by "life as

will to power" in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, for which see, especially, Part II, "On Self-Overcoming", and my remarks in the introduction to *TSZ*, xx-xxii.

⁴ See David Dilworth, "The Initial Formulations of 'Pure Experience' in Nishida Kitarō and William James", *Monumenta Nipponica* 24, 1969, 93-111, and Joel W. Krueger, "The Varieties of Pure Experience: William James and Kitarō Nishida on Consciousness and Embodiment", *William James Studies* 1/1, 2006. In his discussion of a new notion of the sublime in the fifth book of *Dawn of Morning*, Keith Ansell-Pearson characterises Nietzsche's task in that book as "liberating us from our human inheritance and looking at everything with searching eyes, new eyes", by way of pursuing "pure seeing" with a "pure, purifying eye", "On the Sublime in Nietzsche's *Dawn*", *Pli: The Warwick Journal of Philosophy* 20, 2009, 165-94, 187 and 191.

⁵ "I beseech you, my brothers, stay true to the earth and do not believe those who talk of over-earthly hopes!...Once sacrilege against God was the greatest sacrilege, but God died, and thereby the sacrilegious died too. Sacrilege against the earth is now the most terrible thing...!" *TZ*, Prologue sec. 3. For an elaboration of this theme see my essay "Staying Loyal to the Earth: Nietzsche as an Ecological Thinker", in John Lippitt (ed.), *Nietzsche's Futures*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998, 167-88.

⁶ Dōgen, Shōbōgenzō, "Mountains and Waters as Sutras" sec. 4, in William Edelglass and Jay L. Garfield (eds.), *Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, 83-92.

⁷ As recounted by a disciple of Bashō's, Hattori Dohō; cited in Toshihiko and Toyo Izutsu, *The Theory of Beauty in the Classical Aesthetics of Japan*. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1981, 162-63.

⁸ See also *WS*, secs 14, 17, 51, 57, 115, 138, 176, 205, 295, 308, 332.

⁹ See Nick Lane, *Power, Sex, Suicide: Mitochondria and the Meaning of Life*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, 13. Lane notes that the importance of these tiny granules within the living cell as "the fundamental particles of life" was recognised by the German Richard Altmann in 1886, though he called them "bioblasts". The precise biological function of mitochondria was not determined until 1949, when they were proved to be the site of the living cell's respiratory enzymes.

¹⁰ *KSA* 9:11 [21], 450. Compare the following notes, which make similar points:

The I contains a number of different beings. (*KSA* 10:4 [189], 165)

Within the human being reside spirits as numerous as the creatures of the sea: they fight with each other for the spirit 'I'. (*KSA* 10:4 [207], 169)

the cleverness of my whole organism, of which my conscious I is merely a tool. (*KSA* 11:34 [46], 433)

I regard the I itself as a thought-construct, like 'matter', 'thing', 'substance', 'individual', 'purpose', 'number': merely as a regulative fiction, then, with the help of which some kind of constancy [*Beständigkeit*], and therefore

'knowability', is made up and transposed into a world of becoming. (*KSA* 11:35 [35], 526)

¹¹ "I am in the Upper Engadine again, for the third time, and again I feel that here and nowhere else is my proper home and place of incubation. Ah, how much everything lies hidden in me still, and wants to become word and form! Only here is it quiet and high and lonely enough for me to be able to perceive my innermost voices!", Letter to Carl von Gersdorff, no. 427, end of June, 1883, *KSB* 6:386.